

THE
ECLECTIC REVIEW

FOR MAY, 1847.

- ART. I.—1. *Commentary upon the Psalms.* By E. W. Hengstenberg, Doctor and Professor of Theology in Berlin. Translated by the Rev. P. Fairbairn and the Rev J. Thomson. Two volumes: being Volumes First and Second of Clark's Foreign Theological Library. Edinburgh, 1846.
2. *A Literal Translation of the Book of Psalms, intended to illustrate their Moral and Poetical Structure: to which are added Dissertations on the word Selah, &c.* By the Rev. John Jebb, Rector of Peterstow. Two volumes. London: Longman, 1846.
3. *The Psalms in Hebrew, with a Critical, Exegetical and Philological Commentary.* By the Rev. George Phillips, B.D., Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Cambridge. Two volumes. London: John W. Parker, 1846.

No book of scripture has been held in higher or more general estimation than the Psalms, none has been more frequently and extensively employed in divine service, popular exposition, or private meditation. We do not wonder at this wide and general attachment to the songs of Sion, for the diction of poetry forms a language universal in its adaptations, and ever welcome in its tones; and especially when sanctified and inspired as in the Psalter, it speaks to all experience and awakes the susceptibilities of the Holy Catholic Church. Yet, perhaps, there is no portion of the Bible which has been so variously interpreted, or which has been so rudely and wantonly handled by its professed admirers and expounders. The lyrics of the sweet singers of Israel have been profaned by crude and vain speculations, equally opposed to enlightened piety and sound erudition. On the one hand, they have been so degraded and secularised as to

be viewed and described as mere odes of war, victory, or peace: hymns of friendship, gratitude, or patriotism, sung by the priesthood round the altar, with the accompaniment of timbrel, harp, or organ. On the other hand, they have been so spiritualised by a morbid pietism, and their mystic senses have been so multiplied by a polydynamic exegesis, that all questions of their age and authorship, their original composition and use, their historical allusions, oriental spirit, and poetic forms, have been contemptuously set aside; as springing from that bondage which belongs to 'the oldness of the letter,' and totally foreign to that freedom and superiority which are always associated with 'newness of spirit.' What a wide distance stretches between Horsley and Hitzig, Mudge and Mendelsohn, Venema and De Wette, not merely in scholarship, but in the development and application of hermeneutical principles in their respective commentaries on the Hebrew Anthology! But surely the Psalms of David are not, in themselves, either so difficult of apprehension, or so intricate in their style, as to form any excuse for such confused and fantastic aberrations. For these relics of the Hebrew muse are simple in structure, exquisite in language, and striking in imagery. They are rich in the beautiful creations of impassioned genius, and teeming with all the contagious ardour of eastern minstrelsy. They are animated, at the same time, with the breathings of a piety which fits the humblest of saints, and would not dishonour the loftiest of seraphs. They present us with the choice and endeared material of our devotional exercises; and are but the earthly version of those rapturous and eternal melodies which delight and occupy the inhabitants of heaven. The various pieces which form our 'Book of Psalms' whether they be lyrical or didactic, jubilant or elegiac, retrospective or prophetic; whether they are adapted to personal repetition, domestic worship, or ecclesiastical rehearsal, are of their own nature plain and practical; and though their poetical texture creates occasional obscurity, they are less enveloped in difficulty than many sections of symbolical prediction. True, indeed, he who attempts to interpret them must be qualified for his work—the work of analysing poetry, religious poetry, in the ancient tongue of a foreign people, the greater part of whose literature and language has ceased to exist. We need thus be at no loss to detail the qualifications of a successful expounder of the Psalms. The union of these preparatory gifts has seldom been possessed by one individual; the want of any of them can only embarrass and mislead, while the commentary so produced is defective and unshapen. The plectrum must strike in its place and turn, every cord of David's harp, ere the thrilling harmonies of the 'New Song' be evolved.

It need scarcely be laid down as a first principle, that he who would translate and interpret the Psalms must be well skilled in the Hebrew language. We do not refer to such a knowledge of Hebrew as busies itself with a common grammatical praxis, and whose small prattle about Piel and Hithpaël, and status constructus, and hiemantic derivation, exhausts all its Hebrew philology. Such acquisitions in Hebrew are easily acquired and cheaply expended. A higher acquaintance with the tongue of the bards of Judah is demanded, such an acquaintance as from long and laborious familiarity passes beyond the forms and penetrates into the soul of their language. Too many self-named expositors remain in the outer court of the Gentiles, and catch but a distant and passing glimpse of the sacred mysteries. To plod one's weary way with a grammar and lexicon brings no pleasure, and is very far from that intuitive sensibility which has added to the task of acquiring a language, the unspeakable pleasure of feeling the beauties of its diction, and of comprehending its anomalies, through sympathy with its spirit. When we are thus initiated into oriental modes of thought and feeling, the language which is their natural vehicle is instinctively understood, its technicalities can be instantly unravelled, and its poetical idioms and ellipses safely and promptly analysed. Might we not by the application of this righteous test disfranchise, and declare unqualified, one half of those who have written versions of the Psalms, or notes and scholia upon them. Some of these authors give us what they term a root—a word having no existence but in some paltry lexicon they have consulted, or, perhaps, by printing a triliteral vocable, they show their dexterity in creating a stem-word for the occasion. Others, glorying in the supposed uncertainty which attaches to Hebrew terms, enumerate a score of meanings, and yet, not finding one to suit their purpose, add one other from some trite analogy. Some can give us glibly and correctly, person and number, tense and mood, of separate words in such variety as might suffice for the pages of a chrestomathy, but fail to elicit the meanings of the terms in their clauses and connection; while others twist and pervert the text with all manner of emendations so as to destroy its integrity, and rob it of its inspired authority. To multiply examples of the 'baser sort' referred to would require a space disproportionate to its value.

Names of higher note are no exception in some cases to our remarks. We might point to many places in which even Calvin has failed from want of thorough acquaintance with Hebrew. How often has Horsley started aside like a deceitful bow from radical defect in his Hebrew acquirements. His work on the Psalms is to us the least satisfactory of all his treatises. His

Hutchinsonian whims are continually beguiling him into some fantasy; his adherence to the grammatical system of Masclef led to a superficial philology: his unwarranted tampering with the text renders many of his peculiar views unsound and suspicious; while his constitutional inclination to paradox and startling opinion, unconsciously prompted him to defend versions and interpretations in complete opposition to grammatical accuracy, or lexical definition, and in utter defiance of scope and connection, Chaldee targums, Jewish tradition, or Christian information. Horsley's general character, as a biblical scholar, has alone given any name or weight to his exposition of the Psalms; and his son, the editor of the posthumous volumes proved himself a very incompetent judge, when he pronounced them the most learned and momentous of his father's productions. Mr. Jebb, the author of one of the works before us, evidently looks up to Bishop Horsley with great admiration, and endeavours to walk in his steps. But we cannot compliment him on his knowledge of Hebrew, at least he has not displayed it, nor do we imagine that he possesses it. In defence of this opinion we have but to say, that he is of the school of Parkhurst, that he adores this antiquated lexicographer, and solemnly declares, 'that his dictionary is at least equal in real learning to the popular work of Gesenius, and far superior to it in philological science and philosophical arrangement.' Our readers, who are versant with the progress of Hebrew philology, will need no farther criticism on the work of a man so far 'beside himself' as to pronounce such a judgment on the comparative merits of Parkhurst and Gesenius. His translation of the Psalms has been made from such a recipe as this. — Take the English version of the Psalms, and compare it with the Hebrew in the position of the words; arrange this new English version as nearly as possible after the order of the Hebrew; turn up Parkhurst for a few of the leading words,—give them a novel rendering, and impart to them an air of solemn mystery by prefixing an asterisk, then divide off the translation when finished into lines of nearly equal length to show that you are ignorant of the fact of Lowth's dissertations on Parallelism. The work is done, as Mr. Jebb has performed it. Does the reader wish a specimen of a few of his notes? For example, his version reads, 'God hath forgotten;' the corresponding note is, Heb. 'hath forgotten God.' His translation is, 'the foolish shall not stand before thine eyes,' to which the annotation is, Heb. 'shall not stand the foolish.' His reading is 'out of many waters;' but he appends the learned scholium, Heb. 'waters many;' and there is not a page of his translation which is not copiously marked by such profound erudition, worthy, indeed, of a pupil of Park-

hurst. Nay, there are very few notes added to his version which even attempt a higher style of criticism. And this is the man who takes Bishop Marsh to task for having introduced Michaelis to the English public,—who scowls upon German scholars, and is not ashamed to confess in reference to them, ‘I should neither advantage my own mind, nor the cause of sound theology and criticism, by making use of them.’ Had he only translated Ewald, or De Wette, he would have done valuable service to the church, whereas the good to be achieved by his own work will be chiefly confined to those who have earned a remuneration in its printing and publication. The truth is, Mr. Jebb is not without good sense, as many remarks in his preface abundantly testify, but his error is, that he can see nothing praiseworthy, or profitable, out of the pale of the Church of England, beyond its ‘venerable cathedrals and glorious universities;’ and these, according to him, are ‘the strongholds of godliness, good learning, sound Christian doctrine, and holy living.’ Wonderful faith! Are not the cathedral towns of England proverbial as haunts of dissipation? At which of the ‘glorious universities’ did Mr. Jebb receive his biblical instructions and learning? ‘Sound Christian doctrine and holy living!’ Has he never heard of Puseyism, or is he ignorant of the profanity and dissipation of the gownsmen of Oxford? Mr. Jebb’s second volume, to which, perhaps, he would appeal in proof of his Hebrew acquirements, does not by any of its dissertations alter our expressed opinions. It has more pretension than his first, it is composed in a loftier tone, and it assumes a higher authority. The largest dissertation in it is an essay on the term *Selah*, professing to establish some new and momentous theory. *Selah*, according to Mr. Jebb, is a part of the inspired text, and after years of incessant labour and investigation, his erudition in a happy moment discovered its use. That use is one, at the same time, which hundreds had seen before him; a use, moreover, which is only partial, for the *Selah*, or music-pause, does not, as he affirms, always indicate some alteration or transition in the thought or construction of the psalm. Mr. Jebb’s essays on the titles of the Psalms are feeble, though well meant; his ideas on the connections of the various odes are often visionary and fanciful, while his fond abuse of the parallelism proves his ignorance of its real nature and purpose. His notions of it often resemble Bishop Jebb’s applications of it to the text of the New Testament—applications neither so successful, or happy, as they would be, if employed in measuring the rhetorical cadences of Samuel Johnson or T. B. Macaulay.

The work of Mr. Phillips, also a clergyman of the Church of

England, is of a very different character. Mr. Phillips is an excellent scholar, and proves himself skilled in the cognate languages. Whatever be the subject he discusses, he writes with precision and power. His volumes are beautifully printed both in the English and Eastern tongues. The entire text of the original Psalms is given in a bold symmetrical character. Mr. Phillips is not ashamed to own his obligations to continental scholarship, and the names of the brightest German scholars adorn his pages. The fault of the book is, that it is too elementary—that too much of it is occupied with the explanation of such etymological, or syntactic principles as every one should have mastered ere he set himself to read and analyse the Hebrew Psalms. It is, however, but just to Mr. Phillips to add, that he avows it as one of his main objects in this Commentary, ‘to render it in some degree useful to those who possess little or no acquaintance with the Hebrew language.’ We more than question the propriety of such a step. What kind of a book would an author compose who set himself to write a commentary on the ‘Principia,’ for the use of those who are almost ignorant of mathematics? Much valuable space is, therefore, taken up in Mr. Phillips’s publication with the detail of mere technicalities and minutiae, which ought to have been occupied with exegetical development, critical investigation, or doctrinal discussion. The general description of the tenor and style of thought in every Psalm is well given, but we lack the higher criticism, which, rising above verbal remark, elicits the author’s ideas in their order, beauty, and power, and brings to view their connection and dependence by a simple and masterly exegesis, like that exemplified so often in the pages of Hengstenberg.

The work of the last named commentator on the Psalms is yet incomplete, and his introductory dissertations on their poetry, christology, and literature, is not yet published. The author now enjoys an European reputation, and is universally admitted to be one of the few consummate Hebrew scholars of the age. He possesses all the qualities which distinguish German literati, with few of their constitutional vices and defects. His mind is essentially of a practical cast. He unites English clearness to Teutonic ingenuity. No haziness or dubiety rests in his paragraphs. He never wades among difficulties or conflicting opinions with feeble step or uncertain aim ; but with noble honesty and chivalrous resolution he indicates his intended path, and rapidly frees himself from every incumbrance. You feel, in reading his exposition, that you are in the hands of a man of uncommon energy, as well as unwonted erudition—of a man who never scruples to discover his purpose, nor falters in his efforts to secure it. You admire his boldness when you may

lament his indiscretion, or smile at his failure. Perhaps this ardour of temper occasionally warms into vehemence. Such intrepidity in the midst of formidable antagonists, which, springing from the consciousness of invincible powers, casts aside all mildness of tone and gentleness of epithet—tramples where it has conquered, and still defies where it has been repulsed—has its origin not only in some individual peculiarity, but has been confirmed and augmented in that incessant warfare with neology, in all its forms, which Hengstenberg has maintained from the period of his entrance upon public life. And he has some right to vindicate an equality with all his contemporaries; he is not a whit behind the chiefest of them—though, certainly, his remarks are often arrogant, and sometimes unjust; for in denying one quality to an opponent, he detracts from all his acquirements, and leaves no talent to console him—no covering to conceal his poverty. The hostility of Gesenius towards him was well known, and Hengstenberg has repaid it with interest by the exaltation of Ewald, the great rival of Gesenius, on every possible occasion. Though he would laugh outright at Parkhurst, the god of Mr. Jebb's literary homage, yet we believe his opinion of Gesenius would almost coincide with that of our friend, the rector of Peterstow.

The Hebrew learning of Hengstenberg is brought out with peculiar prominence and advantage in his exposition of the Psalms. How rapidly he solves intricate formulæ! with what ease he summons to his assistance whatever auxiliary he requires! with what vigour he clears his way to a simple and consistent interpretation! If he err, it is not from ignorance. Conceit may mislead him, the love of singularity does now and then beguile him, and he loses time in flaying a foe when he might have allowed his corpse to rest in peace. In respect of its Hebrew scholarship, we place his work first among Commentaries on the Hebrew Psalms. It is more acute than Venema; more consistent than De Wette or Hitzig; more elaborate than Koester or Paulus; more sober than Mendelsohn or the Rabbis; and a more complete specimen of Hebrew exegesis than is afforded by the treatises of Ewald or Tholuck. We have thus tested the writers before us by one qualification. We may proceed to try them by a second.

Another qualification for the interpretation of the Psalms is the possession of such taste and temperament as shall lead the exeget to relish, appreciate, and comprehend the beauties and peculiarities of Hebrew poetry. He who analyses prose may fail to give a correct sense to poetry; his nature and habits may not qualify him for such a delicate task. And poetry of the lyrical order is peculiar in its construction. It resembles Aaron's rod, that budded, and blossomed, and brought forth almonds; so that, in order fully to enjoy it, we must inhale the fragrance and

admire the foliage while we taste the fruit. The genius of oriental poetry does not confine itself by those critical laws which have been promulgated under colder skies ; but it will not offend the taste of him who transports himself to the cliffs of Lebanon, whence he may survey the glory of Carmel and the vegetation of Sharon, and the white skiff on the waters of Tiberias ; where he may gaze on the majesty of the unclouded heaven, and feast his vision with the fields, vineyards, and pastures that smiled in luxuriance throughout 'thy land, O Immanuel.' The interpreter must have a kindred feeling with the bard, conscious that his spirit thrills in tremulous response to the music and imagery of the hymns of Sion. Not a few have failed to elicit the power, elegance, and dignity of many portions of the Book of Psalms from want of this natural talent. They have not possessed tact and æsthetical discrimination. They are too apt to crawl in literality, forgetful of the excitement and fervour which belong to the sacred minstrel.

Mr. Jebb evidently imagines that he is blessed with no little share of poetical taste and sensibility, and he has, in proof, given us a pretty long chapter on the poetical imagery of the Psalms, with another on the metrical construction of Hebrew verse. But the whole is juvenile, and consists for the most part of some vague comparisons between portions of Hebrew and classic poetry. Mr. Jebb writes A.M. after his name, and we may therefore give him credit for knowing a little of Æschylus and Homer, but the pointless and diffuse comparisons he has made are altogether lost. Neither can he support his theory that the architype of the Greek chorus, and many of the best thoughts in the Greek tragedians, are to be traced to the Psalms. He has also peculiar favourites among occidental poets. He is in raptures with Dyer ; and the more so, because it was 'his good fortune to have escaped the hackneyed recitation of Grongar Hill in his youth.' Southey is to him 'the greatest and most religious poet of the age.' He seems quite at home in criticising the music of 'our cathedrals,' and of the choirs of the Queen's chapel, and has no doubt of its resemblance to the Jewish orchestra. Nay, he imagines that by a single brief note he has settled the whole Wolfian theory on the nature of the Homeric poems. As he is ignorant both of the vast quantity and clever quality of German literature on this subject, he thinks that the dispute 'has not been sufficiently expanded.' He seems yet to have to learn that the power of quoting a few very fine similes from Shakspeare, Milton, and the Greek poets, and setting these by the side of similar passages from the Hebrew bards, is an easy thing—a kind of thing that may be found to satiety in Lowth's *Prelections*, or taught by Blair's *Lectures*—but something very far below that tact and penetration which

belong to such writers as Eichhorn, Herder, and De Wette—writers who can analyse the idea without robbing it of its warmth and life, and bring the image into prominence without defacing its beauty or marring its proportion, can unfold the painted glory of the flower without withering its bloom or spoiling its fragrance.

Mr. Phillips does not make any unnecessary pretensions, nor does he generally fail. He does not fall into such blunders as those which occasionally tempted Calvin and Horsley. Hengstenberg is not devoid of the poetic temperament, though certainly he is inclined to judge of a figure too much by the rules of logic and syntax; yet, like all his countrymen, he can be a tasteful critic, for in his youth he had dwelt in '*Cloudland*,' and revelled amidst the scenery which a German fancy alone can create and enjoy. In this department of qualification, he is not only equalled but far surpassed by De Wette—a man of most exquisite and delicate taste. Yet his excellent judgment preserves him from any notorious eccentricities. He can write not the less correctly about Hebrew poetry, that he writes without rapture, at least without cant.

A third and very important preparative for the right interpretations of the Psalms, is the possession of a spirit of sincere and candid piety. This is a primary qualification. No real or lasting advance in hermeneutical science can be gained without it. The Bible is a religious book, and can only be fully understood by religious men—by such as have the mind and spirit of its divine Author. The Psalms are 'an epitome of the Bible for the purposes of devotion,' and devotion is the heart of religion. The Psalms treat not of doctrine—are not meant to enforce morals or persuade to the exercise of the virtues. They are the language of devout experience, with which no one can sympathise who is not 'created anew.' If the enjoyment of a pious spirit is necessary to the complete understanding of other parts of scripture, much more is it indispensable in these odes, which form a subjective illustration of the power, the joy, the humility, the trials, the hopes, and the destiny of a child of God. Without a portion of similar experience, the words of the psalmist will be to the critic an unknown tongue—a dialect not found in books—for it is engraven only on 'the fleshly tables of the heart.' How can he comprehend the meaning of a tongue he has never learned,—the spirit of a 'song which no man knoweth' by the mere use and application of grammar and lexicon? The greater portion of the word of God is objective in its character; the Psalms are entirely subjective. The religion portrayed in them is not that of a system, but that of the life—religion as it lives in the consciousness of the saint, clothed in his own mental peculiarities, and indicating both the stage of his own spiritual

advancement and the path by which, through divine grace, he has reached it. And while we are lingering on this part of our subject, it would be culpable not to allude for a moment to the work of Bishop Horne. His only qualification to expound the Psalms lay in his possession of a deep and powerful piety. We almost forget the incorrectness of his interpretations in the beauty of his remarks; and are charmed by that sanctity and elevation which ennoble his reflections. His delicious preface woos us again and again to its 'nectared sweets.' His own spirit at length caught inspiration from the heavenly muse; and who can forget, that has once read it, his beautiful record of his studies on the Psalter.—Commentary on the Psalms. Introduction, p. xxiv.

Mr. Jebb makes no secret of his piety, yet we do not exactly know what it is. We can tell what it should be, and we hope it is not the faith which has flourished of late at one of the 'glorious universities.' He has a high veneration 'for the fathers of our own church,' for that 'church is the stronghold of Catholicity; though, in these days, the ancient foundations of temporal policy, of religion and morals, are shaken on every side.' His religion lies greatly in his churchism. Principles he does not relish are branded not for their folly, but as 'nearly allied to puritanism.' He utters no word against Puseyism, but writes vaguely and loosely about degeneracy. He complains of the want of a 'systematic devotion;' that is, as we understand, a want of due attention to the prayers, songs, scriptures, and responses of a liturgy. Might he not complain of the utter dishonesty of thousands who subscribe a Calvinistic creed, and yet preach Arminian tenets or worse? Might he not, in the phraseology of the Psalter, declare of such, 'all men are liars?' Yet Mr. Jebb obtrudes upon us no heterodox sentiment. We hope he is a good man, possessing somewhat of the psalmist's experience, and so fitted to interpret his thoughts; only his piety is 'cabined and confined' by the shell of his churchism; while true exegesis knows no sect, and its secrets are monopolised by no party in Christendom. We must not draw an evil augury from Mr. Jebb's declaring Southey 'the most religious poet of this age.' Yet what does he think of the religion that could write the 'Vision of Judgment?' Whether it or its fearful parody be the more impious, it is difficult to tell. The late Edward Irving well said of both productions and their authors,—'with the one, blasphemy is virtue, when it makes for loyalty; with the other, blasphemy is the food and spice of jest making.'

Mr. Phillips appears to be a man of simple, unaffected piety, and he earnestly prays that his book 'may contribute, by God's blessing, to the increase of faith and piety among his people,

and so to the glory of his holy name.' We cannot but transcribe the modest conclusion of the preface:—'and now that I am about to retire from academic life to engage in another department of theological labour, I feel much satisfaction that, in submitting these volumes to the public, I am enabled to render to it some account of the manner in which I have employed those opportunities for literary pursuits, through the kind providence of God and the munificence of pious foundresses of a college, I have long enjoyed.' It would be well if every fellow and tutor had the courtesy and grace so to acknowledge his responsibility, and give an account of his stewardship, in so laudable a shape as these two volumes of scholarly criticism. At the same time, a few expressions of piety mingled with the general train of the exposition would have been both natural and pleasing.

The fame of Hengstenberg's religion is co-extensive with that of his scholarship. His enemies have thrust him into notoriety, as the great leader and shield of the most orthodox party in Germany. His stern and uncompromising hostility to every form and shade of neology—to the followers of Schleiermacher as well as those of Strauss, as continually expressed in his own magazine and in all his writings, have made him universally known and generally hated. Hengstenberg's intolerance has passed into a proverb. The very servant girls of Berlin, as Tholuck once informed us, have his name in their mouth as a by-word. Wherever evangelical religion is contemned, Hengstenberg is maltreated. Few at his period of life have borne so much of the reproach of the cross, or borne it so well. The magnates of Berlin attacked him lately, and prayed the king for his removal. Continued persecution has almost worn out his frame. We expected to have heard him in his own class room during the spring of last year, but he was confined; the remark of his physician being,—'though his spirit was firm, the body was not of equally durable materials.' We cannot in all cases free him from blame. We cannot say that he has not given unnecessary provocation by the freedom and harshness of his remarks; yet we cannot but applaud his late warfare against the so-called liberal party, who virtually destroy the truth and authority of the Old Testament, and whose notions of inspiration are so low, that their distinctive adage is,—the word of God is in the Bible, but the Bible is not in the word of God. Hengstenberg predicts the kind of opposition which the piety of his Commentary on the Psalms will provoke. But 'none of these things move him.' 'The author foresees that the spiritual element that pervades the Commentary will give rise to many objections. The Psalms are expressive of holy feeling, which can be only understood by those who have become alive to such feeling; so that

to bring out this is quite properly the purpose of the expositor.' In this spirit is the Commentary executed. The dry bones of criticism live under the vivifying influence of religious sympathy.

The last qualification on the part of an expositor of the Psalms to which we shall allude, is the knowledge of correct hermeneutical principles. This qualification implies the possession of those attainments, the nature and uses of which we have faintly sketched. It presupposes an accurate and extensive knowledge of Hebrew, a correct taste in Hebrew poetry, and the cultivation of a pious spirit. The mere possession of this threefold attainment will not, of itself, create good exposition, apart from a thorough comprehension of those great laws of interpretation which are founded in universal language and experience, and especially of that peculiar province of them which relates to the exposition of symbols and prophecy. Did the Psalms refer to individual experience or ecclesiastical privilege or persecution, the interpretation of them would be comparatively easy, and the application of their sentiments to other persons and modern times would admit of little dispute. The dispensations of God to his church, and the exercises of his people under them are similar in every age, for 'whatever things were written aforetime, were written for our learning.' An inspired history becomes a species of prediction, imparting foresight and faith in the hour of discipline. But the Psalms contain a prophetic element, strictly so called, an element of actual prediction in reference to the person and work of Messiah. The questions that perplex critics then are: how far such an element pervades them; are they all predictions; if not, how many of them point to the great hope of Israel; and in those acknowledged to refer to David's great Son, is there only a simple and plain prophecy, or is there a double sense; and does the Psalm admit of two applications, a nearer and a literal, with a more remote and spiritual meaning? Here opinions vary and verge into extremes. Some find Messiah in every Psalm, others find him in few, a section of modern exegets discover him in none. The New Testament is an infallible guide, and whatever may be said of some of its references to the Old Testament—that they are mere allusions or accommodations—it appears to us very plain, that many portions of the Psalms are quoted by the Lord and his apostles as prophetic oracles directly fulfilled in the life and death and ascension of Jesus of Nazareth. Are we then warranted to apply no Psalms to Christ save such as are quoted in the Christian scriptures? If such a limitation be an error, it is an error on the safe side. At the same time it would be rash to affirm, that every Messianic Psalm has been quoted, or referred to, by the writers of the New Testament. While, then, we

take the New Testament as our guide, may we not regard as prophetic some other Psalms similar in structure, language, and spirit, to those which are quoted by inspired authority as oracles bearing witness to the incarnate Redeemer? This rule may be deemed lax and uncertain, yet surely the prudent use of it might be of invaluable assistance. But with the theory of a double sense, as it generally governs the interpretation of the Psalms, we have no patience. We have seen it map out a Psalm in the most fantastic style, declaring this verse to refer to the literal David because it cannot apply to the mystical David, and that verse to refer to the mystical David because it cannot be applied to the literal David. Who, in such a case, is to be the judge? The principle of separation is quite arbitrary. What one affirms from his own taste to be primary, another from a similar consciousness may assert to be spiritual and secondary. It would need something like inspiration to warrant us in making these distinctions which we are reprobating. Surely no one will demur to the canon which teaches, that if one portion of a Psalm refer to Christ every other does—if not, by what chymical criticism are we to disengage the non-Messianic parts. We believe, too, that the really Messianic Psalms have but one sense. The imagery may be borrowed from Jewish scenes, or the personal history of the poet, yet it has only one signification—Christ, and he alone, being the subject. Is it not so in the second Psalm, the forty-fifth, and the hundred and tenth, as well as others? Our theory is simple, and it has the virtual concurrence of the authors whose works are under review.

Mr. Jebb has, in his introduction, some judicious remarks on this and analogous subjects. He proposes to adhere to the literal sense, while, he adds, the allegorical sense will be given its due weight. We know not what he can mean by an allegorical sense. We know what the sense of an allegory is, and we know what is meant by its application. The phrase 'allegorical sense' does, however, puzzle us. Mr. Jebb admits, that in many cases the literal sense is identical with the prophetic sense. But we apprehend that he has not a clear and distinct view of these guiding principles, for in the whole course of his exposition he violates them without remorse. His grasp of hermeneutical principles is not very distinct or comprehensive, so he is easily induced to quit them. His statement of them is by no means clear, and the memory of what he had written seldom troubles him. He has not, indeed, given us a regular commentary, but the majority of the Psalms are briefly descanted on in his dissertations; and in these many unfounded and mystical theories are broached. Speaking of the

titles of some of the Psalms, he says, 'Aijaleth he-shahar means a harp of Aijalon, and Gittith of Gath, as we now speak of a German flute, or Cremona violin.' Alluding to the twenty-third Psalm, he says, 'the valley of the shadow of death announces our Lord's descent into hell, and the rest in the house of God, to the end of his days, his future glorification.' Again, he tells us, that the words 'Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption,' while 'literally fulfilled in our Lord, are yet imperfectly applicable to the prophet that uttered them.' Mr. Jebb forgets in this last illustration the very principle for which he feebly contends, and contradicts the very argument which the apostle founds upon the words; for the apostle affirms, that in no sense can they be applicable to David who 'was laid with his fathers and saw corruption.' Such mischief results from the notion of a double sense, and from overlooking the subjective nature of the Messianic prophecies found in the Psalms.

The views of Mr. Phillips on this, as on other subjects, are clear and distinct. He indicates the path he means to pursue with great plainness and decision; and, generally, he adheres to it with vigorous resolution. He says justly, in speaking of former works on the Psalms, 'that the public has been favoured with numerous translations. Some of them have been accompanied with critical notes on certain passages, made, chiefly, for defending the particular translations which their authors preferred.' This critique is very true; no independent treatise on the Psalms has for a long time issued from the British press. Mr. Phillips describes the basis of sound hermeneutical sense in these words,—'indeed, we may safely infer, that as God has condescended to make a revelation to man, and, in so doing, has employed the language of men, he intended that, in interpreting the language of holy scripture, man should subject it to the same laws, and employ the same means, as those which are in use for establishing the sense of words and sentences in general.' He maintains that the Messianic Psalms are prophetic, not in a secondary but primary sense; that the theory of a double sense only unsettles the text; that it receives no support from the New Testament which assigns a primary or literal Messianic sense to the Psalms; and that it is opposed to all ordinary linguistic properties; for, 'if a document have two distinct senses, it must also be granted that it may have three or four, or as many as a fertile imagination can invent.' This rejection of a mystical sense does not diminish the number of Messianic or prophetic Psalms, or destroy the spiritual character of any of them; for, as Mr. Phillips remarks, after stating the principles of interpretation he has adopted, 'I think I have been enabled

to establish, upon principles of sound exegesis, a spiritual sense in no inconsiderable numbers of the Psalms, which the tendencies of the age in which we live have led many persons to disregard or deny.' Any one reading Mr. Phillips's Commentary, will perceive the truth of his statement,—he has not overcharged it.

As Hengstenberg has not published his prolegomena, we can gather his principles of exposition only from actual exemplification in the course of his Commentary. That they are in general judicious and sound, no reader of Hengstenberg's other writings will be disposed to question. Yet we think that his ideas on some questions are neither so clear nor so orthodox as those expressed by him in the portions of his 'Christology' which comprise the Psalms. Not to speak of alteration in sentiment, as to the disputed text of two very important passages in the sixteenth and twenty-second Psalms, there are indications that Hengstenberg is disposed too greatly to limit the number of the Messianic Psalms. We must wait, however, till we have his own explanations. These he has promised along with his concluding volume.

It may be gathered from our remarks, that we set a high value on the Commentary of Hengstenberg. Few men possess such qualifications from nature, culture, and grace, as he does, for expounding those fine collections of devotional poetry which we term the Psalms. The work certainly excels all ancient commentaries, and stands foremost among those of a more recent date. Yet we do not reckon it perfect. A better exposition might still be made. We yet need one as ardent in piety and erudite in criticism, but one less rugged in its polemics and less imperious in its demands; one more succinct in its statements and luminous in its conclusions; one more thoroughly imbued with 'the testimony of Jesus which is the spirit of prophecy.' We are glad to see the Commentary of Hengstenberg in an English form, and we wish all success to the enterprise of Mr. Clark, the publisher of the Foreign Theological Library. The issue of the first year has been completed within the prescribed period, and comprises these two volumes of 'Hengstenberg on the Psalms,' along with other two volumes—'Hagenbach's History of Doctrines,' and 'Gieseler's Church History.' These four volumes are a handsome return for the annual subscription. Much depends for the future success of the Library not merely on the character of the books selected for translation, but on the competency of the translators. The two gentlemen who have rendered Hengstenberg into English do not certainly stand in the highest rank as translators. The version is sometimes clumsy and occasionally inaccurate. In other places where they have given the general sense, they have missed the peculiar

point and raciness of the original. The printing, too, might be vastly improved. The Hebrew letters are too large; and therefore they cause an ugly interval between the line in which they occur and the lines immediately above and below it. The page has thus an irregular appearance. A fount of Hebrew types smaller in size, besides being more elegant in form than those large, awkward, sprawling characters, would remedy the evil. Otherwise, the volumes are handsome specimens of the Edinburgh press.

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- ART. II.—1. *Essays on subjects connected with the Literature, Popular Superstitions, and History of England in the Middle Ages.* By Thomas Wright, M.A., F.S.A., &c. &c. 2 vols. London. 1846.
2. *The Literary History of the Middle Ages : comprehending an Account of the State of Learning, from the close of the Reign of Augustus, to its revival in the Fifteenth Century.* By the Rev. Joseph Berington. London : Bogue. 1846.
3. *Histoire des Révolutions de la Philosophie en France pendant le moyen âge jusqu' au seizième Siècle : précédée d'une Introduction sur la philosophie de l'Antiquité et de celle des premiers temps du Christianisme.* Par le Duc de Caraman. Paris. 1845.

THE continual appearance of new works having reference, direct or indirect, to the state of learning and society in the middle ages, indicates an increasing desire on the part of the public for a deeper and more extensive acquaintance than has been hitherto generally attainable, with that portion of the history of the more advanced European nations. In order to throw light on the state of mediæval literature and manners; and in all respects, to do justice to the subject, more particularly as regards our own country, a competent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon language is doubtless indispensable; and that is what the author of the first of the above works is well known to possess. These essays are, therefore, a valuable acquisition; not only on that account, but also from their intrinsic worth, as setting forth juster and more correct views on many subjects relating to this epoch, than had been done by the generality of preceding writers. As a whole, they relate more especially to the literature and history of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, or to subjects which may be traced back to that period, although their influence has been felt down to later times. 'The two volumes,' says Mr. Wright, 'give a tolerably complete, though necessarily slight, picture of the

middle ages taken in one point of view. I have endeavoured to paint the spirit and manners of the age truly: concealing none of what appeared to me to be its beauties or its excellencies on the one hand, nor on the other hiding those great vices in the texture of society, and defects in the mediæval system, which ought to make us look back upon it, with thankfulness, as an age that has long passed away.'

The second volume in our list has already been briefly noticed by us, but we advert to it again, as connected with the subject under review. It is a reprint of the quarto work, published by its author, and has been wisely selected by Mr. Bogue, as worthy to constitute a volume of his European Library. It had become somewhat scarce, and, from its inconvenient size, hardly known to the general reader. The first edition appeared in 1814, and was admitted on all hands to be the best account extant of the important subject to which it refers. The author, Mr. Berington, though an ecclesiastic of the Romish church, was conspicuous in his day for advocating moderate views of her peculiar doctrines. Two excellent appendices are added to the work, one on the learning of the Greeks, from the sixth century, to the fall of the Eastern Empire in 1453; and the other, on the Arabian or Saracenic learning.

Of the third publication prefixed to this article, one volume only has yet appeared; which brings the subject down to the time of Anselm, or the end of the first of the three epochs into which it is proposed to divide the whole work. In adopting these three divisions, the author has departed from the plan of some of the historians of philosophy, such as Tiedemann, Tennemann, De Gerando, and M. Cousin, inasmuch as his is not a general, but a particular history of philosophy. The first period commences with the rise of literature among the Gauls, in proportion as the Christian religion introduces the light of civilization and thought, and as the genius of Charlemagne, by the establishment of schools, seeks to cultivate the understanding, and extinguish barbarism. This epoch terminates with the commencement of *nominalism*, towards the end of the eleventh, or beginning of the twelfth century. The second period begins with Roscelin, the founder of the sect of the *Nominalists*, embraces the disputations of William de Champeaux, Abélard, and other scholastics, and ends with John of Salisbury, whose writings contributed in a remarkable degree, to the downfall of the transitional system of scholastic theology. The third division of the work will comprehend the career of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and Roger Bacon, the renovator of the natural sciences; and is intended to close with the decadence of the confused

philosophy of the middle ages, which yielded at length to a more rational, and positive system, originating in the great intellectual movement of the Reformation. It was Luther who achieved the demolition of the scholastic edifice.

It is not our intention to dwell at any great length on this branch of our subject, being more solicitous to draw attention to some of the topics relating to our Saxon ancestors, so ably discussed in the work of Mr. Wright. But since the curiosity of the literary public has been of late somewhat enlivened by the publication, by M. Cousin, of the inedited works of Abélard,* we may venture to touch upon the two distinguishing doctrines of scholasticism, as treated by two, at least, of our present authors.

‘There is no field of observation,’ says Mr. Wright, ‘more instructive and interesting than that which is presented to us by the study of man’s intellect; and that equally whether we follow it with wonder, untrammelled amid the glorious dreams of Grecian philosophy, even the errors of which show us not only the infinite difference that distinguishes the workings of mind from the workings of matter, but also how necessary to the former is the pole-star of revealed religion to enable it to steer clear of the dangerous shoals of vain speculation; or whether, with no less degree of admiration, we trace its efforts, in a barbarous age, to burst the shackles of bigotry and ignorance; when released, the very impulse which its struggles had generated, carried it far beyond the appointed goal.’

The scholastic philosophy, which took its rise in the eleventh century, consisted in the application of logic (or dialectics) to theology. The Greek writers had been hitherto known to the people of Western Europe, only through some imperfect Latin versions. A few of the works of Aristotle, and the *Isagoge* (or introduction) of Porphyry, translated by the celebrated Boethius, were long the text books in the schools. A passage in the latter of these works again raised among the scholars of the middle ages the question which had so long divided the ancient philosophers. The subject of Porphyry’s work is the different branches of dialectics;—when speaking of genera and species in a logical point of view, he observes with regard to them, ‘I beg to be excused from saying whether they are things that exist in themselves, and have an objective reality, or whether they be mere abstract notions, existing only in the intelligence; as, also, if they exist in themselves, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they exist separate from sensible

* *Ouvrages inédits d’Abélard, pour servir à l’Histoire de la Philosophie scholastique en France.* Edited by Victor Cousin. 4to. Paris. Imprim. royal, 1836.

objects, or in and about them; for this is a most profound matter, and requires another and more extensive examination.' The different solutions of this knotty question had already distinguished the two contending systems of Plato and Aristotle; the former having taught the independent existence of ideas (*i. e.* genera and species), whilst the latter held, to a certain extent, the contrary doctrine. But Boethius had introduced a new term for the ideas, or the genera and species, which he called *universalia* or universals. The Aristotelian philosophy, which thus took the name of *nominalism*, (from its teaching that the *universals* consisted in mere words or names,) had now to contend with a far more powerful antagonist than Platonism, and of course more in accordance with the spirit of the times, namely, Christianity, the doctrine and tendency of which involved the presumptions of idealism in almost all its relations. Here then we find two conflicting systems, each of which had its truths and its errors; 'but of their true principles, with their necessary consequences,' as M. Cousin has justly remarked, 'people were profoundly ignorant; their connexion with the great religious and political questions was not even suspected. It was as yet only two different modes of interpreting a passage of Porphyry; but, as they became better understood, and as they enlarged and developed themselves, these two interpretations were called up to raise memorable discussions, to trouble the church and the state, and in this manner to take their rank in history.'

Roscelin, a native of Britany, who flourished in the latter half of the eleventh century, is considered as the father of nominalism. He denied *in toto* the existence of the universals; and, admitting reality only in the individuals, he taught that every thing which was not in itself individual, was a mere word or name. So with the qualities of bodies; for instance, while admitting the existence of the body coloured, he denied entirely that of the colour. But Roscelin did not confine himself to what had hitherto been allowed as the domain of philosophy; he had the temerity to go further. He ventured to apply his philosophical system to theology, and the doctrines he introduced, though professedly advanced in defence of Christianity, were soon found to strike at its very roots. The dogma of the Trinity was the rock on which Roscelin was wrecked. His doctrines were condemned by a council at Soissons, in 1092 or 3, and he was obliged to quit France; whither, however, he afterwards returned, and lived till after 1121. One extreme begets another. The strong opposition made to the nominalism of Roscelin gave rise to a directly contrary system. Anselm, who had triumphantly attacked his theological opinions, adopted at

once the extreme doctrine that the universals were real, which hence received the denomination of *realism*. But the great philosophical opponent of Roscelin, and the father of scientific realism, was William of Champeaux, who died in the beginning of 1121. Great, however, as was the fame of this teacher of the new doctrine among his contemporaries, none of his various philosophical works seem to be preserved to the present day; and it is only from the newly edited works of Abelard, that we are enabled to learn the exact form of the system which he taught.

The characteristic merits of the two schools, as represented respectively, at the beginning of the twelfth century, by Roscelin and Anselm, are so ably and briefly summed up by M. Cousin, that we extract the following passages as cited by Mr. Wright :—

‘The school of the realists admits the reality of the universals, that is to say, of species and genera, of the human race (*genre humain*) for instance; and this example, which is traced up to Aristotle, once put in circulation by Boethius, and accepted by St. Anselm, as very probably it was by Roscelin, became the example on which the two parties give each other the rendezvous. Within these limits the realist school is right; but it overleaps these limits, and, confounding with the true universals,—with the true genera—pure abstractions, such as colour separated from the body coloured, it falls into the celebrated vice of realising abstractions. On another side, nominalism shows the illusion of abstractions realised, and gives the secret of it; this secret is the power of language, which realizes, in some sort the conceptions of the mind by clothing them in a form at which we afterwards stop, as though it had an intrinsic reality. Nominalism is, therefore, right in its turn, and it is useful in pointing out the danger of realised abstractions, and in calling attention to the wonders of language; *but it is wrong, and it is itself profoundly dangerous, when it reduces essential attributes to accidental qualities, and confounds with conceptions that are purely verbal, existences, that are immaterial indeed, but real; which, without doubt, are conceptions in man’s thought, and words in his language, but which are independent of the conceptions which man forms of them, and of the words with which he clothes them*; existences, without which the conceptions which we form of them to ourselves, and every general conception, and, consequently, language itself, would be impossible; existence, in fact, the reality of which being destroyed, carries with it that of all our sciences, with their classifications, and reduces them to the footing of conventional arrangements devoid of truth, and unworthy to occupy, for a moment, the attention of a serious man. To see everywhere nothing but abstract conceptions borrowed from sensible data and realized by words, is the tendency of nominalism, and of the school of which it is the extreme but faithful expression, namely, the empiric school;

and to realise abstractions is the tendency of the opposite school, and the fatal precipice to which the genius of idealism pushes it. Such were the two schools represented, at the end of the eleventh century and the beginning of the twelfth, by Roscelin and St. Anselm.—Introduct. p. cviii.

Nominalism, though discomfited in Roscelin, was resuscitated in Abelard, and became, in a modified form, the assailant in its turn. Peter Abelard was born at Palais, near Nantes, in the year 1079. This extraordinary man, extraordinary both for his talents and his misfortunes, '*is thought by some,*' says Mr. Berington, 'to have been first a hearer of Roscelin:—we have now his own authority, in the works brought to light by M. Cousin, to prove that he had first studied under that celebrated teacher and founder of the *Nominalists*, while the latter was living in obscurity in Britany. Hence, strongly imbued with the peculiar tenets of his master, he repaired to Paris when twenty years old, and placed himself under William of Champeaux, the head of the opposite school. After making himself thoroughly acquainted with the doctrines there expounded, he began to attack them with unceasing perseverance, and compelled William to modify in some measure his own opinions. But this partial change of sentiment did not satisfy Abelard; for, by the tracts lately edited by M. Cousin, it is proved, that he attacked both theories of the realist doctor with equal vehemence, and likewise opposed, in the same manner, the schools of his master Roscelin. Without reproducing here the arguments he employed against them, (which are first brought to light by the publication just alluded to,) we may proceed to remark that as a disputant, Abelard was, in fact generally right against all the systems he attacked, because, each system contained something of wrong to fall before his assaults. 'The tactics of the combatants, in the war of opinions which perpetuated and gave life to the scholastic philosophy, were always the same; each party attacked the weak parts of his adversary, the possession of which gave him the temporary victory, until his own weak parts were attacked and carried by the same, or by another opponent. Such was the case with Abelard.' On the whole, a decided victory over realism was the result: the reputation of Abelard soon became established, and his school crowded by students. However, the system, which Abelard erected on the defeat of the two others, appears to have been nothing more than nominalism a little disguised. According to Mr. Wright, who follows M. Cousin in his exposition:—Abelard, in opposing realism and nominalism, held that the universals were neither things nor words; individuals only exist, and they are in themselves neither genus nor species; but they have cer-

tain resemblances which the mind can perceive; and their resemblances, considered alone, with abstraction of differences, form classes more or less comprehensive, which are called species and genera. These do not exist of themselves, yet they are something more than words—they are *conceptions* of the mind. Such was the doctrine of Abelard, which has hence received the name of *conceptualism*.

He is considered by M. Cousin, as being, in regard to theology, what he is in philosophy, neither altogether orthodox, nor entirely heretical; but much nearer to heresy than to orthodoxy. What effect his theory of *conceptualism* had upon the solution of most of the theological questions stated by him in the celebrated treatise of *Sic et Non*, there is no evidence to prove; all that is known is, that it drew upon him the indignation of the church, as it was calculated to do. He fell upon the same rock as his predecessor. The fate of his early master, Roscelin, awaited him. He was thrown upon the same dilemma. 'In the philosophy of Abelard, God becomes a simple unity; and the Trinity, as far as we can understand him, seems to be reduced to something like one of his *conceptions*.'

As Roscelin had his Anselm, so Abelard had his St. Bernard. He was summoned before councils, and his life became a scene of trouble and calamity. His school at length declined; but the contest between nominalism and realism, under different phases, and modifications, has continued even to the present day.

Of the various other subjects treated by Mr. Wright, some have appeared to us particularly interesting and instructive; none more so, perhaps, than his Essays on Mediæval Poetry, on proverbs and popular sayings, on the adventures of certain Saxon heroes, such as Hereward and Fulke, Fitz Warine, and on old English political songs. The deep general knowledge he exhibits of the theme on which he writes, his evident cautiousness as to the authenticity of the sources from which he collects his information, and his intimate acquaintance with the dialects of the middle ages, conspire to render him a guide on these subjects, and entitled to great confidence.

It is worthy of remark, that though Anglo-Saxon literature has been studied to a much greater extent of late years than at any previous period, so that many of its productions are now being made accessible to the general reader by means of literal versions in English, glossaries, and annotations, yet it did not escape public attention at the time of the Reformation. It is now ascertained that the Saxons did not hold many of the most objectionable doctrines which afterwards distinguished the Romish church, and which were opposed by the reformers.

The Saxons had, fortunately, translated the scriptures into their own tongue, and hence an edition of the Saxon gospels, with an English version, was printed in 1571, by the celebrated John Foxe, who had already published some extracts from Ælfric, and the whole of the homilies against transubstantiation. Other treatises of Ælfric afterwards saw the light, their genuineness having been attested by several English prelates, among whom was Archbishop Parker, the great patron of Saxon literature.

The prose writings of the Anglo-Saxons are numerous, frequently abounding in noble sentiments and acute observations, though oftentimes not very interesting. Foremost among them, both for elegance and purity of language, stand the works of Alfred, which consist principally of translations; but showing by his own observations, not sparingly interposed, how his great and noble mind improved every thing to which he put his hand.

Of Anglo-Saxon poetry, Mr. Wright observes that—

‘Its characteristics may be described in a few words—they are loftiness of expression, exuberance of metaphor, intricacy of construction, and a diction differing entirely from that of prose,—precisely the characteristics of the poetry of a people whose mind is naturally poetical, but which has not arrived at a state of cultivation and refinement. To feel this poetry, it is necessary that we should understand well the language, and that we should also be acquainted with the character of the people. The form of Saxon poetry is alliteration—not rhyme; instead of two lines always rhyming together, they are joined by the circumstance of the first containing two words commencing with the same letter, and the second having its first word, on which stress is laid in the pronunciation, also beginning with the same letter. This is the strict rule of alliteration. As far as we are able to judge, the Saxons did not measure their verse by feet; the only rule we can discover seems to be that, in the common kind of verse, there must be two raisings and two fallings of the voice in each line,—so that it would appear that a verse ought never to consist of less than four syllables.’

Mr. Wright further remarks—what is probably true as regards many other nations in their primitive state—that the Saxon bards appear to have possessed most of inspiration while their countrymen retained their paganism. Hence two periods of their poetry may be distinctly traced,—a period when it was full of freedom, and originality, and genius; and a later time when the poets were imitators, making free use of the thoughts and expressions of their predecessors.

Of the former of these periods, there is remaining but one complete monument—the adventures of *Beowulf the Great*;

which has been recently edited by Mr. Kemble, together with a glossary, a literal translation of the poem, and a few philological notes. There are many reasons for believing that this poem was composed at a very remote period,—that it was brought here by the first Anglo-Saxon settlers. It is described as a magnificent and accurate picture of life in the heroic ages. The plot is simple; the story is made up of a few striking incidents, gravely traced, and casting deep and broad shadows; a tale of open, single-handed warfare, where love is never introduced as a motive of action, or stratagem as an instrument. The beauty and interest of the poem are not in the plot, but in the accessories, and in the strong and natural pictures of the manners and feelings of the persons introduced—delineations which strikingly prove the intimate acquaintance of the bard who drew them with the state of society he describes.

Mr. Wright mentions a scriptural poem of the Anglo-Saxons—the story of the Creation—as deserving attention, not only for its own great beauty, but as still more interesting from its singular correspondence, sometimes even in expression, with the *Paradise Lost* of Milton. Lucifer ‘one of the most favoured angels of heaven,’ as he appears in this poem, presents indeed a striking coincidence of character with the Lucifer of Milton: but it is, perhaps, needless to dwell on this point here, inasmuch as Mr. Thorpe has given an edition of the poem, (which is attributed to Cædmon,) accompanied with a good English translation.

Our Essayist next presents us with a long and learned, but entertaining article on Anglo-Norman poetry. We will cite one or two passages on the Norman language and literature, and pass on:—

‘Early in the fourteenth century, the influence of the Norman tongue in England began to lose ground fast; its best, or, at least, its most popular literary productions were translated into English; the use of the language itself was by degrees restricted to the courts of law, and at last rejected even from them; and the English language threw away more and more its adventitious words, and became more native in its character, till that character was fixed by the host of luminaries who gave to the seventeenth century so brilliant a place in our literary annals.’—vol. i. p. 32.

Again:—

‘If the Normans ever had a literature of northern origin peculiar to themselves, it seems to have been nearly forgotten before their entrance into England, where their literary productions were formed upon the models presented to them by the language which they had then adopted in place of their own. Their first romances were those

of Charlemagne and Arthur. The class of poetry, however, which was first popular among the Normans in England, consisted chiefly of chronicles and saints' legends. Our libraries contain many early Anglo-Norman metrical lives of the saints, which, though the subject is not very inviting, are often valuable to the philologist for their language; and are sometimes extremely curious in affording us not only incidents which illustrate the manners and modes of thinking of our forefathers of the twelfth century, but also historical information.—vol. i. p. 34.

The distinguishing characteristics of a people may often be discovered in the nature and spirit of its proverbs and popular sayings. The results of civilisation and education have, indeed, a tendency to obliterate the stronger marks of national character; nevertheless, it cannot be denied that England still abounds in proverbs and popular superstitions. Not a few of these may have been as familiar to our Saxon forefathers, who came hither under the banners of Hengist and Horsa, in the fifth century, as they are to us of the nineteenth. Some, there is no doubt, are of comparatively modern origin, and others have arisen from circumstances and ideas of a later growth. In France and Germany several large collections of proverbs have been published, but a complete history of English popular sayings, both in prose and verse, is still a *desideratum*. Such a work would require extensive reading and deep research; but the materials are plentiful, for, irrespective of the allusions to them in our old writers, there exist in printed books and manuscripts partial collections of popular proverbs at different periods. A valuable collection of English proverbs of the sixteenth century is found in a rhyming treatise by John Heywood, printed in black letter, quarto, in 1547.

Mr. Wright alludes, though doubtingly, to the very singular and ingenious theory of Mr. Bellender Ker, as to the origin not only of our proverbs, but of our nursery rhymes; the latter being accounted for as follows. About the time when Charlemagne was oppressing the Saxons on the continent, and when the Anglo-Saxons held possession of this island, it was a sad time for the poor farmers and labourers, oppressed, as they were, by a foreign and onerous church-sway, bringing with it a ministry to which a goaded people imputed fraud and vexation. The outcries of the oppressed were loud and vigorous; as were the scorn and insult heaped upon them by their oppressors. The monks and priests succeeded always in keeping the power in their own hands. The insulted peasantry sought some consolation in making lampoons on their tormentors in the shape of songs, in which they freely dealt forth their complaints and imprecations. These were at first despised by the other party, but

at length they became so numerous and violent, that it was found necessary to adopt some decisive measures. 'The remedy,' says Mr. Ker, 'was ingenious, and worthy of the astuteness of friars. An unparalleled and constant corruption of the dialect in which they were composed, was taken advantage of, and the invective of the lampoon was gradually undermined by the introduction of a harmless, unmeaning medley, of a precisely similar sound and metre, in the latest forms of the altered dialect; till in time the original import was forgotten, and its venom and familiar use replaced by the present *nursery rhymes*.' The success of the scheme has been complete, and the ingenuity and dexterity employed, conspicuous. Mr. Ker adduces, in proof of his theory, some dozen examples of these singular compositions, all which breathe equal vengeance against the parson and the tithe-collector. For one, we may imagine a select vestry in the habit, in those days, of sitting in committee at a village ale house, where the shouts of satisfaction at every new rate imposed, rendered, probably, still more vociferous by copious potations of brown stout, would be heard, as we can easily fancy, by the poor labourer, obliged to put up with an inferior beverage, and 'singing loudly and ferociously these homely rhymes, smothering his indignation for the present, in threats of future retribution. Thus, then,' says Mr. Wright, 'or something in this manner, he sang, in home-spun ballad rhyme:—

'Hear their insolent clamour!
The committee, what axes,
From us church-ridden elves,
Nought but rates and new taxes.
There they sit in the tap-room,
Nor once think of compassion:
We must pummel their noddles
If they grind in this fashion.
Let us stop their long speeches,
Their high vaunting words;
And when they're gone to pot
We shall all live like lords.'

'In the 'outlandish' tongue, indeed, which people spoke in those days, the song ran thus:—

'Guise guise gae'n daer!
Weêr schell—hey waene daer
Op stuyrs aendoen stuyrs;
End in mêlyd is schem baer.
Dere ei! met een ouwel-man!
D'aet, woed n'aet, sie ee is Par-heers.
Hye tuck heim by die left leyghe
End seer ruwe hem due aen stuyrs.'—p. 259.

This song the cunning and politic monks exchanged for the following, which, as our readers will observe, might be passed upon a dull and illiterate peasantry for the original, whose meaning and point are entirely destroyed :—

‘ Goosy goosy gander !
 Where shall I wander ?
 Up stairs, and down stairs,
 And in my lady’s chamber ;
 There I met an old man
 That would not say his prayers :
 I took him by the left leg,
 And threw him down stairs.’—Vol. i. p. 155.

Mr. Wright’s admirable essay on the Anglo-Latin poets of the twelfth century, as well as many others, both in the first and second volume, we are compelled to pass by, from want of space, till we arrive at that on ‘ Old English Political Songs.’ This is, indeed, no new theme. Our early English poetry has formed a prominent subject of research and study to several antiquarian writers and editors, within the last half century. Warton, Percy, Ritson, and some others, have profitably laboured in the same field. It is, however, within the last twenty years that this class of literary antiquities has progressed more rapidly with us, and may be said to stand on a much better footing than heretofore ; inasmuch as more accurate philological notions have been brought to the study of our language in its earlier and middle stages.

Between the disappearance of the pure Anglo-Saxon poetry, and the commencement of the early English, there were only two poems of any magnitude, and one or two shorter pieces, written in a language commonly termed, Semi-Saxon. The English language regained its position of supremacy after the great baronial struggle under Simon de Montfort ; and from this period to the war of the Roses, it has been sometimes denominated Middle-English. ‘ During the latter part of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth, English poetry appears with the forms and much of the spirit of the French and Anglo-Norman poetry, of which it was taking the place.’ In the reign of Edward III., appeared the popular political allegory of the ‘ Visions of Piers Ploughman.’ And immediately after this work arose Geoffrey Chaucer, the father of modern English poetry, who was succeeded by an age of more than ordinary intellectual darkness. Meanwhile, the greatest share of poetic spirit appeared in the popular songs and ballads. ‘ We have much good lyric poetry,’ says Mr. Wright, ‘ in the fourteenth century, and a few charming specimens even in the fifteenth. The political songs partake largely of this character, and they always present at least that vivacity which

is the necessary consequence of popular excitement.' During the reign of the first three Edwards, indeed, down to the time of Chaucer, poetry seems to have been much cultivated. And from this time forward may be collected a regular series of poetical attacks on the vices of the Romish clergy, till the Reformation, and a few poetical pieces by the monks, in their own defence. In the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth, very little political poetry, of any interest, appeared. The manners of society were undergoing a great change; and the accession of James witnessed the decline of what is so expressively termed the 'old English hospitality'—a circumstance not unfrequently alluded to in the popular poetry of the day. The reign of the first Charles presents a continuous scene of enthusiastic conflict, defying all restraint—and hence a new spirit was infused into poetry; and in place of a quaint, stiff, constrained manner, we have all at once a style 'whose characteristic is an extraordinary flow of wit, combined with ease, and readiness of expression.'

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- ART. III.—1. *The Code of Prisons; or, a Collection of Laws and Regulations for French Prisons, and Houses of Correction, from 1670 to 1845.* By M. Moreau Christophe, Inspector General of the First Class of Prisons in France. Paris, 8vo. 1845.
2. *Reports upon the Agricultural Colony of Mettray, the first Institution in France without Walls, for Young Criminals.* Paris, 8vo. 1839—1846.
3. *Bill laid before the French Chamber of Peers, with the Comments of the Minister of the Interior.* Paris, 25th January, 1847.
4. *Circular of the Minister of the Interior to the Eighty-six Prefects, or Lords Lieutenant of France, concerning Young Criminals.* Paris, 17th February, 1847.
5. *Reports of the French Society for the Department of the Seine for Apprenticing Young Criminals.* Paris, 8vo. 1835—1847.
6. *Address of the French Roman Catholic Society for apprenticing Young Female Criminals.* Paris, 8vo. 1847.
7. *Reports of the French Protestant Societies for Reforming and Apprenticing Young Criminals of both Sexes.* Paris, 8vo. 1844—1847.
8. *Report upon Five of the Institutions for Young Criminals in France.* By the Marquis de Montpezat. Blois, 8vo. 1846.

UNLESS the state of society in France, in regard to moral and physical influences upon criminals of the younger classes, differs from that which prevails in the British Islands to a degree not yet marked by the acutest observers, these French records of

fifteen years' experience of new methods of penitentiary discipline, and of disposing of the young criminals reformed by that discipline, merit our very serious attention. In fact, the French have made what really amounts to a discovery in the management of young criminals of both sexes. It is even so; for, although it is unquestionable that important portions of their plan have been anticipated in this country and elsewhere, nevertheless the system, complete in all its parts, as established among our neighbours across the channel, is so new, as to be fairly entitled to the designation of a GREAT SOCIAL DISCOVERY.

It consists of two branches; the one, that young criminals may be reformed *without being shut up within prison walls*; the other, that a dense European community is capable of receiving, as apprentices or labourers, with advantage to every body, a great number of young criminals so reformed, who, until now, were largely destined to a career of fresh delinquency at home, or to become the dangerous or despised members of convict colonization. The former of these two branches of penitentiary improvement is carried out in the institution of *Mettray*, recently selected by ministers for immediate imitation, and in other similar institutions; the latter is pursued with great success by the united efforts of the French government and of those various private societies, called paternal or patronage societies. In the report of the oldest of these private societies (of August last), it is mentioned that our secretary of state for the home department had applied for a complete account of its proceedings, in order to the adoption of the plan in England. That purpose is not persevered in. In Sir George Grey's recent letter, announcing the determination to form a *Mettray* for our young criminals, he declares that, when reformed, they are still to be furnished with facilities to emigrate. He does not even mention the new system of providing for them at home, so successfully tried on a large scale in France, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland, as well as in the United States of America.

Although *Mettray* is not the most valuable of these new French institutions, its celebrity calls for a brief account of it. It was founded in 1839. It is supported by private subscriptions, by grants of money from the government, and by the profits made from the labour of the young inmates. It began with ten boys in 1839; in 1840, it had one hundred and two; and three hundred and forty-eight in 1845; after a gradual increase in the four intermediate years. It has now, in 1847, more than four hundred. The objects of this institution are, to exercise a benevolent superintendence over children acquitted by the courts of justice on the ground of *their tender age* having, in the terms of the law, caused them to act *without due conside-*

ration; to provide an agricultural colony in France for them when set free provisionally; to furnish them there with religious and elementary instruction; and after teaching them a trade, or making them skilful agricultural labourers, *to find masters for them as apprentices or paid servants*. Lastly, the institution continues to watch over them and their masters during three years after they have left it.

From the foundation of Mettray it has had six hundred and sixty-nine boys, of whom one hundred and forty-four were natural children, and ninety children of first marriages, where the father or mother was married a second time. Of one hundred and fifty-one, the fathers or mothers have been in prison. Of the whole six hundred and sixty-nine, three hundred and fifty were unable to read when received; and these have all been taught to read, whilst three hundred and four of them have also learned to write and to cypher. In May, 1846, there were four hundred and twelve boys in the institution, of whom two hundred and seventy-six were labourers on the farm, thirty-one were in the garden, forty in the blacksmith's and wheelwright's shop, learning various branches of iron work; twelve were shoemakers; twelve carpenters; eighteen tailors; fourteen makers of wooden shoes; six masons; and three sailmakers. These last are employed in a trade very necessary at Mettray. All the boys sleep in *hammocks* made there; and many of them belong to the sea-coast of Brittany. Some of the latter have been in the coasting service; and 'their love for a sea life cannot be got over,' says the report. An old sailor, a petty officer, is employed to teach them sailmaking and navigation.

The result of this wise effort to improve the condition of the most unfortunate class in civilized society may be stated in a few words; and will precede, conveniently, a short description of the means by which this result has been produced.

Of the six hundred and sixty-nine boys received at Mettray, one hundred and ninety-seven have been sent back, well trained, into the bosom of society. Most of them have gone to their friends; twenty-four have gone into the army; fifteen into the navy.

Of the one hundred and ninety-seven so disposed of, one hundred and seventy-three 'have never committed a fault;' eight have behaved 'tolerably well;' four have been lost sight of; and twelve have been brought to justice again.

The value of this statement may be inferred from the well-established fact of the public orphan school at Wurtemberg, with one thousand eight hundred children, producing twenty-five per cent. who turn out ill, whilst Mettray gives only six per cent.

The plan pursued at Mettray, which has had this great success, is that of a large farm, well cultivated, chiefly by the hands of the boys, under good superintendence, and under skilful heads of all the different branches of business.

After a small beginning upon twenty-four acres of land, the able and zealous founders of the Mettray colony rented four hundred and six acres of land of a middling quality for £462. a-year, in addition to the original establishment, where the buildings were placed; and the first great difficulty as to capital, was arranged by the liberality of M. Gouin, the banker, who placed a credit of £2,400. on his books in favour of the benevolent undertaking. This sum provided cattle and other stock of all sorts for the farms, and by vigorous exertions to improve the soil, the produce soon met the expenses, and gave a handsome return upon the agricultural operations.

The discipline of Mettray is severe to the ill-conducted; but the rewards for good behaviour are liberal.

In a particular case of theft in the school, the culprit was taken by the constables openly, just as would have happened if a common labourer on a farm had stolen anything. He was then carried to the police court at Tours, and his sentence was afterwards read to all the assembled boys of the institution. The solemnity of the proceeding was believed to have had a salutary effect.

Religious instruction is carefully attended to. But, says the report, it is studiously endeavoured to make the boys, as much as possible, conscientiously free agents, in all that concerns their religious observances.

It is chiefly sought to make them good farm labourers, without any pretensions to superior intelligence. They are brought up as is fitting for young men who have only the work of their hands to depend upon. Those who are taught trades are selected according to their disposition for them. The management of domestic and farm animals is taught with the greatest care.

The usual healthiness of the boys may be judged of from a few figures. In 1840, there were two deaths in one hundred and two; in 1841, five in one hundred and thirteen; in 1842, four in one hundred and sixty; in 1843, four in one hundred and eighty-seven; in 1844, two in two hundred and eighty-nine; and in 1845, four in three hundred and forty-five:—and most of the twenty-one who died in these six years had incurable complaints on arrival, fifteen of them dying within the first year afterwards.

It is a pleasing proof of the good character of the institu-

tion, that one of its boys who has turned out well, is called, affectionately, in the regiment in which he serves, *the little Mettray*. Another, who is a servant to a judge at Nantes, is reported of with proper consideration by his master, for the good action of contributing handsomely from his wages to the support of a sick father. Others of the young colonists who have settled happily, have given pleasing proofs of their attachment to the school to which they owe so much, by bringing their young wives to visit it. Their little capital to set up as house-keepers is provided out of the rewards given to them for their labour and good conduct, and saved for them.

The money required for this institution, for four hundred boys of the most unpromising class, was a little short of £10,000. for the year 1845.

The government provided £6,400. of this sum; the profits of the farm and workshops £1,800.; the sale of books and pictures of Mettray to visitors etc. £65.; subscriptions of the Royal Family £104.; and miscellaneous subscriptions, the rest, £1,631.

The great expense of Mettray is an objection which is understood not to prevail at the institutions founded by the French government upon its model.

Mettray is limited to the Roman Catholics. The French Protestants, whose young criminals amount to about one hundred, have lately founded, with success, a similar institution near Bordeaux.

The whole number of young criminals of both sexes in France is three thousand six hundred, the great portion of whom are still *within the walls* of houses of correction of an improved character; and exclusively appropriated to young people. This number is an augmentation of more than thirty per cent. in four years. But the French minister takes a consolatory view of this fact which many have looked upon with much alarm. The increase is caused, says he, in his circular of February last, by the judges, who now send more culprits than formerly to prisons, because the prisons have ceased to be places of corruption.

The distribution of the young culprits of all classes in France, including those placed out in service, is not accurately known.

In the bill of January last for a new law upon prisons, no provision is made for the multiplication of Mettrays, or institutions for young criminals without prison walls. But upon the second branch of the subject, the *placing of young criminals in apprenticeship, or service under the inspection of paternal, or patronage societies*, that bill, and the comment of the French

minister, together with his circular of January last, contain most important matter. The bill authorises the formation of such societies in every hundred in France; (Art. 2.) and the measure is not confined to young culprits. It is part of a great reform of the penitentiary system of France; and the minister, in his comment on the bill, speaks with confidence of this reform guaranteeing the public against all hazards in the completion of no less a work than the abolition of the *Bagnes*; and the ultimate restoration of a large portion of thirty thousand reformed convicts to society at large.

The bill is the more remarkable, as it is introduced into the French legislature at the very same time at which our ministers announce their intention to *abolish transportation*, and reform the prisons at home.

But, whilst Sir George Grey proposes his bold measures concurrently with those of the French minister, he lays aside, entirely, the particular branch of the new system, upon which the French minister relies as its complement and crown.

That branch, *as applied to young criminals*, was established officially in 1832 by M. D'Argout, whose circular on the subject was the first of a series of papers closing with the circular of M. Duchâtel, issued in February last.

More interesting and important documents cannot be found than those which have thus been promulgated by the French government, during the last fifteen years.

The last report of the Paternal, or Patronage, Society of the Seine puts the great merits of this new system for disposing of young criminals, after their reform, in a strong point of view, by a few figures.

'Before the formal foundation of this system in 1832, such criminals, after their discharge from prison, were regularly brought before courts of justice for fresh offences at the rate of seventy-five per cent.; the new system made a gradual change for the better. By simply placing the culprits in situations where proper attention was given to their conduct, the number of fresh convictions was reduced by degrees to nineteen, then to seventeen and a half, and at length to fourteen and three-quarters per cent. But when to this system of disposing of them in good houses there was added in 1841 an improved discipline before they were so placed out, the proportion of fresh criminals among them fell in 1842 and 1843 to eight and nine per cent; in 1844, to seven and a quarter; and in 1845, to seven and a less fraction per cent.'

Here is a great triumph indeed for the philanthropist; and the patient execution of the system which has produced such a result does great honour to the eminent persons in France who have shared in the work. In it the government has admirably

seconded private efforts. The Protestants have zealously followed the Roman Catholics, who took the lead; and societies of ladies have been formed of late for the young female criminals, as successfully as those which take care of the boys. The system extends to the children whom unfortunate circumstances must soon expose to crime, as well as to actual criminals; and as has been remarked, its principle is capable of reaching even the tens of thousands of criminals of all ages who now fill the Bagnes and the prisons in France. The bill, quoted above, for the general reform of all the French prisons, really aims at applying this wise and humane system with prudence to the whole mass of those tens of thousands.

It is not to be presumed lightly, that our ministers are unaware of all the bearings of this *successful* paternal system of houses instead of prisons for young criminals. But certain it is that very good things are often overlooked. The British government—and the British people, too—have so long been used to the blunder of thinking that they get rid of crime at home by transporting the criminal, that when Sir George Grey, after stating ‘the difficulty as to what to do with the young *reformed* culprits,’ added, that they were still to be made EMIGRANTS of, the probability is, that the better experience of the French was substantially unknown to him. Lord Brougham is a frequent visitor in Paris; yet he, too, in giving a remarkably clear account of *Mettray*, left out its most brilliant result—the fact of its having already, in five years, out of six hundred and sixty-nine boys, of whom four hundred and twelve were still there, sent one hundred and ninety-seven into society again, with the satisfaction of being able to say of them—One hundred and seventy-three have not committed a fault; eight have behaved tolerably well; four are lost sight of; twelve only have committed fresh crimes. This is unparalleled in the history of fallen man.

Our Parkhurst is an admirable penitentiary institution, but it is a *prison*; whilst the Mettrays of France have *no walls*. It is also, as now destined, a school for colonists; whilst the Mettrays prepare their inmates for homes *in France*.

The distinctions are striking; and until the French system be better understood by our ministers, by parliament, and by the public, there is no hope of settling the more important question, whether what is so good within ten leagues of Dover is not applicable to England, Ireland, and Scotland—whether, in the bosom of British society, there cannot be found a large mass of families, and intelligent, kindly people, ready to receive, and capable of watching over with advantage, reformed and well-behaved criminals. This is a subject that cannot be neglected without deep disgrace to us as members of a civilized community;

as a means to facilitate the abandonment of the *national crime*, TRANSPORTATION, it will be found to be of the greatest importance; and proper inquiry will shew that British experience is not wanting in favour of a system so eminent among our neighbours.

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- ART. IV.—1. *Gerald; a Dramatic Poem: and other Poems.* By J. Westland Marston, author of 'the Patrician's Daughter,' a Tragedy. London: C. Mitchell.
2. *The Patrician's Daughter.* A Tragedy, in Five Acts (as represented at the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane). Fifth Edition. By J. Westland Marston. Author of 'Gerald,' a Dramatic Poem, and other Poems. Fourth Edition, enlarged and adapted for representation. London: C. Mitchell.
3. *Borough Politics.* A Comic Drama, in two acts, as performed at the Theatre Royal, Haymarket. Correctly printed from the Prompter's copy. London: Webster and Co.

THE author of these works is one of the most remarkable of the many writers who have in the last ten years devoted themselves to the production of dramatic poems. *Gerald* is a dramatic poem, not intended for the stage. The 'Patrician's Daughter' was acted for a sufficient number of nights to be called decidedly successful; and 'Borough Politics' is a comic drama, in two acts, which was performed with applause frequently at the Haymarket Theatre last season. A literary journal cannot well overlook a feature of the age so remarkable as the enthusiasm for dramatic literature. Few theatres pay their expenses, and scarcely any of their poets earn the wages of merchant's clerks, yet the enthusiasm for writing dramas has raged during the last ten years, and filled our shelves with many productions acted, unacted, and unactable. This enthusiasm was kindled by a vision, a dream of a Victorian dramatic era, as there had been an Elizabethan dramatic era. The few managers who pay their writers, are said to be very haughty and very capricious. Some managers, the rumour goes, are insolent, lubricious, slippery, and do not pay. Actors are creatures of precedent, who will not act parts which are not full of 'situations,' 'points,' and 'hits,' adapted to their peculiarities. The parts must be written for them, or they will not appear in them. The instant the negotiations with the manager come to a successful close, the criticisms of the green room fasten themselves like moths on the piece, to the destruction of its prettiest similies and most precious descriptions. The agonized and remonstrating author cries in vain, 'It is like cutting out the very flesh, sir.' The finest,

gems, the sweetest plums of the composition are left out. The author describes the operation by the dentist-like phrase 'extracted,' but the manager uses the euphonious circumlocution, 'omitted in the representation.' Effects and situations are the chief things prized and sought in the green room, and the kind in request are neither the newest nor the best, but those least out of the common way. To add to the mortifications of the dramatic author, his histrionic critics are not good judges of the public taste. They admire chiefly the parts and words which seem likely to enable them to display themselves. Distinguished actors have been known to expect fresh honours in their profession from the recitation of sublimities which elicited gusts of hisses, and of pathetic passages which have called forth bursts of merriment—tears of woe on the stage, tears of mirth in the pit. On the first night the friends of the author fill the dress circles, having admission by gratis orders, and being ready to act the part of *clacquers*. Every box, that there may be acting everywhere, contains a performer of applause. His entertainment costs him nothing, and he is determined to do a good-natured thing. If a few hisses of disapprobation arise, friendly hands split their white kid gloves in clapping it down, and all goes merrily like the fiddles in the orchestra. But all will not do. The doomsman is in the pit. Sibilant, sarcastic, many-headed, the monster rears his horrid front in the shape of travesties, waggeries, shouts, hisses, noises, bestial and infernal. The *clacquers* cannot lay the spectre. Before the vision of the author the lights grow dim, and the gay scene blackens. Perhaps he escapes the punishment of Thomson the poet, who when he made his hero exclaim, 'O Sophonisba! Sophonisba, O,' heard a wag in the pit travestie the line into, 'O Jamie Thomson! Jamie Thomson! O!' Most probably the author escapes downright failure, and his piece is not hissed off. It is only in gross cases that the newspapers assail the manager for insulting the public with a piece. Generally the fact of the failure is conveyed to the author in the courteous condolences of acquaintance who dislike him, and whose sneers are wrapt up in compliments. The kindness of newspaper criticism, and the tact of managers, avoid the horrors of conspicuous failures. Dreadful, indeed, must the solitary hours of the dramatist be in the first night of his failure, conscious, as he is, of having stood before the huge, jeering, dastardly, deadly public, convicted of aspiration, and failure. Probably the doom does not come in its most dreadful shape. The friendly *clacquers* assert their own efficiency. Sometimes over a sumptuous or a savoury supper, they proclaim their friend the greatest dramatist since Shakspeare, and hail the hope of the Victorian era. From a fevered

sleep he wakens to read the morning newspapers. Some of the criticisms, done by known and responsible writers, are intelligent and just. Others, the contributions of any chance reporter, only surpass the stupidity of their censure by the vile-ness of their praise. On the second night there are few friends of the author in the theatre, and by the fifth night the curtains are up, and the boxes are empty. But the shore at Hastings, or the pier at Brighton, braces the nerves of the unsuccessful author. On his return to town, a decidedly successful author, whose piece ran twelve nights, silyly assumes a tone of superiority over him, whose drama was withdrawn on the fifth. But they have one heart, the hope, for a bright and comfortable Victorian era of the drama, about to break and dawn upon their dark and cloudy day. Wit against critics, and managers, and audiences, enlivens their talk, and the compensation for all their ills is their beautiful dream. But their ills are not over, for the bills of printers and publishers follow them. Dramatic authors must pay 'gentlemen's prices.' The sum hoped for from the manager is not forthcoming, and the expenses of the publication are treble the original calculations. The public, who would not see, will not buy the play. The critics do not know the author, and do not read the play, discussing as some do a 'Quarterly Review' in an hour, a magazine in a quarter of an hour, and a drama in ten minutes. Disinterestedness, fortitude, perseverance, forbearance, are all needed by the man who takes up his pen to write dramas, to produce a Victorian era against hissing pits, carping green rooms, tyrannical managers, incompetent critics, and a public mad for Mammon.

The truth is, the Victorian era is most unfavourable to dramatic literature. Writers of dramas have now a-days more hindrances and fewer helps than in the seventeenth century. The Elizabethan age was favourable to the production of the cluster of writers of whom William Shakspeare was the chief flower. Undoubtedly, the puritan spirit does not, in these days, make the city authorities of London try to put down play houses. But this fact cuts both ways. The frequenters of the play are not, as of old, stimulated by the opposition of puritanism. The passion for the drama is not stirred by hostility into enthusiasm. Dramatic inclinations find indifference more formidable than opposition. Players and dramatists do not hold their old relations to the aristocracy. Social equality is now a thing conceded to all gentlemen, although the idea would have been inconceivable to Burbage or Shakspeare. 'Sheridan, make room for Mathews between us,' cried George the Fourth, when Prince of Wales, at a banquet. Actors and authors have now an aristocratic, in addition to a dramatic position. Shakspeare lived with

his brother players, Hemmings and Condell. Modern dramatists, when young, hover and hesitate between the bar and the drama; and when old, finesse for places at the corners of the tables of the leaders of fashion. The dramatists of the Elizabethan age sought greatness—where alone it could be found by them—in the creations of their genius. They worked with undivided impulses, and undistracted purpose. Shakspeare had all their lights and all their stimulants concentrated upon him. He was a proprietor of the theatre in which he acted, and for which he wrote. His solvency or insolvency depended on it. He knew stage effects practically as well as theoretically. The fitness of the speeches of his characters he could himself test, by uttering them on the stage. The finer beauties of his compositions were not lost in large theatres, adapted only to *spectacles*. Familiar with every actor in his theatre, he was spared the fruitless labour of writing characters which no one could act. The pecuniary interests of the proprietor, the considerations peculiar to the manager, the excitements of the actor, the splendid ambition of the poet, all combined in the mind and in the circumstances of William Shakspeare, to spur his spirit to its utmost, and guide his efforts for the best, when composing his dramas. His dramas were not published as a matter of course, on the night of their first representation. His best thoughts and finest passages were not quoted into fifty journals before the end of the first week. The pleasure and instruction they contained were not given to the public in a way which yielded him no pecuniary benefit. All who wished to elevate and delight their minds by his genius, were obliged to frequent the theatre in whose receipts he was a sharer, as a proprietor, an actor, and an author. To enjoy his mind, the public must go to his theatre. Small though his public was, it was a highly cultivated one. His humble social station did not tempt him into habits of expense, and did not induce him to keep up 'the dignity of literature' by giving champagne dinners to lords. The energy and freshness of his mind were not wasted in exasperation at the charges of printers, publishers, paper makers, and booksellers. Shakspeare was not the victim of the caprices of managers, and the exactions and the torments of a system of which he knew only that somehow it worked ill for him. A few pounds, it is true, were all he nominally received for the copyright of his play. But the dramatic system of his age worked well for him. He left Warwickshire because his father's house was too bare to yield any thing to the distress warrant of his creditors. He left London to become a squire in his native place. The system of his age yielded him a competency in manhood, and wealth when the prime of life was over.

Without presuming to say what is the precise weight to be attached to these circumstances, they certainly do make a great difference between the Elizabethan and the Victorian era.

On the whole, they indicate the decline of dramatic literature—a decline not to be averted even by the private theatricals, or the wits of Punch. The spirit of the beautiful is to assume less objectionable, and let us hope nobler, forms than that of dramatic literature.

Mr. Marston has had the boldness to embody the feelings of the present time in his 'Patrician's Daughter.' His work originated in a desire to produce a tragedy which should be entirely indebted to the habits and spirit of the age for its incident and passion. Mordaunt, his hero, is a parliamentary Liberal; Lynterne, his antagonist, is a Tory earl. The beautiful and imaginative daughter of the earl, aristocratic by position and education, democratic by sympathy and love, is the victim of the antagonism. In her the hostile elements of the age are tragic.

In the preface to the first edition of his tragedy, Mr. Marston states eloquently the theory on which he worked.

'To speak truth, the many find it difficult to credit the tragic capacities and sensibilities of men whose dress, deportment, and pursuits, correspond to their own. The vulgar mind cannot easily resign itself to mental illusions, when the machinery which they employ is of a familiar description. Nevertheless the poetical *dictum*—

' 'Tis *Distance* lends enchantment to the view,'—

is by no means to be accepted as an invariable principle; but as a mere general fact;—the experience of the *common* mind,—not the law of a great one. The elevated and gifted spirit sees the sublime in the present, recognises the hero *in undress*, and discovers greatness, though it be divested of pomp. On the other hand, it is the sure indication of an inferior character, that it tests the essential by the superficial; and if too intimately acquainted with the latter to revere it, finds itself on terms of indifference, if not contempt, with the former.

'This is a difficulty which all who purpose to depict the nobler features of their own age, must encounter. He who would make his heroes his contemporaries, must also be prepared to dispense with many of the melo-dramatic effects incident to the earlier drama. The display of the passions is now more subtle and less obvious than formerly; and their signs, while exciting deeper interest in the cultivated and thoughtful man, fail in their appeals to the gross apprehension.

'Still the operation of human feelings in an intellectual era, must form a higher subject for delineation than that furnished by the

runder stages of their development. To limit to the past, the dramatic exhibition of our nature, is virtually to declare our nature itself radically altered. But, consider our merchant when he returns from 'Change,—the poet as he walks unnoted in our streets,—the calm demeanour of the agitated diplomatist,—the smooth brow, and accustomed smile, of a regnant beauty, while jealous rivals wound with courtesy, and torture *selon les règles*. What suspense! what aspirations! what inward struggles! what subdued emotions! There is truly stuff for tragedy in the age of civilization. The awful gulfs and frowning precipices of the moral landscape are no more;—but broken hearts are resting beneath this same floral *Père la Chaise*!—Preface, pp. 10, 11.

Mabel Lynterne, the Patrician's daughter, has cherished an ideal of a husband—a dream on which the tragedy turns.

'Now if you grant me audience, I will
 Possess you of my secret thoughts, till now
 Nursed in the solitude of my own heart.
 He whom my will shall for its king elect
 Must bring me something more than that I have;
 Women who marry seldom act but once;
 Their lot is, ere they wed, obedience
 Unto a father; thenceforth to a husband;
 But in the one election which they make,—
 Choice of a mate for life and death, and heaven,—
 They may be said to *act*. The man they wed
 Is as the living record of their deed,
 Their one momentous deed. If he be base
 It veils their deed with shame, if he be great
 Encircles it with glory; and if good
 Haloes it with religion. Wouldst thou know
 Whom I would have to be *my* husband, sire?
 In brief terms I will sketch him. He shall be
 High born, handsome, I'd rather—but at least
 With features lit up by the sacred light
 Which marks the elect band of noble men!
 Whose history is the world's, and whose high names
 Linked close with empires, sound—their synonymes,—
 With eye that quails not in the war, with voice
 That thrills the popular ear, and o'erawes senates,
 And of a wide, ceaseless benevolence,
 Bounded but by the walls of the great world;
 And oh! whene'er affection breathed his name,
 Or mind did homage to it, should my heart
 Rush back to the bright hour when first it chose him,
 Saying it was *My Act*.'

A mutual passion springs up between her and Mordaunt—a poet, a politician, and an orator. The aspiring plebeian is rejected disdainfully. The aunt of the lady, a malignant

patrician, plots against him with success. However, in the course of time, Mordaunt rises in fame and consequence in the political and literary worlds, while the fortunes and influence of the Earl of Lynterne decline. The successful adventurer becomes an eligible match for the Patrician's daughter, and Sir Edgar Mordaunt pays back the disdain from which he had suffered. The scene in the library is the most exciting in the drama. The critics have found fault with the author for making Mordaunt guilty of a base revenge on Mabel. The fault arises from the necessities of dramatic effect. Mordaunt believes that Mabel has never loved him, and has only subdued her aristocratic pride to his plebeian worth out of deference to the condition and will of her father. With this belief he was right in rejecting her. He is in collision with Convention when favourable as when hostile to his wishes. But the manner of the rejection, in the presence of a notary and her relatives, though theatrical and effective was ungentlemanly, if not unmanly. The speech of Mordaunt on the occasion is splendid.

'MORDAUNT.

Why see,
How much your expectations mock your acts !
You sow the heart with bitterness, and marvel
That it bears kindless fruit. The slave's treatment
Is what you give man, and the angel's meekness
Is what you demand from him. 'Tis five years
Since this same Lady Mabel lured my soul
With such soft phrases, and such winning looks,
As only leave the words 'I love,' unsaid ;
'Twas not my vanity that thus construed
These signs of tenderness. The Lady Lydia
Noted their import—nay, with earnestness,
Not willing then our union, besought me
To quit the castle ; and though afterwards
She gave herself the lie,—

PIERPOINT.

Audacious—

LYDIA (*interrupting*).

Nay ! hear him, for although we have no wedding,
We'll have the mirth of one.

MORDAUNT.

Though afterwards she gave herself the lie,
Avowed that Mabel had confessed her love.
Encouraged thus, I straightway sought the earl,
Entreated his permission to be ranked
As Lady Mabel's suitor, when it pleased her
Smilingly to admit, that she had toyed
With me, to wile away an idle hour.
I hasted home ;—in a few days the tale

Of my crushed love was blazoned to the world,
 A proud heart's honest passion woke to life
 By specious smiles, and studied blandishments,
 But to be trampled on—the deep excess
 Of passionate devotion—charm of day,
 And dream of night, and hope of life—it was,
 It was all this to me—blown, published, chorused,
 In the quick ear of scoffers! This low churl,
 This foiled plebeian aspirant, supplied
 Mirth to a thousand jesters.—What presumption
 In him to love thus!—What effrontery
 To have a heart! Now for once be men
 And women, or if you can, be human.
 Have you loved ever? known what 'tis to stake
 Your heart's whole capital of blessedness
 Upon one die, the chance of love returned!
 To lose the cast; be beggared in your soul;
 Then to be spurned and made a public scorn
 By those who tempted to the fatal throw,
 Which drained your heart of riches,—and all this,
 Because your birth was lowly?—Had you borne it?

THE EARL.

Enough, sir! you have had your vengeance. Hence!

MORDAUNT.

I have not sought for vengeance in this act.
 My life, my energies, my talents all
 Did I task for the deed! Such apparatus
 Was meant for nobler uses than belong
 To a mere private feud—but I have fought
 A battle for high principles, and taught
Convention, when it dares to tread down *Man*,
 MAN SHALL ARISE IN TURN, AND TREAD IT DOWN!
 As for this lady!—she has never loved me,
 Nor have I lately sought to win her love:
 I would not wreak on her such wretchedness,
 As she caused me for pastime! I have done,
 My mission is fulfilled! (*Moves towards the door.*)

PIERPOINT (*half drawing his sword*).

You shall not quit this house until you answer
 For this indignity!

MABEL (*who rushes forward and arrests his arm*).

(*With great agitation.*) Upon your life,
 Injure him not, put up your sword, I say,—

(MORDAUNT regards her earnestly.)

(*Haughtily.*) He is not worthy of it! [*Exit MORDAUNT.*]

Gerald is a dramatic poem on the struggles and experiences of genius. Gerald is a literary aspirant, who pursues his own ideal of merit to the neglect of the obvious paths to success.

He leaves his country home for London. After an apparent failure, though a real success—failure in obtaining wealth, success in obtaining renown—he returns to his village home a heart-broken, if not a disappointed, man, to die celebrated. There is a keen sense in the poem of the sufferings of the man of genius, who is too well fitted for the highest successes of literature to obtain ready applause and abundant payment. We have marked many passages as worthy of admiration and comment. However, we must content ourselves with the following beautiful illustration of the diversities of character. It may be called an expression of the dramatic aspect of the eclectic philosophy of human nature.

‘Each Philosophy

Is centred in the being of the sage—
Or fool, mayhap—terms are indifferent.
A general error oft is private truth ;
What’s falsehood here, is there veracity ;
The right hand’s nothing is the left hand’s all !
For natures as they limit, or expand,
Determine faith or doubt,—ourselves the bound
To our own fate. That caterpillar’s bliss
Is in luxuriant idleness to crawl
O’er the sweet leaves of roses, wondering
Why yonder bee should wear his wings with toil,
Touring from flower to flower. Perchance the bee
Much marvels that the ringdove builds her nest
So high, that garden odours, and the scent
Of thyme-banks reach it not. That very dove
Hath never solved the charm the martlet finds
In eaves of human dwellings ; unto *him*
’Tis mystery why the kingly eagle dwells
On the rock’s peak in solitude. We judge
Out of our life—or want of it ;—our friends
Who passed just now, from theirs—*which was not mine.*
Since men must measure ; let them—and in dreams,
Belt great Orion with a wisp of hay !’

‘Borough Politics’ is a comic drama, the humour of which turns upon a contest between a rich farmer and a poor physician for the office of mayor. There is a vein of genuine English humour in the piece, indications of which, in the mind of the author, are to be found in ‘Gerald.’ Humour rather than wit, geniality and not satire, are the chief characteristics of the comic powers of Mr. Marston. His farmer, to humble the pride of the physician, beats him in the contest, and for the sake of their children, his daughter being attached to the son of the medical man, in the hour of success, secures the election of his rival to the mayoralty, and the happiness of the lovers.

We part with this young author, assured we shall yet have to meet him in still brighter pages than those before us, and never in any not warmed by benevolence and elevated by high purpose.

ART. V. *Vigilantius and his Times*. By W. S. Gilly, D.D. London : Seeley & Co. 8vo. pp. 488.

It has been with us a settled opinion for many years past, and we perceive it to be gaining ground in other quarters, that if we could know all about the men whose names are registered by the fathers, and handed down by the ecclesiastical writers, in the black catalogue of *heretics*, we should be able to pick out many a faithful witness for apostolic simplicity and truth. From the fourth century downward, most men, aiming at public influence and professing Christianity, deemed '*the church*,' a phrase that they might conjure with. It became mightier than the scriptures, and carried against all gainsayers a more formidable aspect, because it assumed to embody, not only the voice of scripture, which admitted of debate, and diversity of judgment, but the decisions of emperors, and the power of their swords, which allowed of no debate, and demanded uniformity of judgment. Which party soever could command a majority, and by whatever means, was, of course, *the church*, and all the rest were heretics; not always treated with severity in the ratio of their divergence from important and apostolical truth, but just as they impugned some novel conceit, or fond ceremony, or heathenish superstition, which it had pleased the said '*church*' to decree. It, therefore, by no means follows that all those should be left in the roll of heretics, delivered over to eternal perdition, whom it has pleased that *soi disant* church, or some of its apochryphal and disputatious fathers to place there. The infallibility of such decisions has been brought into discredit with all discriminating judges, by the very rashness, passion, and violence, which mark the condemnations recorded, and, as it must appear to all candid and charitable readers of ecclesiastical history, the frivolousness and puerility of the charges upon which those denunciations are founded.

When the so-called church set itself to the filigree work of rites and ceremonies, and all the other ornamental trappings, by which it sought to assimilate the spiritual temple of Christianity to the Jewish economy, perhaps with the view of render-

ing it more acceptable to the notions and habits of the heathen populations, among whom they had to spread it, nothing was more natural than to expect that some simple-minded and faithful men would impugn these proceedings, and incur all hazards in protesting against them. And such arose, though at first few, and far between, but afterwards more frequently.

The precise period of the first introduction of Christianity among a heathen people, is the season of danger to the purity and simplicity of the system itself. Then the temptations are the strongest to give up something or superadd something, by way of conciliating prejudice and ensuring success. When Christianity had so far succeeded in its mission, despite the length and severity of the conflict, as to make it a matter of policy, on the part of the emperor, to take it into the pay of the state, its ministry must have been sought after as one of the most promising avenues to fame, power, and wealth; and the consequence must necessarily have been the rapid growth of secularity, and of that class of men whose aim it would be to aggrandize the exterior of religion, rather than to abide by the example of the fishermen of Galilee. They were now become the priests of an established and richly-endowed church, and that the church of the Roman empire; and consequently the Institute must be made worthy of its patrons, and appear adapted, by its worldly respectability, to take the place of the Olympian Deities, with all their temples, rites, and mysteries. The transition, no doubt, was gradual, but coming on with the sanction of the men who had been the disciples of martyrs and confessors, it had proceeded far, and taken firm hold, before any private individuals could muster courage enough to question the wisdom or the grace of their teachers. The unsuspecting confidence with which their dictates had been received, and the simplicity with which the testimony of men, so generally reputed holy and faithful, would be confided in, gave the most favourable opportunity for human inventions to come in side by side with inspired truths; and thus, without the slightest suspicion of the mixture, or of the fatal issues to which it would lead, the masses that embraced Christianity believed as they were taught, and did as they were bidden, becoming the dupes of the grossest impostures. Their inability to discriminate between the doctrines which Christ had left, and those which men had appended; their lack of the documentary evidence, or of the biblical knowledge essential to a right judgment, must in a great measure exculpate the people from any designed corruption of the gospel, or any wilful departure from its simplicity. A religion founded in miracle they readily believed might require the same to sustain it.

Yet, when the growing evils had proceeded to such a length as to neutralise Christianity itself, and threaten the prevalence of a system of worship, approximating in its corruptions even to heathenism, it was to be expected both that some should detect the source whence all these evils had arisen, and that, after a due trial of their patience and provocation of their zeal, they should lift up a testimony for the simpler doctrine and purer practice of the apostles. They had long borne with the burdensome and unprofitable inventions of their superiors, and there was a depository of truth, not commonly consulted, but yet not inaccessible, which professed to contain the essentials and the exemplars of their religion; and in that they could discover no sanction for those observances which had taken the place of love and purity; and the more they meditated upon the discrepancies they perceived between the inspired documents of their religion and the dogmas of its most influential doctors, the more deeply did they feel the duty of taking up at length a solemn protest against the ecclesiastical spirit of their age. The individuals may have been few and feeble who indulged such thoughts. Many difficulties prevented intercourse. No printing presses could make those thoughts public, and they often died out in vain regrets and sighs after reformation. Obscure men, who proved troublesome with their conscientious scruples, were easily silenced, driven into corners, held up to public clamour, or otherwise got rid of as troublers of the church, whom the civil authorities might remove into the land of oblivion, from whence their voices would never be heard. But now and then comes a bold reformer who cannot so easily be dealt with. He has wealth and learning, influence and friends, and he will be heard. He lives, perhaps, in some remote part of the empire, and he has gained adherents before his *heresy* is detected. The simple-minded listen to him, the truly pious are convinced by the force of his appeals, and even his superiors in the church find it difficult to check his progress, or they even become inwardly convinced that he has truth and reason on his side; hence they wink at his innovations, and protect him against accusers. Many, no doubt, agreed in judgment with such reformers who were reluctant openly to espouse their cause. Hence they were often left to fight the battle single-handed against the hydra-headed monster of corruption, which was laying all waste. Celibacy, relic-worship, asceticism, nocturnal devotions, with all the vicious and licentious abominations which grew out of them, were becoming so rampant towards the end of the fourth century, that it was difficult to ward off the censures and complaints of upright men. And many such uttered their voices about this period,

though with various emphasis; and all, alas! with little success. The recluses had won the reverence of the world, and whoever impugned their dogmas or condemned their practices, not only incurred their bitterest crimination, but had to encounter public opinion, so far as that was a thing then known and expressed. Such a reformer must set himself against the universal church, and, in consequence, is to be treated as an enemy to its greatest lights and ornaments—the men who were second only to the martyrs, and were indeed honoured as living martyrs.

The task was no doubt an arduous one, yet there were several who stood out conspicuously about this time, of whom, indeed, we know little, except from the writings of their enemies; but, even from that source, it may be inferred that their greatest sin consisted in calling for the reformation of abuses, and a return to primitive simplicity. If honour is to be given to whom honour is due, then many a name which stands on the page of ecclesiastical history with the brand of *heretic* legibly burnt in, must be placed among the witnesses who have prophesied in sackcloth, and to whom the great Lord of the church has said, ‘Well done, good and faithful servant.’

There were, no doubt, real heretics in abundance—men who departed from the faith of the apostles, and perverted the truth of Christ by their metaphysical subtleties and philosophical theories, who caused trouble and contention for many a long age; but the methods generally employed on both the orthodox and heterodox side to secure success, were altogether alien from the spirit of the gospel and its Founder. Each party invoked the *ultima ratio* of kings; and the consequence was, a perpetuation and multiplication of savage controversies, which never ceased till it was discovered that only one bishop had brains, that is, infallible brains, and that in him, as the successor of St. Peter, ought to rest the exclusive right of settling all controversies—at least, in appearance. From the period of that discovery or invention, a power arose that adroitly nipped all heresy in the bud; but in the fourth and fifth centuries, there was no ready-made apparatus by which they could be disposed of; and, consequently, we learn from the writings of great men, who buckled on the armour against them, that they were sometimes suffered to roam at large, under a prestige which it was not deemed prudent to violate.

Such a heretic and such a reformer appears in early church history under the name of Vigilantius, who was born about the year 364, and flourished from 390 to 406, giving the celebrated St. Jerome, who was then a recluse at Bethlehem, no little vexation, though, from all that appears, he conducted his controversies in a respectful manner, and with all due deference to so

learned and celebrated a monk. The fact that such a reformer should stand forth at so early a period, to denounce those very corruptions which, in a later age, brought on the Reformation in Europe, and which, in our own days, are provoking a second reformation within the corrupt and apostate church, is a deeply interesting fact, and merits the attention of all who would thoroughly understand the transitions which the historic church has undergone. Dr. Gilly has rightly apprehended its importance, and performed a service of high value, in thus bringing distinctly forward the character and biography of one of the first dissenters.

“Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou ordained strength.” This prophetic saying, to which our Lord referred on two remarkable occasions, had an extraordinary fulfilment at the period we are now discussing. The chief among the ‘wise and prudent’ of that day, were falling into errors, which had gradually crept into the church; and the religion, which was at first commended to the world by the simplicity and unbending holiness of its professors, was now promoted by sophistry and false reasoning. Ambrose, who was then at the height of his reputation in the Western church; and Jerome, who was consulted as an oracle, both in that and in the Eastern church; and even Augustine himself, gave their sanction to practices and opinions at which ‘the stones would have cried out,’ had all who professed to be guided by the holy scriptures, held their peace. But at this crisis, Vigilantius of Aquitain, a young presbyter of obscure origin and lowly condition, began to express doubts as to those devout exercises, which had beguiled men older and abler than himself, into creature-worship, and which had rendered them obnoxious to the charge of being *Cinerarii* and *Idolatræ*.

‘This ‘Christian brother,’ as his adversary Jerome called him, before their celebrated disputes on the subject of saints, and relic-worship, was one of those who occupied a foremost place in that doctrinal succession of truth and apostolicity, which has been, under the divine blessing, the preservation of Christianity. He was a witness, and a connecting link in the golden chain of protestantism; and it is as absurd to suppose that protestantism was the growth of a single age, as to imagine that ‘Romanism’ was the production of any one generation.

‘There are two questions which may be answered by the word ‘*successive*.’

‘1. How did Christians get so grievously wrong in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries? By a *succession* of corruptions, and by a gradual departure from the gospel of Jesus Christ

‘2 How did they return to a purer doctrine and practice in the sixteenth century? By a *succession* of struggles for the truth. ‘Romanism’ did not rise full grown and full armed from the sowing of one crop of dragon’s teeth; nor did the reformation spring from the brain of any one individual, like the fabled Minerva from the

forehead of Jupiter. It was the production of successive throes and labours, in men who contended for the truth: and Vigilantius of Aquitain, and Claude of Turin, and Waldo of Lyons, and Luther and Cranmer, and our other 'protestant forefathers,' are only links in the chain, which connects antiquity with the present time. Some of the earliest protests were made against errors *natural* to the heart of man. Affection, equally anxious about the eternal destinies of the dead, as of the living, led even some of St. Paul's converts, the Thessalonians, into mistakes touching the condition of their friends who had departed in the faith, and concerning the coming of the day of the Lord. (See 1 Thess. iv: 2 Thess. ii.). In process of time, similar affection multiplied errors. To collect the relics of the dead, to keep vigils at the tombs of the saints, to burn lights and to assemble over their ashes, might be very *natural* means of showing reverence and affection for the departed. But to what gross corruptions did not these things lead? To make vows of perpetual continence, and to drag out a life of self-denial and mortification, may be necessary and praiseworthy upon some occasions; but are celibacy and asceticism to be exalted, as they have been, above all Christian virtues? To pay decent respect to the relics of holy men, and to call to memory their precepts and examples; to speak of them with veneration, and to pray to be made like unto them; this is always to be commended. But is there any real virtue in the dead bones of departed saints, or in the remains of their vestments? Or is it lawful to invoke the dead in prayer? What, indeed, is more natural, when some dear and venerated object is gone to join in the unseen world the company of just men made perfect, than to cherish the thought, that the beatified spirit will be with our spirit, will pray for us before the throne of grace, and help us in this world of trouble? But for this belief is there any divine authority in the book of revelation? and if not, may we make it a prescribed article of faith, or recommend it as a beneficial practice? The arm of the Lord is not shortened, and it may yet be his pleasure to display his power by preternatural manifestations, and to shew signs and wonders for the extension of his kingdom. But are miracles likely to be of very frequent occurrence? And may not the pious be sometimes deceived by imaginary miracles? Are there not alleged miracles which savour of delusion and imposture, and the very extravagance of which must excite disbelief?

'Such were the doubts and reflections of Vigilantius. His scruples led to serious consideration and inquiry. He passed several years in travelling, for the purpose of conferring with the pious and wise of different countries. He expended vast sums of money in the translation and circulation of scripture. He visited churches when resistance was made to the corruptions that prevailed in Rome and in the east. He 'searched the scriptures daily, whether these things were so.' And, at length, he openly declared his conviction, and raised his testimony against relic-worship, the invocation of saints, nocturnal services at the sepulchres of the

dead, monastic vows, and the obligation of clerical celibacy. For this, he was denounced by some of his contemporaries as a heretic; although he was never known to deny any of the vital truths of the gospel, or to oppose himself to the apostolical discipline of the church: and the Gallic witness of the fourth century is now regarded as one famous or infamous in ecclesiastical history, according as Protestants or Roman-catholics pronounce sentence upon him. Vigilantius was an extraordinary example, not only of perseverance in the pursuit of truth, amidst many difficulties, but also of the obloquy and unfair misrepresentations to which every inquirer is exposed, who ventures to take part against religious error in high places. He was raised from an humble station, and was introduced to the society of the learned and the good by Sulpicius Severus, and Paulinus of Nola, two of the very best men of the age, whose affection and friendship he never lost. In the first passage, where we find mention made of him by his opponent Jerome, he is called 'the holy presbyter Vigilantius;' and yet, when he undertook to protest against practices which he regarded as superstitious and unscriptural, Jerome assailed him with every expression of contumely and rancour. '*Base-born tapster,*' '*Madman,*' '*Brute,*' '*Monster,*' '*Possessed of an unclean spirit;*' these are specimens of the styles in which the valour of Bethlehem inveighed against the witness of Aquitain.

'It will be the object of the following pages to set his character in a true light, and to show what effects were produced in the minds and conduct of sincere Christians, by the opinions which Vigilantius impugned, and which Jerome advocated.'—pp. 4—9.

After several interesting chapters, in which the author throws some important and valuable lights upon the characters of the leading men in the church during the latter half of the fourth century, such as Martin of Tours, Sulpicius Severus, Paulinus, Jerome, and others, he comes, in his sixth chapter, to the Memorials of Vigilantius. It appears that he was the son of an innkeeper, and born at Calagorris, the present Comminges, in Aquitain. The place of his birth, as well as his occupation, are shown to have brought him frequently into connexion, while yet a youth, with the many celebrated persons who, in those days of councils, were known to travel between France and Spain. Hence he became acquainted with Sulpicius Severus, who presently befriends him, as undoubtedly a young man of promising talents, and takes him from his low occupation into his own house, for the purpose of guiding his education and forming his character. But about this time, Sulpicius, who had hitherto appeared a useful and consistent Christian, yielded himself to the fanaticism of Martin of Tours, and, under his influence, underwent a transformation, which speedily interfered with the prospects, and contributed to turn the character

of his young friend to a bent the very opposite of that which his tutor intended. This important event in the early life of Vigilantius, with the new views which it forced upon him, is well described in the following passage:—

‘ But a blight was cast over the well-spent life of Sulpicius when that evil counsellor, Martin of Tours, persuaded him that all his benevolent and pious actions would not enable him to escape the everlasting fire reserved for the wicked, unless he made for himself a Gehenna and Inferno upon earth, by the practice of the most rigid penances. Under the influence of such baneful advice, Sulpicius tried to convert a household of faith into a scene of the grossest superstition. He denied himself the necessities of life; he exhausted his strength by long fastings and devotional exercises, which lasted through the greater part of the twenty-four hours of every day; he tore his body with scourges, and invented new modes of self-punishment. When these inflictions failed to bring him peace of mind, he redoubled his contributions to charitable purposes, and thought to purchase a sure interest in heaven by alms-deeds, which exceeded all that he had done before. But he was still goaded on to make further sacrifices, and was exhorted never to be satisfied with himself until he had sold all to give to the poor. In the midst of all his self-denial, he was racked with doubts and suspicions, and haunted by a phantom which accused him of reserving too much for himself out of his own property, and of not having been sufficiently unsparing in the maceration of his body; of not having duly prolonged his fastings and watchings; of not having adopted a more painful posture in his exercises of devotion. This proceeded from want of faith, and he resorted to the extremes of self-denial as a means of making satisfaction for his sins, because he did not place his reliance on, or feel security in, his Saviour’s atonement. He did not look to his Redeemer for the full and entire expiation of his sins, but adopted the belief, that the ransom was incomplete without some suffering of his own, and that the uttermost farthing of his debt to an inexorable God could not be paid, so long as he enjoyed any one earthly comfort. Such was Sulpicius Severus, the early friend and religious instructor of Vigilantius; and in him the young mountaineer witnessed that spiritual wavering and unsettled character, that mixture of piety with fanaticism, and of kind-heartedness with austerity, which produced in his own mind a spirit of inquiry, and must have forced such reflections as these upon him: ‘ Can that system be right which perverts the understanding, influences the imagination, and tortures the body and mind of such a man as this generous master of mine? The dignified senator is urged to abandon his post of duty; the influential noble, whose pure and blameless life, in the midst of corrupt society, might preach Christianity with persuasive eloquence, and make converts every day, is told to shut himself up in a cell, and to hide his light under a bushel. The professed follower of him who promised refreshment and rest unto

those who should adopt his religion, is directed by his ghostly adviser to place some new yoke upon his neck, heavy to carry, and hard to bear.

'The more Vigilantius revered and loved Sulpicius, the more dissatisfied would he be with the system, which never allowed a really pious man to be at rest in his conscience, but filled him with doubts and misgivings as to the safety of his soul, so long as he indulged in the most innocent earthly enjoyments, and reserved anything to be called his own out of his princely patrimony.'—pp. 137—142.

In the year 394, Vigilantius was sent by Sulpicius, with a single companion, to Paulinus, at Nola in Campania, as the bearer of a letter. Paulinus was, at that period, using his utmost influence, and consecrating all his wealth, to introduce into the Latin church those corrupt practices which soon after became its characteristics. Illness protracted the visit of Vigilantius, and exposed him still further to the pernicious and powerful influence of those fanatical superstitions which prevailed at Nola, under the sanction and support of Paulinus, almost as successfully as at Tours, under Martin. The strength both of the principles and of the understanding of Vigilantius, was here put to the severest test. But he came out of the furnace as gold, fitter for the Great Master's use.

'That mind must have been one of no common strength, which could resist the fascinations of the discourse and example of a holy recluse, who was consulted as the Christian oracle of Italy, and who was, at the very period of this visit, employing his wealth and his influence to promote those observances, which Vigilantius afterwards denounced.

'The simple mountaineer saw splendid shrines rising in honour of a man who had lived one hundred and fifty years before, and of whom little could be known with any accuracy. He beheld preparations made for a series of rites, and a course of daily worship, which take the fastest hold upon the imagination. He witnessed the ardour shown by an ordained minister of Christ, to promote the homage of dead men's bones, to encourage prostration before pictures and statues, to invoke the dead, and restore ceremonies which are called idolatrous in the holy page of the book of life. The person who sanctioned these things, and to whom writers, calling themselves Christians, have imputed the honour of being the foremost in promoting this falsely-called '*Christian philosophy*,' was held in such high estimation, that the supreme pontiff of Rome himself could not keep the tide of honour which poured upon him within due bounds; for even when the pope frowned upon him for some of his irregular proceedings, public opinion loudly testified its admiration, and the portals of Paulinus were crowded by persons of the first eminence who came to Nola, at the very time that Vigilantius

was there, to pay him their best tributes of respect. 'They (the two young men) have seen,' said Paulinus, in his epistle to Sulpicius, speaking of the rebuke which he had received from Pope Siricius, for suffering himself to be uncanonically ordained at Barcelona, 'they have seen how the grace of God has made the prejudice of the pope work for my honour; they have seen, within the short interval of a few days, how I have been visited by monks, clergy, and bishops, and even by laymen of the highest rank. There is scarcely a bishop of Campania who has not testified his respect for me in person or by letter; and prelates from Africa have deputed representatives to express their veneration.'

'Of all this public homage, rendered to one of the most celebrated fathers of Christian idolatry, Vigilantius was witness. He loved the man, he heard him discourse, as sophists and fanatics can discourse, in hurried accents, of the lawfulness of mixing up heathen rites with Christian observances, and yet his mind remained unpolluted.

'Under the divine grace and the especial providence which guard those servants of God from evil, who are reserved to be the instruments of correcting and reforming his church, I attribute the escape of Vigilantius from the peculiar perils of his situation, to the scriptural lessons which he learnt of the very man whose religious errors were so dangerous to him. The bane and antidote were both before him.'—pp. 171—173.

But Vigilantius appears to have had his convictions of the abuses and corruptions of the church deepened and strengthened by his visits to such celebrated saints as Martin and Paulinus. Truth, purity, and genuine piety, he had seen sacrificed by these eminent men, to superstition, fanaticism, pretended miracles, and personal ambition. His clear and vigorous understanding had taken hold upon the word of God, and no blandishments, no fashions of the time, no trumpet of holy fame, could seduce him from this deep conviction—that holy scripture virtually, if not by its letter, condemned nearly every thing in which these saintly men prided themselves. That he concealed his convictions cannot be pretended, for both his patrons appear to have known them; and if he was prepared to represent and defend them before Jerome, there could be no reason for his concealing them at home. Yet he obtained ordination about this period, most probably in a Gallic diocese, and through the influence of his patrons, who might have hoped thereby to soften his objections, and reconcile him to the practice of the church. But it had not this effect. He made no secret of his opposition to prevailing corruptions, but published his objections everywhere, and by his preaching gained many adherents in various places. The progress of corruption at Nola, under Paulinus, continued to strengthen those convictions, and Vigilantius determined to visit and confer with that holy recluse at

Bethlehem, whose name was an authority with all the inferior men, and whose example it had become their ambition to follow. This was seeking the lion in his den.

The visit to Jerome had no other effect upon the mind of Vigilantius, than to unveil more of the enormities and absurdities which he condemned; and, after long and fierce disputes, he departs from Palestine, visits Egypt, studies at Alexandria, goes to Italy, and at length arrives at the Cottian Alps, where, probably, at that early age, he found more persons than in other places disposed to listen to his remonstrances against corruptions. Opposition to the yoke of celibacy had become rife in the Sub-Alpine and Gallic provinces. Historic proof exists that the gospel was professed at this time in the Cottian Alps, and probably finding a spirit there congenial with his own, his visit greatly tended to promote and encourage that purer form of Christianity which both tradition and history have connected with that region and with the name of this reformer.

It is not possible to present to our readers any abridgment of the events that followed Vigilantius's visit to Jerome at Bethlehem. Much controversy was the result. Jerome issues his fulminations, and writes letters to his friends, and the friends of Vigilantius, condemning, reviling, and falsely accusing the reformer, but yet bringing no proof, and no charge of any error deserving the name of heresy; but, on the contrary, shewing that the points in dispute were just those very corruptions which have, in after ages, in so many different lands, provoked faithful and honest men to demand a return to apostolical simplicity and purity.

Vigilantius continued to pursue the course of reform, despite the criminations and fulminations of Jerome. He had his friends in the church, who screened him for a while; but they were overborne at length by the authority of his accusers and the ignorant fanaticism of the people, who stupidly bowed their heads in reverent submission to the monks and recluses, whose reputation awed the universal mind, and whose voices silenced those of the apostles and Jesus Christ. Persecution, however, at length fell upon the reformer. He disappears altogether about the year 406; whether he was banished, assassinated, or killed in the general massacre which is known to have taken place at Barcelona by the Vandals, to which place it is reported he had retired, cannot be determined. Certain it is, that the rising torrent of corruption continued to roll on, bearing before it all opposition; and the protests of our reformer and others would never have been heard of, but for the writings of those who opposed him, and the traditions of the Waldenses, which connect him with the history of their churches.

Dr. Gilly's biography is deeply interesting and instructive in more ways than one. Its evident intention is to check the rising and wide spreading admiration of the Nicene age, or, as it has been styled, 'the age of councils and synods,' 'the golden age of Christian learning,' and 'the dogmatic age;' but which was never better defined than as 'the age of all monstrous, all prodigious things.'

Dissent, therefore, was not essentially an evil; but, according to our biographer, a great good, and an essential service to Christ's cause. So it is still, since the church is but yet very partially reformed, according to the standard of Vigilantius, which Dr. Gilly most highly approves. Ever since it has admitted of formal alliances with the state, the church has always been opposed to such reformers as Vigilantius; its tendency has uniformly been to corruption and to the persecution of reformers. Those who now deem themselves, *par excellence*, *the church*, would undo all that reform has ever done, and consign the whole succession of reformers, from Vigilantius down to the dissenters of the present day, to one common perdition. Yet the appeal of the faithful witness who first resisted the tide of corruption, as well as that of the living witnesses, is to the same supreme and scriptural authority, against which all the voices of churchmen, living or dead, have more or less prevailed, but assuredly will not always prevail.

We trust Dr. Gilly's work will be very extensively read, and that it will prove eminently useful in bringing on that happy day when the church of Jesus Christ shall stand, not in the wisdom of men, not in ancient traditions, not in the authority of human statutes, but in the power of God and by the sword of the Spirit. Dr. Gilly must know that the weapon Vigilantius employed is still unsheathed, and is wielded by many a reformer as faithfully and skilfully as ever, against those abuses and corruptions which still exist even in our reformed church, but which can plead just as little sanction from scripture as the saint and relic worship, the celibacy and monachism of the fourth century. The evils of the present church, though neither so glaring nor so vicious in their effects as those Vigilantius assailed, are yet the opprobrium of the men who, with the scripture as their only professed authority, still cling to many of those very abuses which sprung up in the same age, and which have all proceeded from the same sources—ecclesiastical tradition and state alliance—nor can there be any reasonable hope of their removal, till the church stands exclusively by its one Lord, and his one foundation.

ART. VI.—*Select Writings of Robert Chambers. Essays Familiar and Humorous.* 2 vols. Edinburgh.

MR. ROBERT CHAMBERS has now for fifteen years been a feature and a power in the periodical literature of this country. Such a man is worthy of notice and study among his contemporaries if they are worthy of their own attention.

To-day, we can only note some of the qualities and circumstances to which he owes his success and importance. The Messrs. William and Robert Chambers of Edinburgh, have combined in themselves all the departments of the literary craft. They are printers, publishers, and authors. They wield themselves all the elements of bookmaking, the mechanical, commercial, and intellectual. Now we cannot help thinking such men extremely likely to do well in literature. They have all the stimuli, all the knowledge, and all the experience brought to bear upon them, which is usually separated, divided, weakened, dispersed, and scattered, among printers, publishers, and authors. Of course we shall be reminded of the benefits of division of employments. But we do not choose to allow a phrase to blind us to a fact, nor shall we be seared away from the instruction the fact contains by a bugaboo made up of the authority of Adam Smith. We believe the Chamberses have succeeded by the combination of employments. It is no disparagement to Mr. Robert Chambers to say his merely literary talents are not superior to those of Laman Blanchard. Had he been merely a literary man, he could not have made more than a bare subsistence by his pen. As it is, he is a tradesman as well as a literary man, and finds himself consequently a successful author and a successful tradesman. He is at the head of one of the largest establishments in this country. Unlike many literary men who write for the proprietors of journals, he writes for his own purposes, his own opinions, freely and independently. He does not write to order; others write to his orders. What is true of Robert is true of William Chambers in this respect, and we submit they have not become what they are in consequence of the division of employments, but in consequence of the combination of employments. It will not be a sufficient answer to this remark to say, one of the brothers has been more of a publisher and the other more of an author. Individually and severally, as well as in partnership together, they have self done and superintended the whole of their business themselves. They have combined, they have not divided employments. What the Messrs. Chambers have done, they have done in the teeth of a principle of political economy, as popularly and generally understood and interpreted. Of all

the publishers and authors who have endeavoured to supply cheap literature to the public, they have been the most successful and the best. The highest feat in the production of cheap literature has been achieved by the combination and not by the division of employments.

Now, there was a great thing done by the combination of employments upwards of a couple of centuries ago, a thing compared with which cheap literature is insignificant. Shakspeare did his work in spite of the principle of the division of labour. He was a monopolist of employments, a proprietor of his theatre, a wardrobe lender, an actor, and a dramatist. Roll, the chief proprietor of Drury Lane, the poet Bunn, Macready, the tragedian,—*Baron Nathan*—a poetic genius as lofty as that of William Wordsworth, a theatrical tact as effective as that of Sheridan Knowles, combine the logic of the Greek philosophy and the beauty of Italian art in one Saxon man; and the harmonized unit resulting from the compound, the splendid amalgam, would resemble the sublime and manifold Shakspeare.

The profession of literature is notoriously a bad one. The book trade in the publishing department is not found to be generally lucrative. Insolvent publishers are not scarce. Authors who have obtained the widest circulation for their works and yet continue to be needy men, abound in the present day. They have made the fortunes of their publishers, and have not been able to provide for their children. May not the fault lie in the system which makes authors and publishers the natural enemies of each other, instead of partners in the production of books? As for the notion that publishers are the patrons of authors, there would be equal truth in saying, game-preservers are the patrons of game, when they feed them to eat them.

The chief evil of the present system for authors, is the irregularity of their payments. They never know what their income is, or when they will have it or want it. Every author of merit has a portion of the public who feel kindly and gratefully towards him for instruction or amusement. They would gladly pay him. They wish much to see his life rescued from anxiety. But the present system gives no play or scope to their kindness. They have no wish to enrich his publisher. They share the spite of authors against the publishing craft.

Mr. Robert Chambers owes much of his success to the vein of strong Scotch common sense which runs through his writings. Common sense is just the expression of the average selfishness and intelligence of a given people and age. Religious liberty is common sense now-a-days, though it was a crotchet of benevolent enthusiasts two hundred years ago. Free trade is com-

mon sense at Manchester, and quite another thing in the Carlton Club. The opinions of Mr. Robert Chambers embody his view and interpretation of the common sense of his day. His personal qualities are a love of knowledge, a passion for getting on, a shrewd humour, an admiration for comfort and kindness; in short, he is the essayist of success in life, as this success is understood in the sober and moderate, and not in the wild and enthusiastic circles of the Scottish metropolis. His style is neat, plain, and lively. His ideas without being ever profound, original, impassioned, or lofty, are ingenious, clear, and intelligent. He always steers shrewdly, and adroitly, and safely, through his subject, if he never strikes out new light; and his tendencies, as a writer, are good to make men more sensible, prudent, and kindly, if not to exalt, ennoble, and glorify, the human mind.

Mr. Robert Chambers entered the world of letters under the patronage of Sir Walter Scott, and all his prejudices and sympathies are, and always have been, with the poetry and romance of toryism. Jacobitism, a superstition as wretched as the Fetichism of the African negroes, is a thing respecting which he has always been insinuating apologies and applauses into the public mind. Feudalism, the squirely aspect of the superstition which appears in its royal dress in Jacobitism, has received no blows, and many a pleasant little word from his pen. Just before the Reform Bill struggle, and when Chambers's Journals started, aristocracy had reached its greatest height in this country, and has ever since been declining in general estimation and actual wealth and power. Progress has triumphed over ignorance, benevolence over sinister interests, democracy over aristocracy, the people over the peerage, since 1830; but the good cause has had no help, and the evil cause many fair words from Robert Chambers. Hence, though supplying the public with a journal of much merit, he has not lodged himself in the affections of the people. His common sense has led him to ridicule all enthusiasts. A paper, entitled, 'Led by Ideas,' shows this, his bad side, very disagreeably. In this paper, the advocates of allotments for labourers, of co-operative communities, emigration, free-trade, popular sports, national education, out-door relief, temperance, picture-galleries, solitary imprisonment, peace, public baths, are severally, individually, and collectively, held up to ridicule. We are told, the authors of such schemes are 'subjected to a disesteem which never befalls the quiet selfish men of the world.' Our knowledge of such men is pretty extensive; and the picture of them which our author draws, as quite intolerant of the schemes of each, seems to us a gross caricature, the falseness of which would have been

corrected by more general and careful observation. By whom are such enthusiasts held in disesteem? We believe it is not by any large section of the public. When they succeed, they win the admiration of all men and of distant times. Of course, they have the disapprobation of the persons whose selfish interests they interfere with, and of, here and there, a sordid old hermit, whose conduct is rebuked by their generous labours. But Mr. Chambers ought not to cater for the approbation of such men, if he would not share their universal disesteem.

We have not deemed it necessary to illustrate the qualities of Mr. Chambers as a writer, his essays being so well known and accessible. They are all readable, and some of them racy. They are well worthy of perusal in their collected form. The reader of them will find many shrewd observations upon human nature, as there told clearly, cleverly, and amusingly. Upon the whole, as the essayist of prudence and propriety, a teacher of industry, diligence, and perseverance, the name of Robert Chambers is worthy of honour, and his writings entitled to extensive circulation and perusal.

ART. VII.—*History of the Reformation in Germany.* By Leopold Ranke. Translated by Sarah Austin. Vol. III. London: Longman and Co.

THE men of the Reformation were cast in a noble mould. Their qualities were of the highest order, and fitted them to act their part in the great drama of life. There was nothing fictitious or unreal about them. Pretence was foreign from their character. They were all which they appeared, and their actions realised their promises. Between their inner and outer man there was entire congruity, a harmony which bespoke integrity, and revealed the mighty power of their principles. They were not the mere semblance of men, the outward and visible form of a godlike nature, from which the indwelling deity had retired. They stood up erect and manly, a fitting emblem of mental power and conscientiousness. As their character was real and not fictitious, so their work was pursued with intense earnestness. It was in no light or trifling spirit that they followed their vocation. Necessity was laid upon them; they could not do otherwise, so clear and strong was their conviction. They were impelled onward by a sense of right which no logic could weaken, nor authority control. They

were the messengers of God, the appointed heralds of truth, the church within which were the ark of the testimony and the Spirit of the Lord. Such was their conviction, and it gave a lofty and noble enthusiasm to their course. They were in earnest, and they felt themselves right in being so; and the elevating tendency of their conviction was seen in the fortitude with which they encountered difficulties, and the calmness and self-possession which enabled them to triumph over adverse circumstances. There was nothing light or superficial in their labours. They spoke and acted as they thought. Their thoughts were sincere, deep, and earnest; and their actions partook of these qualities. They had many imperfections, they committed many errors. Their views were incomplete and often erroneous; their spirit was intolerant, and their denunciations frequently revolting. Yet, with all this, they were amongst the noblest of men, thoroughly in earnest in a worthy cause, and actuated throughout their career by the highest influences of which our nature is susceptible.

The study of their life and labours is specially appropriate just now to dissenters. It contains a moral which should be deeply pondered, and, if thoroughly comprehended, will go far to prepare us for the struggle on which we are entering. There is no self-laudation in supposing that we have improved somewhat on their views. We have had three hundred years to do so—years of hard conflicts and of terrible privations. We have been disciplined in the school of persecution, and have been sufficiently reluctant to admit its lesson. Our progress has been slow, but it has been real. Our puritan fathers clung to state-churchism; the non-conformists saw the truth more clearly, but failed in reducing it to consistent practice; and the dissenters of the Revolution, down to a recent period, held their principles feebly, and suffered them to be overlaid by political considerations. Throughout the whole, however, there has been steady progress. Truth has been gaining ground; and he who studies, with a philosophic mind, the successive stages of the ecclesiastical controversy, will see that they are but the varying phases of the same great principle, each adapted to its day, naturally growing out of that which preceded, and giving birth to that which followed. Dissenters were never so clear-sighted or so unanimous as at present. They have been approximating to one common centre for some years past, and the providence of God has hastened their movements. With an inconsiderable exception, they are now as the heart of one man in their condemnation of the existing union between things sacred and secular, the incorporation of the church with the institutions and intrigues of the political world. What

they need is earnestness—a deep, abiding, practical sense of the claim of their principles; the right and the obligation of making them paramount, and of labouring for their diffusion, as the first and highest duty which they owe to God and their country. For the production of such a feeling we know few studies more appropriate than that of the history of the Reformation. The men of Germany and of Switzerland were really in earnest; they staked their all in the great cause, and felt that it was worthy of their doing so. The story of their lives is as instructive as it is alluring, and we gladly contribute our aid to render it as popular as it is valuable.

Of the general merits of the work before us we need not now speak, having done so in our notice of the former volumes. There is a largeness and breadth in it not common to ecclesiastical histories. It treats more fully of the political bearings of the Reformation, the secular relation of its chief actors, the course of European negotiation, and the policy of Charles v., of Ferdinand, the pope, the Italian states, the German princes, and the Swiss Cantons. It is the book for statesmen and politicians, at the same time that it is admirably adapted to enlarge the views, and to fill up the meagre outline with which the generality of readers are satisfied.

Having recorded the early struggles and doubtful triumphs of the Lutheran church, the author proceeds, in the volume before us, to narrate its growing strength. In this stage of development we unhappily find it, as Mrs. Austin accurately observes, 'laying claim to the possession of absolute truth; already forging instruments for restraining the inquiry it had so ardently promoted and so largely used; and for establishing an authority akin to that which it had risen to overthrow.' This infirmity of noble minds is deeply to be deplored, as it perpetuated the reign of spiritual despotism, and has left it to the present age to work out the emancipation of mankind. But enough of this. We pass to the history as it stands before us. The age and character of Luther were happily tempered to each other, and the following passage only does simple justice to the coincidence.

'Though the papacy was still intent upon a more rigorous and minute development of its dogmas and its rites, and a more strenuous assertion of them, tendencies of a scientific kind which were opposed to the reigning system of the schools, and longings of the religious spirit which found no satisfaction in the ritual observance of the prescribed ordinances, were at work within its own bosom. The wonderful coincidence was, that just as abuses had risen to the most intolerable height, the study of the sacred books in their original tongues once more revealed to the world, in all its radiance, that pure

idea of Christianity which had so long been darkened or disguised. A man appeared who, in that secret travail and contention of mind to which the remedies usually applied by the church afforded no relief, seized with his whole soul on an aspect of Christianity hitherto the most profoundly obscured ; and such was his own experience of its truth, fulness, and saving power, that he would never more suffer it to be wrested from him, but maintained it unshaken through life and death. In the contest to which it gave rise, he drew around him all the other elements of innovation, with a consistency and sagacity which at length gained over the whole nation, and secured to himself a degree of sympathy such as no other man ever enjoyed. At the same time that he gave a new direction to religious thoughts and feelings, he opened a new prospect of national regeneration. Men already felt that the papacy was not to be held in check by constitutional forms ; and that if they would free themselves from its usurpations, they must contest the spiritual grounds on which those usurpations rested.'—p. 5.

It is known to every reader, that the German and Swiss reformations borrowed much of their character from the personal qualities of their leaders, and that these, again, mainly arose from the circumstances peculiar to the country of each. Luther and Zwingli had some qualities in common, but there were others in which they differed, and which led to bitter and interminable strife.

'If we compare him with Luther,' says Ranke, referring to Zwingli, 'we find that he had no such tremendous tempests to withstand, as those which shook the most secret depths of Luther's soul. As he had never devoted himself with equal ardour to the established church, he had not now to break loose from it with such violent and painful struggles. It was not the profound sense of the power of faith and of its connexion with redemption in which Luther's efforts originated, that made Zwingli a reformer ; he became so, chiefly because, in the course of his study of scripture in search of truth, he found the church and the received morality at variance with its spirit. Nor was Zwingli trained at a university, or deeply imbued with the prevalent doctrinal opinions. To found a high school, firmly attached to all that was worthy of attachment, and dissenting only on certain most important points, was not his vocation. He regarded it much more as the business and duty of his life, to bring about the religious and moral reformation of the republic that had adopted him, and to recal the Swiss Confederation to the principles upon which it was originally founded. While Luther's main object was a reform of doctrine, which, he thought, would be necessarily followed by that of life and morals, Zwingli aimed directly at the improvement of life ; he kept mainly in view the practical significance of scripture as a whole ; his original views were of a moral and political nature ; hence his labours were tinged with a wholly peculiar colour.'—p. 71.

The revolution they severally contemplated was as distinct as were their personal qualities. The views of the Swiss reformer were larger and more radical than those of his contemporary of Wittenberg. He sought to effect a more thorough change in the external aspect of the church, and apart from the doctrine of justification, was clearer and more scriptural in his conceptions of religious truth. Their controversy respecting the Lord's Supper is well known, and few of our readers will hesitate to give the palm to Zwingli; but the following passage betokens other points of disagreement, with which the general reader is not probably so familiar:—

‘The principal difference is, that, whereas Luther wished to retain everything in the existing ecclesiastical institutions that was not at variance with the express words of scripture, Zwingli was resolved to get rid of everything that could not be maintained by a direct appeal to scripture. Luther took up his station on the ground already occupied by the Latin church: his desire was only to purify; to put an end to the contradictions between the doctrines of the church and the gospel. Zwingli, on the other hand, thought it necessary to restore, as far as possible, the primitive and simplest condition of the Christian church; he aimed at a complete revolution.

‘We know how far Luther was from inculcating the destruction of images; he merely combated the superstitions which had gathered around them. Zwingli, on the contrary, regarded the veneration addressed to images as sheer idolatry, and condemned their very existence. In the Whitsuntide of 1524, the council of Zürich, in concert with him, declared its determination of removing all images; which it held to be a godly work. Fortunately, the disorders which this measure excited in so many other places, were here avoided. The three secular priests, with twelve members of the council, one from each guild, repaired to the churches, and caused the order to be executed under their own supervision. The crosses disappeared from the high altars, the pictures were taken down from the altars, the frescoes scraped off the walls, and whitewash substituted in their stead. In the country churches the most precious pictures were burnt, ‘to the praise and glory of God.’ Nor did the organs fare better; they too were connected with the abhorred superstition. The reformers would have nothing but the simple word. The same end was proposed in all the practices of the church. A new form of baptism was drawn up, in which all the additions ‘which have no ground in God's word’ were omitted. The next step was the alteration of the mass. Luther had contented himself with the omission of the words relating to the doctrine of sacrifice, and with the introduction of the sacrament in both kinds. Zwingli established a regular love feast (Easter 1525). The communicants sat in a particular division of the benches, between the choir and the transept, the men on the right, the women on the left; the bread was carried about on

large wooden platters, and each broke off a bit, after which the wine was carried about in wooden cups. This was thought to be the nearest approach to the original institution.'—pp. 86—88.

The Diet of Spires in 1529 gave visible form to the resistance which it was determined to offer to the evangelical doctrine. It was resolved formally to revoke the article of the Recess of 1526, in virtue of which all existing innovations were recognised. Ecclesiastical bodies were forbidden to be deprived of their authorities and revenues; and such as denied 'the sacrament of the true body and blood of Christ,' were to be subjected to the severest penalties of ecclesiastical law:

'In short,' says our author, 'though the dissidents were not expressly admonished in the Recess, to return to the bosom of the church they had abandoned, it was unquestionable that by assenting to it they would bring about the total and speedy ruin of the evangelical church, which was just rising into importance.

'It appeared as if the religious reforms which had begun to acquire consistency from the situation of the political affairs of Europe, were now about to be overthrown by the changes which those affairs had undergone. The great community of the empire, which for a while had wavered, now resumed its station on the side of the two great combined powers.'—pp. 165, 166.

It remained now to be seen whether the reformers would submit. Authority was clearly against them. The emperor's brother, Ferdinand, was actively concurrent with the majority, and no doubtful indications were afforded of the readiness of the catholic princes and divines to resort to force. It required large faith to abide steadfast: to waver now would be to abandon all they had projected, whilst to maintain their position seemed fraught with certain ruin. Their perplexity was increased by their relation to the emperor, of whose policy there could be no doubt. He was their liege lord, and few of them were yet prepared to resist the power with which it was obvious he would seek to crush their church. In this crisis Saxony was firm. On the 12th of April, Minkwitz, the envoy of the elector, declared in a full assembly of the empire, that in affairs of conscience a majority had no force. This was an ominous averment, sufficiently startling under the circumstances, and not fully comprehended, as is clear, by the parties who uttered it. It betokens, however, the progress which men were making, unknown to themselves, and reveals the salutary influence of trial. Truth has gained little in calm and sunny hours. It has been amidst the darkness and fury of the tempest that men have resorted to the strongholds in which alone they are unassailable and safe. The principle involved in this avowal

was at first only partially applied. The parties who used it did not contemplate its universal application. They raised it as a shield for their own defence, but denied it to others. An important service, however, was rendered by its utterance on this great occasion, and during the three hundred years which have since elapsed, it has passed into an axiom which no honest or reflecting man will deny. King Ferdinand and the Catholic majority were not, however, to be diverted from their policy. They demanded entire obedience, and the evangelical princes, startled at the refusal of their proposals, retired to determine on their course. The result is known to history, and is thus detailed by our author:—

‘In reply to a request of the princes, that they would not refuse a short delay, King Ferdinand said that he had received the positive commands of his imperial majesty; these he had executed, and so the matter must remain: the articles were determined on. So saying, he and the commissioners left the house. Still more irritated by the contempt for their dignity and their rights which this conduct implied, the evangelical states now determined to execute a project which they had conceived some weeks before, as soon as they saw the turn affairs were taking at the diet. They resolved to resort to the only legal means of resistance left them. It was evidently impossible to make the assembly recede from its resolutions; to submit to them, would be to renounce their own existence. They reappeared in the same sitting,—not indeed before the king and the imperial commissioners, but before the states still assembled,—and caused that protest to be read aloud, from which they took the name their descendants still bear—Protestants.

‘They especially insisted on the fundamental principles of the laws of the empire. They declared that they could not be obliged, without their consent, to give up the privileges secured to them by the Recess lately drawn up at Spires, which had been confirmed by such strong mutual promises, and attested by their common seals; that the attempt of the other states to repeal this by their separate act, was null and void, and had no authority over them; that they should go on to conduct themselves towards their subjects in matters of religion, according to the terms of the former Recess, and as they thought they could answer it to God and the emperor. If the other States were not to be restrained from framing the present Recess with the offensive resolutions, they begged that their protest might at least be incorporated with it.

‘This declaration, the mere form of which is most remarkable, was expressed with all possible external deference and courtesy. The States were all spoken of as ‘our dear lords, cousins, uncles, and friends;’ they were entitled, with the most careful attention to their several distinctions, ‘You, well beloved, and you, others.’ To the former were addressed ‘friendly requests,’ to the latter, ‘gracious consideration’ (*Gnädiges Gesinnen*); and while they do not for an

instant lose sight of their princely dignity, they beg their opponents not to misunderstand the course which they feel themselves compelled to adopt: in return, they promise the former to deserve this by their friendship, and the latter to requite it by their good will. The style of the documents of this century certainly have no claim to be called beautiful or classical, but they are suited to the circumstances, and have a marked character,—like the men of that age and all that they do.—pp. 171—173.

In consequence of these proceedings a league was projected between the two branches of the reformation. Under the pressure of a common danger the princes deemed such a league practicable, and it is only just to the Swiss reformers to say, that the objections which prevented it did not emanate from them. On this point, as on some others, they were greatly in advance of the Lutherans, amongst whom the spirit of an exclusive orthodoxy was lamentably prevalent. It is due, however, to the latter, to bear in mind what our author remarks, 'that the whole reformation originated in religious convictions, which admit of no compromise, no conditions, no extenuation.' There was no general principle recognized as the basis of their procedure, no assertion of human right, no distinct perception of the sacredness of conscience, and the direct relation which man sustains to his Maker. Each was persuaded of the truth of what he held, and abided by it simply as such. 'Some are sorrowful,' said Luther, 'as if God had forgotten us; but he cannot forget us, he must first forget himself; our cause must be not his cause, our doctrine not his work. Were Christ not with us, where then were he in the world? If we have not God's word, who then has it?' This was the secret both of the strength and of the weakness of the German reformation. It raised its agents above the fear of man, but induced an intolerant suppression of the faith of others. In the present case it led to evil, as the following extract will show:—

'The parties to the new league had at first kept it secret from the theologians in Spire; and when at length it was communicated to them, they were obliged to acquiesce in it.

'But they were the first in whose minds scruples concerning it arose. Melancthon, a man who, with patient and unwearied labour, worked out in his own mind every difficult problem that came before him, returned home robbed of his accustomed cheerfulness. He fancied that if Zwingli's adherents had been abandoned, the Lutherans would have found the majority more willing to make concessions; he reproached himself with not having insisted upon this, as was his duty. He was alarmed at the idea that a subversion of the empire and of religion might be the consequence of this compliance. On reaching Wittenberg he spoke to Luther about it, and we may easily

imagine what were his sentiments. Melancthon fell into the most painful state of inward strife. 'My conscience,' says he, in a letter of the 17th May, 'is disquieted because of this thing; I am half dead with pondering upon it.' On the 11th June: 'My soul is possessed by such bitter grief, that I neglect all the duties of friendship, and all mystudies.' On the 14th: 'I feel myself in such disquiet, that I had rather die than endure it longer.' As if with a desire to remedy the wrong that had been committed, he at length endeavoured on his own authority, to put his friends in Nürnberg on their guard against concluding the projected treaty. 'For the godless opinions of Zwingli must on no account be defended.'

'His sovereign master, the elector, he could safely leave to Luther's influence.

'Luther, as we have said, had not hesitated a moment to condemn the alliance with the followers of Zwingli. Instantly and spontaneously, on hearing Melancthon's statement of the facts, he applied to Elector John even now to set aside the agreement concluded at Spires. He represented to him that all such compacts were dangerous, and reminded him how the former one had been misused by the impetuosity of the young landgrave. 'How then,' said he, 'shall we dare to connect ourselves with people who strive against God and the Holy Sacrament? We shall thus go to perdition, body and soul.'—pp. 184—186.

The views of the Protestants were greatly divided as to whether they were bound by the words of scripture to pay unlimited obedience to the emperor. In their case, as with the Puritans, the development of political truth was aided by religious sympathies. The emperor was known to be unfavourable to them. His hostility had been growingly evinced for some time past, and many things induced the belief that he would, probably, ere long, resort to force to constrain their obedience. In these circumstances it was natural for conscientious men to inquire how far they would be justified to resist the supreme power of the empire; what, in fact, were the limits of obedience, and whether rights, though subordinate, might be defended in arms against a superior and aggressive power. The jurists maintained that self-defence being permitted, resistance was justifiable, and Bugenhagen, on whom, in the absence of Luther and Melancthon, it devolved to decide the theological question, affirmed their judgment. 'He declared, that if a power, however unquestionably derived from God, set itself in opposition to God, it could no longer be regarded as the supreme authority.' Luther's opinion, however, was totally different from that of his colleague, and it ultimately prevailed even in Saxony. It was partly true and partly false. True, as it repudiated a resort to arms in defence of religion; and false, as

it involved a denial to subjects of the right of resistance to civil tyranny.

The elector, John of Saxony, took an active and prominent part throughout these discussions. He stood confessedly at the head of the Protestant princes of the empire, and the integrity of his character gave weight and consideration to his views. Few men have passed through trying circumstances with a more unblemished reputation, and the following brief sketch of his career will be read with interest by all who admire high principles, or do honour to undeviating consistency:—

‘Elector John of Saxony, the last of the four excellent sons of Elector Ernest,—educated with the greatest care, at Grimma, to qualify him for either the spiritual or the temporal dignities of the empire—the progenitor of the Ernestine house, which has now such numerous and flourishing branches—did not possess the political genius, nor the acute and penetrating mind of his brother Frederic. On the other hand, he was remarkable from his childhood for good nature and frankness,—‘without guile and without bile,’ as Luther said,—yet full of that moral earnestness which gives weight and dignity to simplicity of character. He is believed to have lived to his thirty-second year, when he married, in perfect chastity; there is at least no trace of the contrary. The brilliant and tumultuous knightly festivals in which he sometimes took part at the court of Maximilian, afforded him no satisfaction, although he always made a distinguished figure at them; he once said, at a later period of his life, that not one of these days had passed without a sorrow. He was not born for the amusements and dissipations of the world; the disgust which inevitably attends them made too deep an impression on him, and gave him more pain than their frivolous enjoyments gave him pleasure. With his brother, who was his coregent, he never had a difference; never did the one engage a person in his service without the full consent of the other. From the first appearance of Luther in the world, John embraced his doctrines with the most joyful sympathy; his serious and profoundly religious mind was gradually but completely imbued with them. His greatest enjoyment was, to have the scriptures, which he now heard for the first time, read aloud to him in an evening; sometimes he fell asleep—for he was already far advanced in years—but he awoke repeating the last verse that dwelt upon his memory. He occasionally wrote down Luther’s sermons, and there is extant a copy of the lesser catechism in his handwriting. Examples are not wanting, both before and since his time, of princes whose powers of action have been paralysed by absorption in religious contemplation; but with him this was not the case; notwithstanding the extreme simplicity of his character, he was not less conspicuous for elevation and force of will. When, during the peasants’ war, the cause of the princes was in so tottering a state, he did not disguise from himself that a terrible convulsion might ensue; he was prepared for reverses, and was heard to say that

he could content himself with a horse or two, and be a man like other men; but this sentiment did not prevent his defending his good right as bravely as any of his brother princes; only he used his victory with greater clemency. It would be difficult to point out a moment in the subsequent years of his reign, in which he could have indulged in a merely contemplative piety. We know of no prince to whom a larger portion of the merit of the establishment of the protestant church can justly be ascribed. His brother and predecessor had merely not suffered the new doctrines to be crushed; he had taken them under his protection in his own dominions, and, so far as it was possible, in the empire. But when John assumed the government, there were rocks on either side, on which the whole cause might have gone to wreck, and which could only have been avoided by a policy founded on those lofty convictions that never for a moment failed or wavered. The peasants' war was followed by violent tendencies to a re-action; and urgently as the adoption of these was pressed upon him by his worldly-wise and experienced cousin, John did not allow himself to be mastered by them. On the contrary, the course which he took at the ensuing diet contributed to the passing of that Recess on which the whole subsequent legal structure of protestantism was reared. It soon indeed appeared as if the impetuosity of his Hessian ally would hurry the elector into a series of political perplexities of which nobody could foresee the end; but his calmer and better judgment saved him in time, and he returned to that defensive position which was natural to him, and which he was able to maintain. His sole object and endeavour was to give to the new doctrines an utterance and a recognised existence in his dominions. He introduced into Germany the first evangelical form of church government, which, in a greater or less degree, served as model for all others. He speedily put a stop to the arbitrary acts of his nobles; mild and sweet tempered as he was, he was not to be induced to grant any unjust favour, and he censured his son for listening more than was prudent to those about him. In all these respects, Luther had the greatest influence over him; Luther knew how to set the secret springs of this pure and noble soul in motion at the fitting time, and to keep this upright conscience constantly awake. Thus, therefore, it was John of Saxony who took the lead in that Protest which gave its name and position to the whole party. For when justice and religion were on his side, he knew not hesitation; he sometimes quoted the proverb, 'Straight forward makes a good runner.' ('Gradaus giebt einen guten Renner.') He was by nature retiring, peaceful, unpretending; but he was raised to such a pitch of resolution and energy by the greatness of his purposes, that he showed himself fully equal to their accomplishment.—pp. 288—292.

The growing diversities of opinion amongst reformers, had from the first alarmed their more timid friends, and given to their enemies much occasion for scandal. It was nothing more than might have been anticipated. The breaking up of the

dull monotony of ancient formalism rendered it inevitable, and the subsequent history of religious opinions serves clearly to show that the wisest course would have been to let such diversities alone. The sixteenth century, however, was not prepared for this heroic forbearance. Protestants and Catholics proclaimed a common crusade against the minor sects, and their histories form, in consequence, some of the darkest chapters of religious persecution. The natural result followed. They receded farther and farther from the recognized standards of orthodoxy. One diverging opinion generated another, and a deeply rooted hatred of all ecclesiastical authority was spread throughout Europe. At this we are not surprised; the measures adopted were well suited to elicit such a result, and should be borne in mind in any judgment we pass on the opinions and spirit of the Separatists. The following sketch of some of these measures may be received as an illustration of what was acted on a European theatre:—

‘It is difficult to believe how widely these opinions were diffused. We find them in Salzburg, without being able to trace how they got there. They were professed by a community of poor people who rejected all divine worship, lived together in solitary places, and established confraternities by voluntary contributions; they called themselves Gardener-brethren (*Gärtnerbrüder*). They believed that the desire to do good was inherent in man, and that if he fulfilled the law it was enough; for that God drew us to himself by that necessity of acting justly, which he had imposed on us: that Christ was by no means the fulfiller of the law, but a teacher of Christian life;—doctrines of no very profound, but of a perfectly innocuous character. Nevertheless they drew down upon these poor people the most terrific punishment. Some of them being discovered at a meeting in the house of a parish priest, had, without hesitation, given the names of the absent members of their society. Hereupon, they were all delivered up to justice. Those of a weaker faith who allowed themselves to be persuaded to recant, were first beheaded and then burnt. Those who refused to recant were consigned alive to the flames. ‘They lived long,’ says a contemporaneous account, ‘and called aloud upon God, so that it was most piteous to hear.’ In other places, they were brought together into the house where they had frequently held their meetings and preached to one another, fastened in, and the house set fire to. ‘They cried out most lamentably together, and at length gave up the ghost: God help them and us all!’

‘There was a beautiful girl of sixteen, who could by no means be induced to recant;—for indeed the soul is at that age stronger and more capable of the highest flights of devotedness to a great moral sentiment, than at a more advanced period of life;—it is certain that she was guilty of the things whereof she was accused, but in all other respects she had the consciousness and the expression of the purest

innocence. Every body supplicated for her life. The executioner took her in his arms, carried her to a place near where horses were watered, and held her under the water till she was drowned; he then drew out the lifeless body, and committed it to the flames.'—pp. 560—562.

It is almost needless to say, that Mrs. Austin has discharged her duty as a translator with eminent fidelity. Her rendering is at once free and accurate. It preserves the German cast of thought in a perspicuous and graceful English style. We thank her for her labour, and shall welcome its continuation as an invaluable addition to our historical literature.

ART. VIII.—*The Elements of Moral Science.* By Francis Wayland, D.D., President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy.

NOTHING more clearly indicates man's superiority over his fellow-beings which constitute the animal creation, than his ethical nature. If the doctrine of final causes be not altogether a presumption, surely we hazard no error in saying, that the nature of every being marks out the end for which that being is designed. Do we see in brutes any development of a moral, religious, or æsthetical faculty? It is contended by some, indeed, that we ought to regard the examples of sagacity which the higher animals exhibit, as indicating a species of reason. Be it so: still it cannot be denied that the chain of consequences which they can forge is soon run out; it consists, at best, but of a very few links. But by whatever name we may call the brutal intelligence, it may perhaps be admitted that there are cases in which it may not be easy to draw the precise distinction between this intelligence and some of the lower exercises of reason in man. It would seem, however, that at all events, there is a clear line of demarcation between *conscience* in him, and any thing which, so far as the effects are concerned, might seem to resemble it in brutes. An animal may be trained to act in a certain manner from dread of pain, as we see in the absurd tricks which dogs are sometimes cruelly taught to practise at the sound of the lash: and there are cases in which some animals seem to exhibit what appears almost like a sense of guilt and shame. Probably all such phenomena may be resolved into the fear of punishment; that is, ultimately, into association; for that animals are subject to this law of intelligence, is

not to be doubted. This is proved by all their acquired habits ; and is exemplified every time a horse stops of his own accord at an accustomed inn. Animals, equally with man, are formed to act, also, on the *à priori* principle, that the course of nature is uniform ; that like causes, in like circumstances, will produce like effects ; that is, that what has happened will happen again : for why else should the dog that has once been thrown into the water shun the river's brink ? In regard to these ultimate principles which regulate all physical activity, it may be said of the animal tribes, as of man : '*The inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding.*' But no one, that we are aware, ever regarded any of the phenomena of the mind of brutes as *moral*, any more than *æsthetical*. The most stupendous scenes of nature may lie before them, but there is no indication of any corresponding feelings. The most terrible devastations they may commit on human life and property, are unattended with any signs of remorse, or of the consciousness of having broken a moral law. Indeed the very supposition of such sentiments as attaching to brutes, seems absurd. The sense of law, the sense of beauty and of sublimity, the sense of a creating power, demand a lofty elevation of reason. The brutes are thus deficient, because they have no moral and religious destination. The Roman poet, in his celebrated description of the creation, (so remarkably coincident, in many of its details, with the Mosaic account,) beautifully characterizes the moral nature of man, in the first word of the lines which he devotes to the subject of the formation of the human race :—

Sanctius his animal, mentisque capacius altæ
 Deerat adhuc, et quod dominari in cetera posset
 Natus homo est. Sive hunc divino semine fecit
 Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo :
 Sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto
 Æthere, cognati retinebat semina cœli.
 Quam satus Iapeto, mistam fluvialibus undis,
 Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

Man's destiny as a moral being does not exhibit itself at his birth. He is at first, indeed, a mere animal of remarkable organization. His primitive and instinctive tendencies, on the contrary, begin to be developed with the first hour of his existence. Many of these, as they each come into activity, present no moral or even deliberative character ; and spontaneously tend to their objects before reason has taught what end they are designed to answer. We see, in infancy, a multitude of desires appearing in the form of the instinctive impulses of the appetite for food ; the tendency to activity, and to self-preservation ;

the desire of knowledge, (curiosity,) and of society; assimilation, or voluntary and involuntary imitation; the sense of the ludicrous; the love of possession or power; the principles of fear, sorrow, joy, and shame in the form of shyness. Along with the advance and maturity of reason, we find the development of wonder; the desire of the approbation of others; the desire of superiority; conscience; the emotions of taste; the sense of sex.

Coevally with some of the above elements of human nature, arise other sentiments which are formed to have a more exclusive bearing on the social state: we allude to the benevolent and displacent affections, such as love, sympathy, gratitude, on the one hand; or hate, and anger, on the other. Some of these emotions which have a direct relation to society, give a social character to certain of the former; which, (as we have implied) terminate in the individual who feels them: thus, for example, joy and sorrow, which are first awakened by what befalls ourselves, are afterwards, as occasion may arise, taken into combination with the sympathetic principle, and we are thus capable of sympathising in the joy and grief of others. In a similar manner, the sense of sex, allied with the complacent or benevolent affection, becomes erotic love.

Now it might, we suppose, easily be shewn that none of these elemental principles of human feeling are, in themselves, evil; though they are all capable of perversion, and have actually been perverted in the history of mankind. Indeed, if they are only so many connate tendencies of man, as he is constituted by his Creator, to imagine any of them essentially immoral, would violate all our notions of the Deity—notions which are never given up in any form of Theism, either natural or revealed. To regard any part of the human constitution as, *in itself*, immoral, appears to us proceeding on false views of that in which vice and depravity really consist. Perhaps it may be asked—whether anger and hate, at least, (which are sometimes, and as we think, undesirably, termed ‘malevolent affections,’) are not always more or less evil? We would venture to say, in reply, that we judge the contrary. That they may very easily degenerate into base passions is too well known: they do so whenever they fix on the wrong object; or when they appear in the form of malice, envy, or revenge. The same, however, might be said of the natural love of superiority: this also may readily lead to arrogance, undue contempt, or malignity. We must, in all these cases, make just distinctions. The connate tendency to anger, or the capacity of feeling it, must be guided and restrained by reason and by conscience. Hatred must be of *evil*, not of persons. The love of superiority must be in what is good, and it

should be blended with good feeling towards others. Some of these illustrations may possibly be thought to go near to begging the question: still we think that the moral facts of human nature would bear them out. We may add our conviction, that it would not be difficult to sustain them by an appeal to delineations of the Divine attributes; or of virtuous human character, even that of Jesus himself; in the books of the Old and New Testament.

In very early infancy, there is no self-control: no anticipation of evil consequences. Such of the elementary impulses as are awake and active, carry forward the will accordingly as any one of them may, at any time, happen to be the most strongly excited. Reason dawns, and soon begins to lay some check upon the first promptings of impulse; which are now seen often to lead directly to evil in the form of bodily pain, the instantaneous result of rashness and incaution. This is the beginning of moral discipline to the infant mind. But reason is long in rising to the general conception, that the complete satisfaction of all the separate tendencies of our nature is impracticable; that there is necessarily an antagonism among them; and that the greatest possible present good, as a whole, is the resultant of a balance of these antagonist powers.

Thus, when the reign of mere blind impulse and passion has ceased to be undisputed, the principle of self-interest begins to work. There is now some calculation of consequences. Whether we call this principle, and the previously-developed elementary impulses themselves, by the common name of self-love, or not, may be of little moment, provided we only remember that, before reason has given the idea of self-interest, we do not act from *motives* in any sort of *moral* sense: we are merely urged forward by impulse, as mechanically as the stone gravitates to the earth. Even when self-interest is first called into action, we are not yet strictly, and in the proper sense, *moral agents*—we have only begun to be rational. Self-interest teaches that we must not, as we value the very good which our impulses bid us seek, follow these impulses blindly; we must use, for the divining of consequences, the little experience we have of the laws of the physical world, and of the circumstances in which we find ourselves placed: 'the burnt child dreads the fire.'

Self-interest is not the highest law of which we are susceptible of feeling the influence, though some moralists (by a very hasty process, as it seems to us), would reduce all practical ethics to this single principle. For, in one word, we would ask, how can man be supposed always to act from self-interest, when, in a thousand actions, his utmost attempt at analyzing the phenomena which are passing within him at a given moment, can

detect no such element? There is a higher and nobler law, which after a while begins to utter forth its mandates, and which is destined to control all the impulses, and even self-interest itself; though it must be admitted, that this law—we of course mean the law of *duty*—is never opposed to self-interest in the most enlarged view of it. In other words, the good is never, ultimately, and on the grand scale, opposed to the useful. This is probably the cause why some writers have placed the essence of virtue (incorrectly, we think) in *utility*. When the idea of *right* or moral order is attained, and in proportion as it is clearly attained, its beauty and its harmony with all things are at once felt and recognized—however impulse or self-interest, on the usual partial scale, may sway the will to resistance. In other words, conscience is awakened. Where is the child, arrived at intelligence to comprehend the terms, who would not acknowledge that truth and gratitude were right—that lying and ingratitude were wrong? Supposing previous ignorance of the subject—which would be the easier—to inspire the idea that the two former are in harmony, the two latter in discordance, with moral order; or the idea of the reverse? Here we arrive at a point between which and self-interest, as commonly understood, there is a vast chasm—far wider than that which lies between passion and self-interest itself. Passion, when it reigns, blindly urges, reckless of what can properly be called self-interest, and often in diametric opposition to it: but in the one case the impulse, in the other the motive, tends towards gratification or satisfaction. But when the moral principle comes into operation, we recognize a new element—a new natural law—a law which is to arbitrate amidst all other contending claims, and is to demand precedence above all. We gain the idea of *obligation*—an idea which has reference—not to impulse—not to calculation—not to gratification—but to the highest good *in itself*, and for its *own* sake; an idea which we feel ought to regulate all impulses and passions, and to reign over the mind apart from all consideration of self-interest, and paramount to all consequences.

Of course, the most happy state possible to man, in this world, is that in which there is the greatest harmony between the elemental impulses, self-interest properly understood, and moral obligation. In proportion as this harmony is anyhow prevented, life will tend to prove a conflict of antagonist powers; but the predominance of the moral principle, which it is the main object of Christianity to secure, will remedy, as far as the nature of things renders possible, any want of this harmony, by subjugating the natural impulses, together with ordinary self-interest, to the dominion of moral law. We must no longer, however, pursue

this train of thought, but address ourselves to the volume before us.

The author of this work proceeds on the principle, that there is a science of morals to which the natural faculties of man are, in themselves, capable of leading. We have taken occasion, in a former number,* to advocate this view of ethics, in distinction from that which would seem to deny that the rational and moral constitution of human nature, as now existing, ought to be regarded as a legitimate source of theoretic morals.

It is true that the enormous aberrations of man's will from rectitude, exemplified in all history, and in the chronicles of daily life, constitute a great fact, which no one can or ever does dispute, whatever interpretation may be put on it according to the variation of theological systems. Passion and self-interest evidently have power to darken the light of reason, and benumb the moral sense; false associations, the resultant of these disturbing forces, confound good and evil; and man may be so sunk in animal and brutal degradation, as hardly to seem any longer a moral being. Nevertheless, even waiving all other considerations, it may be affirmed, that the extent to which pagan writers on ethics, of different ages and nations, have agreed as to what is right and what is wrong, not only among themselves, but also with the precepts of Christianity, has never been satisfactorily accounted for, apart from the principle that there are moral elements in man's nature of uniform origin and tendency—in short, a 'law written on the heart;' and that this law, however obscured, or perverted, or apparently obsolete, still remains there, as a part of the human constitution. Men's minds may be turned away from the business of endeavouring to trace the inscription, or, even when it is set forth in legible characters, and fortified with the deductions of reason by some master-spirit like those of antiquity (nay, even by evangelists and apostles), the law may still fail of actual power to subdue the will and passions of men; but wherever the subject has become interesting enough to command special attention, there is, within certain limits, an agreement as to good and evil, evidently indicating a uniform moral constitution in man, which may be made to testify to what is right, much as its voice has been overpowered by the practice of what is wrong.

Professor Wayland states that, when he began lecturing on moral philosophy in Brown University, the text-book in use was the work of Paley. He soon found himself compelled to dissent from that distinguished writer, but unsatisfactory ethical theorist; and, in the course of time, the materials of the present

* See Spalding's Christian Morals, May, 1845.

volume were accumulated. The former part of the book is entitled, 'Theoretical Ethics.' The author begins by discussing the *origin of our notion of the moral quality of actions*. In so doing, he defines moral philosophy as the science which classifies and illustrates moral law. 'All relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of the enactment of the Creator of all things.' Hence, the moral laws of God can never be varied by the institutions of man, any more than the physical laws. The reason why men imagine they can violate moral law, and yet escape the consequences, is, because while, in physics, the consequent often follows the antecedent immediately, and for the most part after a stated interval; in morals, the result is often long delayed, and the time of its occurrence is uncertain. Still the effects which God has connected with actions will invariably happen, just as the sequences which follow by the law of gravitation. What, then, is a moral action? It is the action, not only of a voluntary and intelligent agent, for brutes are, to some extent, voluntary and intelligent—and they are so far the subjects of government, that we can often determine their actions by intimidation or encouragement: a moral action is the action or volition of a voluntary intelligent agent who is capable of distinguishing right from wrong—what he *ought* from what he *ought not* to do. In order to determine the question—in what part of an action we discover its moral quality?—the author proceeds to observe that, in a deliberate (external) action, four distinct elements commonly exist; namely, the outward act, the conception of this act, the resolution to carry the conception into effect, and the intention or design with which all this is done. The (subjective) moral quality of the action belongs, says Dr. Wayland, only to the *intention*: this is that in which it resides. A and B both conceive the thought of giving C a piece of money; both resolve to give it to C; both actually do give it: there is nothing here to determine the question of right or wrong; but if A gave the money to C with the intention of bribing C to commit a crime, and B gave it with the intention of making C the channel of beneficence to a family in distress, the moral quality attaching to the whole action is at once determined. Hence we hold men guilty, not for the consequences, but for the motive, that is the intention of their actions. So also we distinguish between the instrument and the intender of good; and this distinction regulates our gratitude. It is not, however, necessarily wrong to intend evil. Harm or punishment may be inflicted, with propriety, for the ends of justice. Here the good of society demands evil to the offender. The whole of the intention, then, must be taken into the account. We think it must already be evident to our readers, from the above abstract,

that the author has brought to his work no mean qualifications for psychological and moral analysis.

In pursuing the fundamental inquiry, 'whence do we derive our notion of the moral quality of actions?' the utilitarian theory, among others, is discussed. Dr. Wayland argues that if the consequences of actions represent to us their moral character, it ought to be found, in practice, that we are so constituted as to approve of certain actions on the precise *account* that they promote our own benefit or that of others; but he asks—

'Is it a fact that we are conscious of this connexion? When we are conscious that an act is right, is this consciousness preceded by a conviction that this action will be productive of the greatest amount of happiness? When we say, it is wrong to lie or steal, do we find this consciousness preceded by the notion that lying or stealing will not produce the greatest amount of happiness? When we say, a man ought to obey God, his Creator and Preserver, do we find this conviction preceded by the other, that the exercise of this affection will produce the greatest amount of happiness? I am much deceived, if many persons will not be found who will declare that, often as they have formed these judgments, the idea of the greatest amount of happiness never actually entered into their conception.'

We think it undeniable that, frequently as the tendencies and consequences of actions present themselves to our minds in connexion with our moral approbation or disapprobation of them, we as often feel the latter sentiments without the immediate consciousness of any such estimate. We are struck with the moral beauty or turpitude of an action in itself, and for its own sake; and our being so affected does not appear, by any means, *essentially to depend* on the accompaniments or results of the action, however much these may, in certain circumstances, have a reflex influence on our moral sentiments. Still, that it is of the very nature of virtue to produce happiness, we do not for a moment doubt. There would almost seem to be some necessary connexion, in the nature or appointed constitution of things, between what is right and what is, on the grand scale, beneficial; for it appears as impossible for us to imagine that an action can be right, without its being ultimately, or immediately, calculated to promote happiness, as to imagine an effect without a cause. Even Dr. Wayland, though justly denying, on the authority of fact and phenomena, that *to us* a course of conduct is felt to be right simply *because it is useful*; does not hesitate to admit the possibility that, after all, the foundation of right may be closely united with the tendency to happiness. He thinks, however, that it may be doubted whether the solution (in this respect) of the question—why is an

action right? may not be beyond the reach of the human faculties. Bishop Butler says, on a somewhat different subject:—
 ‘An infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this *moral piety* of moral agents *in and for itself, as well as* upon account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness of the creation; or the whole end for which God made and governs the world may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties.’*

The author also repudiates the theory that our notion of the moral quality of actions is derived from mere association:—
 ‘Association is the faculty by which we transfer, but we can transfer nothing which did not previously exist. We could never use the idea of right and wrong by association, unless we had already acquired it.’ This argument, however, would hardly avail against the advocates of the doctrine that the utility of an action and its rectitude are but two names for the same thing; for they would of course maintain that actions are called ‘right,’ or conformable to rule, merely because the idea of utility is associated with them; that is, they are conformed to the law of utility. Dr. Wayland further alleges that our notion of the moral quality of actions is not derived from an exercise of judgment. He understands ‘a judgment’ in the logical sense of affirming or denying a predicate of a subject: but before we can do this we must have the notion of the predicate and the subject already in our minds. A man who had no notion of ‘grass,’ nor of ‘green,’ could never intelligently affirm that ‘grass is green.’ A man who had no notion of right or wrong, could never affirm these qualities of any subjects; much less could he by judgment acquire the original idea. The judgment affirms a relation to exist between two notions which previously existed in the mind; but it can give us no *original notions* of quality, either in morals or in any thing else.’

Our acute and enlightened transatlantic moralist then proceeds to unfold his own views of this difficult and controverted point, substantially as follows: as soon as a human being comprehends the relation in which two human beings stand to each other, whether he himself be one of the parties or not, there arises in his mind *on the very conception of this relation*, a notion of moral obligation—an impression that *one* of the parties *ought* to exercise certain dispositions towards the other. This is the result of the human constitution as adapted to the objective relations of things; and this would be our feeling even irrespective of any knowledge of a Deity. In like manner, we cannot contemplate the notion of an infinite being, as standing to us in the relation of Creator, Benefactor, Lawgiver, and Judge, and

* Analogy, part i. chap. ii.

to whom we stand in the relation of dependent creatures, without the consciousness that we *ought* to entertain certain corresponding dispositions towards him. 'And hence, in general, our feeling of moral obligation is a peculiar and instinctive impulse, arising at once by the principles of our constitution, as soon as the relations are perceived in which we stand to the beings, created and uncreated, with whom we are connected.' The author admits that the proof of this statement must rest with human consciousness; and he illustrates it by remarking, that his views are confirmed by the manner in which we attempt to awaken moral feelings both in others and in ourselves. In the case of others, we always place before the mind the relation in which the parties stand to each other. In our own case we do the same: if, for instance, we wish to awaken in ourselves gratitude to another, we dwell on the idea that the individual is our benefactor; if this does not produce gratitude, nothing else will. It is not the thought of the greatest good, but the thought of the relations of the parties, that causes the moral feeling. The Deity has dealt with man in the same way. What so calculated to produce a sense of gratitude and its attendant acts, as the revealed character of God—the relations he condescends to sustain towards man? Dr. Wayland forcibly distinguishes between the sense of duty, and the sense of utility, if we may so call it, as motives to moral actions; and we cannot hesitate to believe that virtue, regarded in a subjective light, is totally distinct from the bare aim at utility, whatever *objective* connection there may be in the moral order of the universe between virtue and happiness. If a child were to say, 'I will obey my father because it is for the good of the family,' would the action be filial obedience? No—filial obedience is the obeying another *because he is my father*. Is it enough to say, that God is to be loved and served on the account that love to him and serving him promote my own happiness and that of others? Surely not—the obligations are felt to arise from the essential relations which subsist between God and his intelligent creatures. The author thus sums up his discussion of this part of the subject:—

'We stand in relations to the several beings with whom we are connected, such, that some of them, as soon as they are conceived of, suggest to us the idea of moral obligation. The relation in which we stand to Deity, suggests the conviction of universal and unlimited love and obedience. This binds us to proper dispositions to him; and also to such dispositions towards his creatures as he shall appoint. Hence our duties to man are enforced, first, because of our relation to man as man, and secondly, because of our relation to man, as being, with ourselves, a creature of God. And, hence, an act which is performed

in obedience to our obligations to men, may be *virtuous*; but it is not *pious*, unless it also be performed in obedience to our obligations to God. We see, hence, that two things are necessary in order to constitute any being a moral agent; an intellectual power by which he can understand the relation in which he stands to the beings by whom he is surrounded; and a moral power by which the feeling of obligation is suggested to him as soon as the relation in which he stands is understood. He is *accountable* just in proportion to the opportunity he has enjoyed for acquiring a knowledge of the relations in which he stands, and of the manner in which his obligations are to be discharged.'

In the chapter of the work which is more expressly devoted to the subject of conscience, Dr. Wayland considers 'some of the objections' which have been made against the supposition of a moral faculty in man. He begins by defining conscience or the moral sense; evidently including under these terms our sense of the good or evil of the conduct of *others*, as well as of our own. 'By conscience, or the moral sense, is meant that faculty by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain affections in respect to this quality.' In order to make this definition of the moral faculty harmonize with the author's opinion (which we have already stated in detail) that our notion of the moral quality of actions is not *originally derived* from an exercise of the judgment, it is necessary, of course, that we should not understand him to mean any such exercise by what he here terms '*discerning*' this moral quality. We do not, and cannot, according to his previous statements, judge or pronounce an action right or wrong, until we have already acquired the notion of rectitude. It would have been, therefore, less liable to misinterpretation, and more consistent, verbally at least, with his views before adduced, if he had defined the moral faculty to be that by which we are found to have a conception of (discern) certain relations in which we are placed, and immediately on this conception to have certain feelings. In this way, reason and emotion would blend together in our original notions of right and wrong: our discernment of right and wrong would not be complete till we have felt moral approbation or disapprobation, supposed to be as necessarily consequent on the contemplation of certain relations, as the sensation of sound is consequent on a certain affection of the auditory nerve by vibrating air. This, we apprehend, is exactly what our author expresses generally, when he says that 'there is a moral quality in actions, and that man is endowed with a constitution capable of bringing him into relation to it.'

It may be objected to this view of the moral sense, that if

such a faculty had been given to man, it must have been universal: but it is not so; for what some nations consider right, other nations consider wrong; 'as infanticide, parricide, etc. Savages violate, without remorse or compunction, the plainest principles of right. Such is the case when they are guilty of revenge and licentiousness.' To these objections the following is the reply:—

'The objections seem to admit the universality of the power of discerning in actions a moral quality: it is admitted that men make the distinction, but it is affirmed that they refer the quality to different actions. But we have said that we discover the moral quality of actions in the *intention*. Now it is *not the fact* that this difference exists, if the *intention* of actions be considered. Where was it not considered right to *intend* the happiness of parents, and wrong to *intend* their misery? Where was it ever considered right to intend to requite kindness by injury, and wrong to intend greater kindness? In regard to the *manner* in which these intentions may be fulfilled, there may be a difference; but as to the moral quality of these and many other *intentions themselves*, there is a universal agreement among men. In those very cases in which (objectively) wrong actions are practised, they are justified on the ground of good intention, or of some view of the relations of the parties, which, if true, would render them innocent. Thus if infanticide is justified, it is on the ground that this world is a place of misery; that is, that the parent intends well to the child; or else it is defended on the ground that the parent has the right of life and death over the child. Thus, also, various other acts of wrong are defended. Where can the race of men be found, be they ever so savage, who need to be told that ingratitude is wrong, that parents ought to love their children, or that man ought to be submissive to the Supreme Divinity? No men, nor any class of men, violate *every moral* precept without the feeling of guilt, and the conscious desert of punishments. Hence the objections will rather prove the existence of a *defective* or *imperfect* conscience, than that no such faculty exists. The same objections would prove as destitute of taste or understanding, because these faculties exist in an imperfect state among savages and uncultivated men.'

Paley, in his chapter on the 'Moral Sense,' in which he endeavours to resolve all our moral sentiments into association, objects to the doctrine of a moral faculty such as has been above described—that, after all, even if the theory be admitted, these moral instincts have no *authority*: if a man choose to bear remorse of conscience for the sake of pleasure or profit, 'the moral-instinct man has nothing more to offer.' To this argument Dr. Wayland thus replies:—

'The objection proceeds upon a mistake respecting the function of conscience. Its use is to teach us to discern our moral obligations,

and to impel us towards the corresponding action. It is not pretended that man may not, after all, do as he chooses. All that is contended for is, that he is constituted with such a faculty, and that the possession of it is necessary to his moral accountability. It is in his power to obey it or to disobey it, just as he pleases. The fact that a man may obey or disobey conscience, no more proves that it does not exist, than the fact that he sometimes does, and sometimes does not obey passion, proves that he is destitute of passion.'

We have always regarded the argument derived from antiquity in favour of a definite moral faculty in man, as unanswerable: a faculty which, however distorted and impaired by the false associations consequent on the fall of human nature from rectitude, has never ceased to assert its existence in the homage which has been paid to virtue, in theory, and often in practice, under the most unfavourable circumstances. The ancient pagans furnished illustrious examples. Their actions frequently formed a decided contrast to the legendary characters of the deities whom they worshipped; and this is a striking evidence of the universality of moral distinctions. Rousseau, himself an unhappy instance of the homage which vice pays to virtue, has forcibly expressed the above fact: for Rousseau, though sceptical, was not, like many of the French contemporary literati of that awfully prophetic period, an atheist, or an absolute infidel. Helvetius, Diderot, and D'Holbach, jeered him as a bigot; and Voltaire, who ridiculed the idea of morals and religion, often coarsely abused him. Rousseau's conscience was sensibly alive to the superior morality of Christianity, and he argued from it the Divinity of the Christian religion.

Dr. Wayland is professedly a disciple of Butler; and he modestly intimates, in the preface, that he supposes his views on 'conscience' to be little more than a development of Butler's ideas on the same subject. With this distinguished author, he maintains, as we have seen, the doctrine of a moral faculty, in opposition to any modification of the theory which would reduce conscience to bare association founded on the notion of utility. But he is far more explicit than Butler, and has carried the operation of the moral faculty much more into detail. In illustration, many passages might be quoted from the chapters on the 'manner in which the decisions of conscience are expressed,' 'the authority of conscience,' 'the law by which it is governed,' and 'the rules of moral conduct,' founded on the phenomena of conscience.

Our author next proceeds to discuss the nature of virtue, in general. He remarks that in the case of a perfect *adjustment* of the moral faculty to its *moral relations*, there would be perfect virtue. The intellect would exactly discern the given relations;

the conscience would respond to all the consequent obligations, and impel to the corresponding courses of conduct. This might be expressed, we apprehend, by saying that there would be a perfect harmony between *objective* rectitude and *subjective* morality. But the moral faculty in man has become disordered : though it is rather functionally than organically deranged, as appears to us, (since it is capable of restoration to a high degree of susceptibility and correctness,) it is now in itself, but an imperfect guide. Hence Dr. Wayland observes, that the actions of man may be divided into those in which conscience correctly intimates to him the obligation, and those of which, from the present condition of his moral nature, he does not perceive the obligation. In the former case, the doing of right, and obedience to conscience, would be equivalent terms ; but, in the second case, 'how far is the omission of these actions, or the doing of the contrary, innocent ? That is to say, is the impulse of conscience in an imperfect moral being the limit of moral obligation ?' To this question, the following is the reply :—

'This will depend on his knowledge of the relations in which he stands. If he have not the means of knowing these relations, he is guiltless. If he have the means, he is guilty. The apostle Paul asserts that the heathen are guilty of sinning against God, because his attributes may be known by the light of nature. He also asserts a difference between the condemnation of the Jews and of the heathen : 'Those that sin without law shall perish without law ; and those that have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law.' His guilt will depend, secondly, upon the *cause* of this imperfection of his conscience. Were this not the result of his own act, he would be guiltless ; but in just so far as it is the result of his own conduct, he is responsible. It is well known that the repetition of wickedness produces great stupidity of conscience, or hardness of heart. But no one ever considers this as in any manner an excuse. It is, on the contrary, always held to be an aggravation of crime.

'From these facts we are easily led to the distinction between right and wrong, and innocence and guilt. Right and wrong depend on the relations under which beings are created ; hence the resulting obligations are fixed and unchangeable. Guilt and innocence depend upon the knowledge of these relations, and are affected by the degree in which the imperfection of conscience was the result of the voluntary agency of the individual himself. These are manifestly susceptible of variation ; while right and wrong are invariable. If an actor have no means of knowing an action to be wrong, he is held morally guiltless in the doing of it. He may, from ignorance of the way in which that obligation is to be discharged, perform an act in its nature wrong ; yet if he have acted according to the *best of his possible knowledge*, he may even be held virtuous. On the contrary, if a man do what is right [objectively] without a desire to fulfil the

obligation of which he is conscious, he is held to be guilty. Illustrations might be easily drawn from the ordinary affairs of life, or from the scriptures.'

We are glad to find our author so plainly asserting the objective character of rectitude, as wholly independent of human agency. As in all other kinds of truth, the object, that is the truth itself, is not to be confounded with the *minds* that may attain to the truth or fail of it, so undoubtedly must it be in moral truth. A moral action has two bearings: its relation in itself, to the moral order of the universe, and the intention with which it is performed by the agent. If there are moral actions in which these two criteria blend into one point, it is because moral order, in those cases, terminates in the disposition itself. We do not see how the above quoted remarks, founded on these distinctions, can be gainsayed. They certainly appear to be borne out by the consciousness of mankind, by the criminal laws which are recognised in society as just, and by the scriptural mode of representing the sources and degrees of human obligation. That the subject is thus cleared of all its difficulty, we are far, indeed, from being prepared to assert. The various and complicated circumstances in which moral agents are placed by the strange mixture of evil with good which attends the present state of human nature, renders the doctrine of man's responsibility one which requires to be dealt with in a spirit of deep humility and reverence. In human legislation, even after the loftiest aim at justice in the enactment and administration of penal laws, much remains which can hardly be justified, excepting on the principle of absolute necessity, in order to the welfare or even existence of society. In the moral government of God, more immediately, although we see an immense sphere of clearly-defined obligation, to which conscience fully responds, more particularly in Christian countries; still it must be admitted that no moralist or theologian has been able to do more than point out a few general principles; to apply them in all cases is beyond human power. The most practical inference from the moral condition of pagan nations, and of myriads of heathens in countries called Christian, is that the avowed disciples of Christ are greatly responsible for this state of things, and that they ought to unite their energies more than ever to remedy it: the adjustment of conflicting circumstances in the responsibility of individuals can only be left to the Omniscient Judge of all! and the secure resting-place for every devout mind, from the painful bewilderments of speculation, is the assurance that '*the Judge of the whole earth will do right.*' Still it cannot be denied that he who contributes to

set in a clear light any aspect of man's accountableness to his Maker and to society, does a real service to the cause of truth.

After a short chapter on 'Human Happiness,' which is said to consist in the gratification of the various tendencies of our nature within the limits assigned to them by the Creator, the author proceeds to treat of self-love, on which subject he closely follows Butler; distinguishing self-love as that deliberate and calculating regard to our own good, either more or less extensively surveyed, which leads us to keep in check or balance the impulses of passion. In this way, Butler and Mackintosh justly consider the appetites, and all the primary tendencies of our nature, as quite distinct from self-love; not to speak of the benevolent affections, which have very strangely been reduced to self-love by some philosophers. Self-love always shows more or less of calculation, and within certain limits, it is not vicious; but if we seek our own happiness at the expense of that of another, self-love is transformed into selfishness.

In the remarks on the 'Imperfection of Conscience, and the necessity of some additional moral light,' the distinction between objective and subjective morality (terms, however, which the author does not use) is employed in illustration of the results of actions. If we imagine a nation to know nothing of the wickedness of revenge, murder, uncleanness, drunkenness, and the like; this nation would still suffer the consequences of violating the present constitution of things; the results which commonly flow from these actions would still follow. On the contrary, a nation practising forgiveness, humanity, chastity, temperance, and similar courses, without knowing them to be right, if this be conceivable, would nevertheless enjoy the benefits connected with such actions.

'Now whatever be the object of this constitution, by which rewards or punishments are affixed to actions as right or wrong, one thing seems evident, it is not to reward or punish actions as *innocent* or *guilty*, for the rewards and punishments of which we speak, affect men simply in consequence of the *action*, and without any regard to the innocence or guilt of the actor. Let us now add another element. Suppose a man to know the obligations which bind him to his Creator, and also what is his Creator's will respecting a certain action; and that he then deliberately violates this obligation. Now every man feels that this violation of obligation deserves punishment, and, also, punishment in proportion to the greatness of the obligation violated. Hence the consequences of any action are to be considered in a two-fold light; first, the consequences depending on the present constitution of things; and, secondly, those which follow the action as innocent or guilty; that is, as violating, or not, our obligations to our Creator.'

The above distinction is important, and it is clearly expressed. If we do not observe the known laws of nature, we suffer for it, whether we violate these laws by design, or by carelessness, or ignorance. Over-exertion in attempting to do good to our fellow-men may, no doubt, as effectually ruin the health, as vice and intemperance. We do not therefore, in strictness, regard many such results as morally retributive. Hence society punishes only the intention. In like manner, the retributions of another life are aimed, ultimately, not at the bare actions, but at the evil state of the heart, that is the will and the affections. It is here that the guilt lies. The concluding remark of Dr. Wayland on this distinction is, that whatever view we may take of the reason why pain should be consequent on [objectively] wrong actions, irrespective of guilt, 'we can have some conception how great this pain would probably be. But if we consider the action as guilty, that is, as knowingly violating the will of our Creator, no one can conceive how great the punishment of such an act ought to be.' We are not quite sure that we fully comprehend the former part of this remark. It is only from experience that we become acquainted with the properties of matter, with the laws of organic life, or with the manner in which mind is affected by given causes. Statics, dynamics, medicine, psychology, are all founded on an empirical basis. We could not therefore *à priori* (and this we suppose to be meant by the word '*probably*') form any conception of the laws which constitute these sciences; and we could as little anticipate the consequences of not observing these laws. With regard to subjective guilt, we have, in the present world, the experience which is constituted by remorse of conscience: but we can pronounce nothing as to the future, excepting on very general principles. Reason, which is the light of God within us, and without which we cannot understand or believe in Revelation itself, assures us that the awards of the awful, unknown future, will be strictly just, and in perfect harmony with all the Divine attributes: but it is eternity that must lift the veil.

Under the circumstances in which human nature is, Dr. Wayland argues that it is 'surely not improbable that a benevolent Deity should make use of some additional means to inform us of our duty; and that it is still less improbable that he should take some means to deliver us from the guilty habits we have formed, and restore us to the love and practice of virtue.' Hence 'the new and remedial dispensation.'

In the chapter on 'Natural Religion,' the author assumes, as almost self-evident, that there is a First Cause, and that we are capable of deriving a knowledge of his will, by the tendency of certain actions, and by means of the various relations in which

man is placed. By reflecting on these tendencies and relations, man may ascertain much of the will of his Maker in respect to actions and course of conduct. When this will is once known, conscience instinctively tells us that it ought to be obeyed. The author thinks that, from the consideration of the greatest amount of happiness, we arrive at a knowledge of our duty, 'not directly, but indirectly.' The sense of obligation arises, he says, not from the fact that such a course of conduct will, or will not, produce the greatest amount of happiness; but from the fact that 'this tendency shows us what is the will of our Creator;' and we are, by the principles of our nature, under the highest possible obligation to obey that will. We regard this as an intelligible account of the coalescence of virtue and true utility. Utility, viewed from this point, is seen, not as the foundation of obligation, but as the sign and mark of it. The obligation is still obligation to obey God, who has indicated the path of obedience by the relation of the consequences of actions to the moral system.

Our readers will, by this time, have perceived the sense in which the author uses the term 'Natural Religion,' or the 'Light of Nature;' they are with him equipollent expressions; and they note a source of information distinct from conscience. For example, conscience testifies that gratitude and obedience ought to be rendered to a Deity (admitted to exist). Conscience testifies against injustice, theft, and the like. Conscience does this just as the eye sees an outward object. Vision is a sensitive, conscience a moral faculty. But 'by the light of nature, we discover much moral truth which would never be discovered by conscience unassisted.' Of course, the 'light of nature' must here mean the light which is gained by the due exercise of the rational faculty. Several illustrations are given, of which we quote the following:—

'I doubt whether the unassisted conscience would teach the wrong of polygamy, or of divorce. The Jews, even at the time of our Saviour, had no conception that a marriage contract was between individuals for life. But any one who will observe the effects of polygamy upon families and societies, can have no doubt that the precept of the gospel on this subject is the moral law of the system under which we are. So, I do not know that unassisted conscience would remonstrate against what might be called reasonable revenge, or the operation of the *lex talionis*: but he who will observe the consequences of revenge, and those of forgiveness of injuries, will have no difficulty in deciding which course of conduct has been indicated as his duty by his Maker.'

After pointing out some of the principal 'defects of the system of natural religion,' as compared with that which is revealed,

our author discusses the relation which subsists between the two. Of the defects of the former some of the wisest pagans were far from insensible, when they considered the uncertainty in which their speculations left them as to futurity. Still it must be granted that natural religion does teach some unquestionable truths: hence revealed religion, however it may transcend that which is natural, will ever be harmonious with it. A revelation might be expected to give us much information which could not be learned by the light of nature, both as to the substance of duty, and the manner of performing it. It would present additional motives to virtue. It would base itself on new grounds and evidences. 'Now these expectations,' says Dr. Wayland, 'are all fully realised in the system of religion contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.'

The closing chapter of the former part of the volume is entitled, 'The Holy Scriptures.' The author regards the 'proof of their authenticity as a revelation from God,' as 'belonging to the course of instruction in intellectual philosophy.' He proceeds, therefore, to consider what the scriptures of both Testaments contain, of which he gives a brief view; and then inquires how we may ascertain our duty from the scriptures. The object here is to discover, as far as possible, the principles by which we are to be guided in deciding 'what portion of the mass of instruction which the scriptures contain is binding upon the conscience at the present moment:' since much of it is mere history; much has reference to a less enlightened age, and to a particular people, set apart from other nations for a special purpose, and who were governed by laws now abrogated. Dr. Wayland concludes that, in a revelation from God, whatever is our duty will be signified to us by command; and that what is not commanded is not to be considered as obligatory: for without this limitation, he adds, all the actions both of good and bad men might be regarded as authority, and thus revelation might become an instrument to confound moral distinctions. The *command of God*, therefore, is the ground of moral obligation, as derived from a revelation.

In this very interesting and highly important part of his work, Dr. Wayland supports the above principle by unfolding what he supposes the term 'command' to involve. He understands it to imply three things; namely, that an act be *designated*; that it be somehow *signified to be the will of God*; and that *we* are included among those to whom the command is addressed. An act may be designated either in the matter of it, as 'giving bread to the hungry;' or by designating a disposition under which it is comprehended, as that of universal love. Without some intimation that it is the will of God that a

given act should be performed, history would hold up contradictory duties. If there were no signification that *we* are included within the number of those to whom the command is addressed, all the commandments to patriarchs, kings, and prophets, whether ceremonial, symbolical, or individual, would be binding upon all who read them. Hence, 'whoever urges on us any duty, as a revealed command of God, must show that God has somewhere *commanded that action to be done*, and that he has *commanded us to do it*.'

'This principle would exclude whatever was done by inspired men, if it was done without the addition of being somehow commanded. Thus, the New Testament was manifestly intended for the whole human race, and at all times; and it was written by men who were inspired by God to teach us his will. But still, their example is not binding, *per se*; that is, we are not under obligation to perform an act, *simply because they have done it*. Thus, Paul and the other apostles kept the feast of Pentecost; but this imposes no such obligation upon us. The example of inspired men in the New Testament would, unless exception be made, prove the *lawfulness* of an act; but it could by no means establish its *obligatoriness*.'

The author shows that the same principle will *include* as obligatory whatever has been enjoined as the will of God upon man as *man*, by God himself, by the mediator Jesus Christ, or by any persons divinely commissioned. In answer to the question, how we are to learn to distinguish what is obligatory on us from that which is local or peculiar? Dr. Wayland replies, that the instructions of the New Testament never involve any thing local or peculiar, but are clearly intended for all men. The question, therefore, is only applicable to the Old Testament, and must be decided by reference to the nature of the Jewish commonwealth, a temporary dispensation preparatory to that of Christianity. The latter may be supposed to contain all the moral precepts both of natural religion and of the Old Testament, together with whatever else it was important to man's salvation that he should know.

'If, then, a revelation has been made in the Old Testament which is repeated in the New Testament, we shall be safe in making the latter revelation the criterion by which we shall judge respecting the precepts of the earlier. That is to say, that no precept of the Old Testament, which is not given to man, as man, or which is not either repeated, or its obligations acknowledged, under the new dispensation, is binding upon us at the present day. This principle is, I think, avowed in substance by the apostle Paul in various places of his epistles. While he repeatedly urges the moral precepts of the

Old Testament as of unchanging obligation, he speaks of every thing else, so far as the moral obligation is concerned, as utterly annihilated.'

In the remaining part of the volume the author treats,—first, of love to God, or piety (under which head he includes an inquiry into the general obligation of supreme love to God); the cultivation of a devotional spirit; prayer; and the observance of the sabbath. The reasonableness of prayer is vindicated (in opposition, we presume, to the infidel objection that prayer cannot alter the divine determination) on the ground that God may establish such connexions between cause and effect as he pleases. Hence we are not competent to say, that prayer cannot be the *antecedent* to the bestowment of favours. 'It is at least as good as any other antecedent, if God see fit so to ordain.' After enumerating many reasons for keeping sabbatically the first day of the week, the author thus remarks:—

'From these considerations, we conclude that the first day of the week was actually kept by the inspired apostles. Their example is sufficient to teach us that the keeping of *this* day is acceptable to God; and we are, on this ground, at liberty to keep it as the sabbath. If, however, any other person be dissatisfied with these reasons, and feel under obligation to observe the seventh day, I see no precept in the word of God to forbid him. If, however, as seems to me to be the case, both days are allowable, that is, if I have sufficient reason to believe that either is acceptable to God; but if by observing the first day, I can enjoy more leisure, and suffer less interruption, and thus better accomplish the object of the day; and if, besides, I have the example of inspired apostles in favour of this observance, I should decidedly prefer to observe the first day. Nay, I should consider the choice of that day as obligatory. For, if I am allowed to devote either day to the worship of God, it is surely obligatory on me to worship God on that day on which I can best accomplish the very object for which the day was set apart.'

We have no space to do more than state the division of the second part of Practical Ethics; or, the Duties to Man: which the author divides into those of reciprocity and benevolence. The duties of reciprocity he considers as including three classes. Class the first relates to justice as affecting personal liberty, property, reputation, and to veracity as to the past, present, and future. Class the second comprises the duties which arise from the constitution of the sexes; here are treated chastity, marriage, the law of parents, and the law of children. Class the third relates to the duties of man as a member of civil society. The duties of benevolence are discussed in their relation to the unhappy, the wicked, and the injurious. On most of these

subjects there are passages which we should have been glad to quote ; but we must forbear.

We cannot, however, close the volume without doing to the author the justice to express the pleasure we have felt in its perusal. It is by no means a common-place work, notwithstanding the numerous treatises which are extant on the subject. It is a work of considerable originality. The author is evidently a man who thinks for himself ; though he is far from the folly of affecting indifference to what others have thought before him. He entertains a very clear conception of what moral philosophy is ; for while he shows the points in which natural ethics blend with Christian morals, he gives due prominence to the fact that there is such an object of study as natural ethics—a fact which seems almost forgotten (and disadvantageously so to the cause of truth) in some of our modern evangelical pulpits, at least on this side of the Atlantic. We hardly know a better auxiliary to the serious and effective enforcement of moral obligation on their hearers, than our young divines would find in the careful and diligent study of these ‘Elements of Moral Science.’ The work is practical throughout—remarkably so ; though nearly half of it is devoted to ‘theoretical ethics.’ It is also eminently a Christian book. No sacrifices are made to mere philosophy, though the book is highly philosophical. The author is superior to all small and sectarian outcries if he should not adhere to hackneyed phrases, which are used by many without meaning : still his work is decidedly evangelical—we mean that he views his subject in connexion with man’s whole case, and God’s whole remedy for it. His moral science is that which is found in conscience and in reason ; and it is that also which is found in the scriptures. The style in which he writes is always perspicuous, if not always elegant. We have read some effusions from the American press of late, of the transcendental order, which we doubt not were very fine ; but the misfortune was that when we had got to the end, we were obliged to ask ourselves what the authors meant by all this high-flown eloquence ; and what is worse, we were obliged to come to the conclusion that we could not tell ; and that the authors could not have told themselves. It is quite refreshing to read a book on such a subject written in so plain, simple, and unambitious a style. We should really have hopes of some of our young novitiates in divinity, if we knew that they could thoroughly relish it, and admire truth most when ‘unadorned.’ If the author’s talents for metaphysical analysis are not of the highest order, like those of Jonathan Edwards, or Dr. Thomas Brown ; he is less adventurous than the former, and a better moralist than the latter. He has much of the acuteness of Paley, with a far superior sys-

tem ; and much of the good sense and seriousness of Dwight, with a greater discrimination of the mutual limits and relations of utility and duty. We know of no book on the general subject of moral science, which we could, on the whole, so strongly recommend. Independently of the superiority of its theory to that of Paley, and even independently of Paley's lax applications of his own theory, the moral tone of the volume before us, the general moral impression which its careful perusal is likely to leave on the mind, is incomparably more elevated. Throughout the whole, speculation is felt, by the reader, to be entirely subservient to practice. As a book for promoting solemn and religious feeling on the subject of ethics, we think it even superior to Butler's 'Three Sermons.' We only add, that it bears, in all its parts, evident signs of the manner in which it has grown, by degrees, out of the author's lectures. It is a thoroughly-digested treatise ; the fruit of many years' consideration, and re-consideration.

ART. IX. *Temper and Temperament ; or, Varieties of Character.* By Mrs. Ellis, author of 'The Women of England,' etc. etc. London : Fisher, Son, and Co.

It has been said, 'Temper is everything ;' and, viewed in certain relations, this axiom, for such it is deemed, may be admitted. A good temper is the sweetener of social and domestic life ; and as it is in these connexions we are found every day, it has necessarily an important bearing on the entire happiness of existence. As, according to scripture, 'one sinner destroyeth much good,' so one angry or petulant person may annihilate the peace of a family, or disturb the comfort of a neighbourhood by his unworthy ebullitions. The varieties and degrees of bad temper might perhaps be classified under two general divisions : namely, the sullen and the irascible. Of these it would be difficult to determine which is the most calculated to inflict the greatest misery on society or the individual's self,—for it is he, after all, who substantially suffers the most ;—but to the sullen is usually assigned the pre-eminence in the rank of atrocity. On this question it is not necessary to enter here ; for, in a moral point of view, both, as referable to a depraved disposition of mind, are to be utterly condemned.

We are aware that attempts are continually made, on one plea or another, to extenuate the offensiveness of the evil in

question ; and especially is irritability represented as venial, and all but admirable, if it be connected with intellectual superiority ; as if talent could atone for moral delinquency. Whereas it is in reality the worse for being so associated, inasmuch as it is furnished with the greater means of mischief, and demoralizes the observer as well as the man, by incidentally teaching the most deceptive and the basest lessons. That which is intrinsically bad can never be made good by any associations ; nor can that which is mean be dignified by any elevation.

A happy or acquiescent temper is not only, as we have said, the sweetener of private and social life, but challenges our estimation as powerful in its regulating tendency upon public measures, whether of the people or the government. In regard to the former, it is clearly the reflection of an enlightened public opinion on subjects of high and universal interest. Amidst all the mighty stirrings of sentiment, and conflicts of opinion in politics and religion, that have displayed, of late years, an unwonted energy, the *temper* of the times has manifestly improved. In proportion as men have exercised their reasoning faculties, and divested themselves of barbarous prejudices, they have adopted less violent methods of assault and defence. They have been led to perceive that others have the right and the power to think as well as themselves, and are not deserving the hangman's rope or the martyr's stake, for differing from them. It is not that essential truths, or what may be conceived to be such, are held with the less firmness of conviction—rather, perchance, with more—but it is, that there has been infused into the minds even of the multitude, something of the restraining influence of a calm philosophy, instead of the former crude and ignorant recklessness. The public movements, accordingly, have been less violent and boisterous, and there has appeared more of the majesty of principle, and less of the turbulence of faction.

The temper of government, too, we might say of almost all governments, is benefited by the upward progress of the people in sentiment and religion. As wise governments will teach the people to be wise, so a wise people will of necessity impress similar lessons upon a government. When the moral takes the place of the physical force, all society, from the peasant to the prince, must be progressive ; and this is just the primary basis of distinction between barbarism and civilization, the energy of a blind impulse, and the power of an intelligent and calculating system of laws. The consequences of bad temper in a government were never more fearfully illustrated than in the history of the American war—a war which began in a great political blunder, was carried on in a barbarous spirit of revenge, and

terminated in an utter overthrow of irritated ambition in statesmen, and sullen obstinacy on a throne. The effects of a happier disposition in the ruling powers of nations are realized in the position of political affairs at the present time. The *temper* of Europe, or, at least, pre-eminently of the government of England, is entirely pacific. It seems as if no light thing could renew the spirit of exasperation which was heretofore so rampant, and as if the potentates of the earth were determined to forget and forgive their past hostilities, and live in a state of cherished amity and brotherhood. A season of tranquillity and reflectiveness has evidently prepared them for the interchange of kindly offices; and it seems plain that they are not only sick of the cost of contention, but convinced of its folly. The revolution of France was like a thundering tempest that swept over the whole heavens, terrifying and desolating and rousing mankind to a state of furious excitement; but it is gone by, never to return—passion and prejudice have subsided, and, at least during the present generation, we have the prospect of a calmer atmosphere and brighter skies.

It is not only in politics, but in polemics, that a manifest improvement has indicated the larger views and higher refinement of the present times, in comparison with a past age. There is much to condemn in some of the writings of the greatest reformers, though the peculiarity of their circumstances, the natural ardour with which the mind clings to new discoveries, or to truths which from time immemorial have been concealed by trickery and superstition, and hence have the appearance of being new; the force of conviction upon bold and powerful intellects, the unreasonableness of the multitude, the persecuting spirit of an ecclesiastical despotism, with other considerations, might be pleaded in mitigation of controversial offences against good taste and good manners. In the exacerbations of *temper*, we must also admit some degree of allowance for the peculiarities of constitutional *temperament*. Yet, a better spirit has gradually come over theological disputants, and we hail it as a prognostic of a better era. Truth can gain nothing by violence; on the contrary, its interests must be chiefly advanced by the calmness of a philosophic investigation. At the same time, it cannot be denied, that men are too often made offenders for a word; and controversialists with their respective partizans sacrifice the cause they advocate on the altar of selfishness, and in the blaze of mutual recrimination.

It is not, however, with the more extensive and public exhibitions of temper and temperament, at which we have glanced, that the present volumes are conversant. They have a direct

reference to the more limited circle of private life and domestic habitudes. We shall let the author explain her own design and give her own definitions, which will put the reader in possession of the basis and essential material of the work.

'We shall never,' observes the writer in her brief preface, 'be able rightly to discharge the duty we owe to our fellow-creatures, until we have made ourselves intimately acquainted with the varieties of human character, and with the peculiar requirements of different dispositions. Anything, however trifling in other respects, which throws light upon this subject, is of important service to society; and it is with the view of adding a few simple lessons to this great and glorious study, that the present work is offered to the attention of the public.'

'The question very naturally arises, What is meant by Temper and Temperament? By the latter I would be understood to mean, in the foundation of human character, something equivalent to the soil of a garden or a field, which produces some kinds of trees and plants with much greater facility than others; though it may, by careful and persevering cultivation, be made to yield what it would never yield spontaneously; and by Temper, I would be understood to mean, those occasional manifestations of peculiar temperament, which may be compared to the result produced by atmospheric changes, climate, and culture, operating upon the soil above alluded to, which, though transient in their display, and arising out of accidental causes, still bear a general and necessary analogy to the foundation from whence they spring.'

'It is scarcely necessary to say, in a work of this kind, that my aim is to write popularly rather than scientifically. I would therefore endeavour further to illustrate my view of the subject of temper and temperament, by describing the latter as denoting that habitual or constitutional tendency of character which may be said to lean towards hope or despondency, trust or suspicion, repose or action: and so on, through all the different phases of human existence; while of the former I would speak as the occasional development of such tendency in a stronger and more decided form, called forth by collision with other natures, or by passing circumstances, whatever they may happen to be.'

'But beyond this question, which relates merely to the meaning of the writer, there naturally arises another of far higher importance, relating to the writer's design—a question why the subject is taken up at all, and especially when it is so intricate, so little understood, and so seldom made the object of serious and impartial consideration, by the world at large. It is in reality these three reasons for not taking it up, which operate with me in exactly the opposite way. Because it is intricate, I would do my best to make it clear—so far, at least, as relates to its mode of operation upon individuals and society; because it is little understood, I would exhibit in one view some of the most striking characters it is accustomed to assume, and

because it is but little regarded by mankind in general. I would endeavour to show how it frequently lies at the root of happiness and of misery ; through the whole course of human life.'

The volumes consist of three tales, sufficiently distinct and characteristic. The first is entitled, 'The Managing Wife;' the second, 'Imprisoned Mind;' the third, 'The Sunshine of Life.' In estimating their comparative merits, we should say, that the second is decidedly the superior of the three. All of them contain developments of life and character, which have in them a certain portion of absolute truth, and such as becomes obvious in almost every day's experience, together with a degree of exaggeration, in which fictitious narrative is permitted to indulge, in order to impart raciness and strength to the picture. It has been often said, that there are circumstances as singular, and characters as remarkable in real life, as may be found in the imaginary pictures of poetry and romance. It may be so, and we have ourselves witnessed a few ; so that possibly Mrs. Ellis may have given a plain matter-of-fact story from the treasuries of her personal experience ; nevertheless, we deem the *combination* of events, as exhibited in such details, extremely rare, no less so than the very strange projections and acute angles of the moral physiognomy. Some noses are wonderfully prominent, and some eyes are frightfully staring, but while for the sake of improvement by the correction of errors, the peculiarities in question are specially exhibited, the fair one will be very likely to get rid of the desired impression by saying, 'I am sure I have not got such a nose or such an eye. *My* temper, at any rate, is not so marvellously bad ; *my* mind is not so crooked ; *my* general disposition is not so wilful or so foolish as is represented ; *I* never have, and never can run into such absurdities ;' and thus the self-deceiver is entertained rather than instructed, and laughs at follies rather than corrects them.

Now we allege all this, not as the peculiar fault of Mrs. Ellis, whose compositions perhaps are less illustrative of it than those of many others in the same department of literature ; but, in order to suggest to writers of fiction that there is no need to depart so egregiously as they often do, from probability to produce effect and secure instruction. So far from this, such departure is more calculated to counteract than to aid their design, if their purpose be the moral benefit of the reader. Where it is otherwise—where it is simply to amuse—which, in nine cases out of ten, is simply to corrupt—we leave the writer to that unpitied oblivion which he is in all likelihood destined to attain. On this ground we cannot shed a tear over

the fate of the Richardsons and Fieldings of a former age, and hail the high tone of moral feeling which has distinguished some of the lighter literature of our own times. The historical novel is, however, after all, too frequently interspersed with what is wrong in meaning or expression, and that species which may be termed religious, has, in many instances, shown its liability to what is prejudiced and dictatorial. Such compositions are, moreover, liable to degenerate into prolixity and tameness; eliciting lengthy discussions or wire-drawn sentiment. With all its excellence, Hannah More's 'Cœlebs in search of a Wife,' is no mean specimen of this miscalculating style of writing. Were we severely to criticise our author, we should say there is an occasional tendency to this in the work before us, though a great deal of spirit pervades its pages. Historical novels will bear much more elaboration than others, without becoming tedious; but their authors incur a great amount of responsibility, which has not always been regarded even by the first-rate writers of the class. And we must express our opinion, that religious novels, or those of a highly moral kind bordering upon it, will not permit such extensions. The sort of productions of this order which would be most effective, we apprehend would be the brief and pointed, somewhat after the manner of Mackenzie, where the story might be soon told, the moral be obvious, and the incidents true to life. That fiction itself is not only unobjectionable but beneficial in its tendencies, can, we should imagine, be scarcely questioned with the beautiful parabolical illustrations of the sacred scriptures before us, in which are equally united truth, brevity, and force. These, like the Lord's prayer itself, may serve as models, while they admit of indefinite expansion. But besides the strictly working out of these inimitable compositions into forms of greater detail, we have no objection to the full exercise of imaginative genius in giving vivacious descriptions of life as it is, under *noms de guerre* and narratives of social or domestic scenes; all we plead for is, such a display of character as may tend to improve by lasting impressions, as well as fascinate by strong and varied colouring. Let the dulce and the utile be combined.

We are free to award to Mrs. Ellis the merit of having achieved this in a considerable degree; and we must say to her credit as a writer in this line, that she has frequently evinced tact in knowing how far to go, and where to stop. On the whole, we recommend these volumes, not like some of our contemporaries as the best she has written, but as worthy of perusal, and of excellent tendency. Still we must give her the friendly caution not to indulge too freely in this mode, and to be

specially wary of over-writing herself. It is due to her to furnish a specimen or two, that readers may form their own judgment. We should not be surprised if something analogous to the following scene has frequently occurred. We cannot enter upon the general story: the case of an interesting young woman, married to a clever but now dying man, must be supposed. She takes an adventurous journey from Devonshire to London to seek pecuniary aid by the fruit of her talents.

'With her child in her arms, Louisa once more went forth to thread her way along the crowded streets of London. Arrived at the door of a celebrated publisher, she looked earnestly in, but passed on; for her strength seemed unequal to the effort of entering where groups of gentlemen appeared to be engaged,—some in earnest conversation, and others in glancing over papers and periodicals, probably many of them intent upon reading their own praises, or those of the party to which it was their pride to belong. What could Louisa do in such a place? She looked in again; and persuading herself that it was but a shop, after all, she took heart, and entered.

'Supposing her to be some person who might have called about the conveyance of a parcel, one of the young men of the place looked inquiringly towards her, and she was so far encouraged as to venture to ask for Mr. L——.

'He is engaged,' said the young man. 'Any message may be left with me.'

'I wish to speak with Mr. L——,' replied Louisa.

'Mr. L—— is not at liberty,' said the young man. 'Any business you may have, can be transacted with me.'

'I beg your pardon,' said Louisa, 'but I do not think it can.'

'The young man threw down some writing-paper he held in his hand, with an impatient slap upon the counter, and retreating into an inner apartment, sent out an elderly man with a pen behind his ear, and with a dry contracted face, that looked as if it had never known the natural and benevolent expansion of a smile.

'Are you wanting anything, young woman?' said the man.

'Are you Mr. L——?' said Louisa.

'No,' said the man; 'but I can attend to anything you may have to say.'

'Louisa was at a loss what to do. There had been standing near her a little, earnest, singular-looking man, intent upon the pages of a review, who from time to time had glanced at her from beneath his overhanging eyebrows, and then back again to his paper; and though from his appearance he was one of the last of all mankind to have been appealed to for sympathy or attention of any kind, yet Louisa, in her great difficulty, turned her eyes towards him with a look so quick, yet so imploring, that he nodded his assent to what she was about to do, and even said, audibly, 'You may consult Mr. Jenkins, I know him very well.'

‘Upon this assurance, Louisa drew out a thick roll of thickly-written paper, and spreading it out before Mr. Jenkins, asked if he would be kind enough to look at that manuscript, ‘and—and—,’ Louisa was wholly at a loss how to express her meaning.

‘‘And bid you a price for it, eh?’ said the little man, laughing to himself.

‘Louisa smiled too, for such was her real meaning; but no symptom of a smile appeared upon the countenance of Mr. Jenkins. He shrunk from even touching the ill-fated manuscript, as if it was likely to cleave to him in case he did so, but let it lie there to curl itself up again, leaf after leaf, and page after page, with a pertinacity which seemed to indicate an unwillingness on its part to be exposed even to the eye of admiration. With one hand, for she had but one at liberty, Louisa persisted in opening out her scroll; and with a manner which told how little she was accustomed either to coaxing or entreating, she again urged Mr. Jenkins to read, at least, some pages of her manuscript.

‘‘We have no time to give to things of this kind;’ observed Mr. Jenkins. ‘It is not at all in our line.’

‘‘But you don’t know that, until you have seen it!’ observed Louisa.

‘‘We altogether decline going into the matter,’ said Mr. Jenkins.

‘‘Then what can I do?’ exclaimed Louisa.

‘‘That is no affair of mine;’ was the reply.

‘‘Certainly not;’ said Louisa. The little man looked up from his paper, for Louisa had a fine, clear, well modulated voice, by which she generally succeeded in obtaining some degree of attention; and he saw that her cheek was flushed with emotion, and her eye flashing wildly, as if wholly unaccustomed to such transactions as that in which she was engaged.

‘The little man laid down his review, and took up the neglected manuscript. Louisa could have dropped upon her knees before him. She watched him with eyes which absolutely glared upon his countenance, and then upon the pages he turned over, one after another, shaking his head all the while, and smiling with something of a sarcastic expression; but yet, Louisa fancied, not quite unkindly.

‘‘Perhaps, sir,’ said Louisa, too impatient to wait longer, ‘you can tell me how I had better proceed in this matter?’

‘The little man shook his head more and more.

‘‘Instead of proceeding,’ said he, ‘I should advise you to go back.’

‘‘I only want justice,’ said Louisa. ‘There is an extensive trade carried on in such articles as I have brought for sale. Are there no means by which I can obtain a fair inspection of my goods?’

‘‘There are means, I believe,’ replied the man; ‘but I should think them far enough from being attainable to you. In the first place, you must leave your child at home. That is a necessity of your case.’

“Alas! sir, it is a necessity that I must bring him with me. That is my misfortune, not my fault.”

“Then I can tell you, go where you will, you never can obtain a reading of your papers, so long as you carry that child in your arms. That of itself settles your business. But, independently of that, your case is utterly hopeless, unless you could obtain some recommendation, or make more figure; or look altogether different from what you do!”

“But, sir, I am in such urgent need!”

“Ah! that is just what I say. There is no one fact so sure to operate against you in the way of business, as this. You look as if you were in need, and that condemns, and will condemn you, to utter neglect.”

We must subjoin another extract, which displays considerable powers of description. It relates to scenery in the Pyrenees.

‘There is a singular part of the route to Garonne, known by the name of Chaos, and here the guide never fails to point out the marks of the horse-hoofs of that redoubtable warrior, who cleft his name in the distant Breche de Rolland, rising on the frontier of Spain, from whence he leaped, according to the legends of the place, at one bound, from that yawning crevice in the barrier of the mountain, many leagues off, alighting on his war-horse upon the stones of Chaos, where something like the shape of a giant-hoof is seen.

‘But puerile and meagre is the interest derived from these childish fables in such a place, compared with the impression made upon the mind by the stupendous and mysterious character of the scene itself. It needs no giant warrior leaping from the mountain-barrier of a hostile country, to set the imagination afloat upon a sea of wonders, in that plain of granite rocks which have evidently rolled from the summits of the surrounding mountains, filling up the solitary and silent space with their majestic forms, and frowning upon the pigmy traveller as he passes over or below them, with a black and threatening aspect, as if to warn him from treading with audacious foot within the precincts of their solemn and unpeopled realm.

‘Across the whole valley in its length and breadth, no human habitation nor living form is seen, except that sometimes the Spanish muleteer winds stealthily along the ridges of the mountains, hoping to evade the scrutiny which everywhere besets his lawless path.

* * * * *

‘They journeyed on without further interruption, until reaching that point of view from whence the astonishing spectacle of the amphitheatre of Gavernie first bursts upon the sight.

‘This immense basin or hollow, in the very bosom of snow-clad mountains, is said very much to resemble the crater of a volcano. It is surrounded by precipitous rock on all sides but one, where a comparatively narrow opening admits the traveller within the circle, in which he stands, amazed and enchanted, in the midst of a scene scarcely rivalled in its curious and majestic features by any in the

world. It is perhaps not generally known, that the highest waterfall in Europe pours over the edge of a mountain height with a fall of thirteen hundred feet, broken only by one projecting mass, into the hollow of this circle; while many others, scarcely less in apparent magnitude, and certainly not inferior in beauty, stream down the dark marble walls by which the circle is enclosed, with thousands of silvery channels, some scarcely discernible amongst the far heights, where the sunshine glitters on the snow with a brilliance strongly contrasted with the deep solemnity of the scene below.

‘But these far heights; what a spirit-stirring spectacle they present, on looking up to the giant towers of Marboré, crested with their dome of everlasting snow, and, as it seems from below, supported by the most exquisite columns of many-coloured marble, reflecting all the rich and gorgeous colours of that delicate climate. Beyond these towers arises, height above height of trackless snow, glittering in clear outline against the dark blue sky; and almost in a line with the towers, though sloping downwards towards the right, is that monstrous gash in a vast wall of solid rock, said to have been cut by one sword-stroke of the champion Roland, and now remaining a curious land-mark, to which the traveller is directed as a point of entrance into Spain.

‘Below the towers of Marboré, already described, lie fields of snow, from whence, in the distance, small creamy-looking cascades are stealing, while from the lower fields, for they are many, the torrents swell and grow, until at last, over the dark wall which terminates in the abyss, they fall in crystal and varied beauty, each assuming some form of grace and softness, on which the eye might dwell for hours. It is impossible, however, to give any general description of this astonishing scene; for with the changes of the atmosphere and the melting of the snows, it assumes a different aspect to each successive group of travellers. Sometimes when the mountain-mists roll heavily along the higher ridges of the amphitheatre, a blackness, like the shadow of death, dwells in the deep hollow where the cascades are heard hissing and boiling in their foamy beds; and sometimes, too, while all this blackness and mystery fills the surrounding space with solemnity and gloom, up high in purer air, and towering above the grey sullen mists, may be seen the domes and pinnacles of snow, glittering in cloudless sunshine, and holding out the promise of a loftier and more glorious world beyond that dark abyss.’

Art. X.—1. *The 'Nonconformist,' and the 'Patriot,' April 16th.*

2. *The 'Morning Chronicle,' April 20th, 21st, and 22nd.*

THE ministerial vote on education has been confirmed. The Commons House has passed it by a majority of 372 to 47. At this we are not surprised. In the state of parties and under the circumstances of the case, it might have been anticipated. Having once committed themselves to the scheme, the administration was bound up with its success. To have suffered defeat, would have been to relinquish office, and for this no party in the state was prepared. The so-called liberal members have complained, and shown symptoms of insubordination, but the church and the conservatives were ready to take their place. They have consequently contented themselves with decrying the tact of leaders who have placed them in such a dilemma, on the eve of a general election. Their patriotism has evaporated in words, their public virtue has contented itself with silent reproach. Their votes have been with the ministry, whilst their unpublished sentiments were in many cases with the people. The sovereignty of the legislature, the sacredness of conscience, the freedom of religion from secular controul, have been alike contemned. The course of rightful legislation has been turned back; England, or rather the parliament, has taken a receding step, and church power is once more the idol of our statesmen. Conceal it as they may, cover it up as best befits them, under the specious fallacies and glittering oratory of their advocates, the fact is yet palpable that the Whig ministers of 1847, have purchased the temporary favour of the church, by a concession far greater and more potent than the Tory ministers, from William Pitt downwards, were able to accomplish. Sustained by the popular voice, preserved from utter insignificance by the too-confiding trust of a people whom they have always mistrusted, and frequently betrayed, the Whig leaders of our day have outbidden their opponents in the church market, and are, in consequence, for a time, the pet champions of the Bishop of London and of Sir Robert Inglis. Shadows are frequently mistaken for substances; the smile of opponents is often preferred to the favour of friends; but history is false, experience a lie, if the fruit of such weakness or treachery be not disappointment and contempt. It may answer a temporary purpose, but the triumph it achieves is the sure forerunner of defeat. Popular leaders can only live on popular support; and Lord John Russell may yet learn to rue the folly which leads him to trifle with his surest and most confiding friends. They merited other things at his hands; and when the hour of retribution comes, he will

have nothing to reflect on but his own suicidal madness. Indications have been rife for some years past of the breaking up of the once formidable Whig party. It has outlived its day, and will now go down to history, as having been shattered beyond repair by the stolid policy of a scion of the House of Bedford.

Quem Deus vult perdere
Prius dementat.

Before proceeding to our special object, we must briefly glance at one or two of the events which have occurred during the past month. The most remarkable of these is the conference which assembled at Crosby-Hall, London, on the 13th and following days of April. The meeting was convened by the Central Committee, and though the notice given was necessarily brief, and many of the parties invited had made arrangements to attend the Anti-State-Church Conference on the 4th of May, nearly five hundred delegates assembled from all parts of the country. The tone of the Conference was decided and very earnest, its views admitted of no question, and its proceedings were in general characterised by good temper and sound judgment. It comprised men of various shades of opinion, yet it was clear from the first that the views of Mr. Baines, and those of the Anti-State-Church Society were the cherished and earnest conviction of nearly all the delegates. No sentiments were so heartily responded to as those which repudiated the interference of the state with education, whether mental or religious. All were eager to move onward, fully aware of the difficulty of the undertaking, yet sensible of the claims of duty, and confident of ultimate triumph. We have witnessed former assemblies of the kind, but we never saw any composed as this was, of various and commonly dissociated sections of the dissenting body, which was so united or so earnest in the assertion of their distinctive principles. The most cautious were on this point amongst the most decided. Many of our number have hitherto been averse to agitation. Their taste and habits alike disincline them to it. The more quiet and retired duties of their profession have had stronger claims for them, and they shrunk, in consequence, from the arena of strife, with a sensitiveness which some mistook for unfaithfulness or timidity. But the government scheme has compelled a reference to first principles. Dissenters have been driven home by the force of circumstances to the great radical truth of religious voluntarism. State-churchism has been forced on their attention as a practical grievance, and the talk about abstract principles has been merged in a sense of wrong, an indignant protest against political truculency and ecclesiastical usurpation. Amongst other objections to the

ministerial scheme, it was unanimously resolved, on the motion of Dr. Vaughan,—

‘That, most especially, this Conference objects to the Government measure, as, in a new form, allying the State with religious institutions, and thus aggravating an evil, already of enormous magnitude and pressure, by the creation of a subsidiary Ecclesiastical establishment.’

We are not disposed to reflect on the past. It is as foreign from our hearts as it would be ungenerous and impolitic. It was not unnatural that some should stand aloof for a time, from such an organisation as the British Anti-State-Church Society. Perhaps it is well that the association has had to pass through a trying ordeal. The discretion, the integrity, the perseverance of its members have been put to the test, and they are now amply recompensed. We may err in our judgment, but it appears to us no trifling indication of good, that at such a juncture as the present, there should be in existence an organisation so adapted to the exigency of the case, and which has for some time past been obviously working itself into the confidence, and arraying on its behalf the suffrages of a rapidly-increasing number of the religious men of these realms. So far, at least, the views of the Conference recently assembled, were unequivocal.

On another point, for which we were not wholly prepared, an almost equal unanimity prevailed. This was evidenced in the adoption of the following resolution, which passed, we believe, with only two dissentients :

‘That, in the judgment of this Conference the unsatisfactory issue of the efforts which successive governments have made to extend their patronage of popular education, may be held to demonstrate the impossibility of their doing so with either benefit or safety ; and to afford decisive practical evidence in support of a principle which has already found strenuous advocates, and which this Conference now avows, namely, that it is not within the province of government to educate the people.’

Considering what has passed amongst us in former days on this subject, and the efforts which have recently been made on behalf of an opposite opinion, we were not prepared for such a result. It is, therefore, doubly gratifying, and we record it as such. That an assembly consisting of nearly five hundred, obviously unfettered in its discussions, loving freedom, and fully alive to the exercise of its rights, should, after an extended and most able exposition of the matter, have affirmed, with almost entire unanimity, ‘that it is not within the province of government to educate the people,’ is a cheering symptom of the healthful progress of the popular mind. The light may not yet

have penetrated St. Stephen's. It does not usually gain early admittance there. The atmosphere is too murky for it, and it must prevail around, and be found, not only in the studies of the learned, but in the workshops of the artizan, before it is permitted to illumine the region where party strife and ministerial patronage find their constant home. Senators and statesmen consequently remain unapprized of the startling fact with which common men are familiar, and even philosophical radicals affect to deny its existence, or derisively refer to the petitions in which it is affirmed. But here is historical evidence of it, a formal assertion by a deliberative body, representing the views of hundreds of thousands, of the principle which Mr. Macaulay and Mr. Roebuck unite in decrying. This is not the first time that great truths have found their birth-place within the precincts of dissent. English puritanism is rife with illustrations of the fact, and the time will come when some future Hume will bear reluctant but honourable testimony, to the value of the service which has just been rendered.

We are glad to find that the Conference was not content with a simple record of its protest. It was due to its own consistency, and obviously enforced by the requirements of the case, that it should look to the future. If the professions made and the resolutions adopted mean anything—and we are not unbelievers on this point—there is much to be done, and the time for doing it will speedily arrive. We are on the eve of a general election. The dissolution of the present house may not improbably be hastened, in order to prevent the opponents of the government scheme from strengthening themselves at the next registration, and it therefore became such an assembly to indicate the course which should be pursued by their constituents when called to exercise the elective franchise. The difficulty of giving practical expression to their views, and of avoiding, at the same time, the appearance of a threat to their members, was severely felt by many of the assembled delegates. For ourselves, we have little sympathy with this feeling. There are great questions, leading and vital principles, on which we never hesitate to require a distinct and formal pledge. It was so with catholic emancipation, with the reform bill, with the extinction of slavery, and with the abolition of the corn laws. We have, therefore, no scruple about requiring a pledge against state-churchism, which we deem a more serious evil than any that these measures contemplated, and only refer to the cautious and deliberate tone of the Conference, in order to give additional weight to the resolutions which were unanimously adopted on this vital question. These resolutions must not be regarded as expressive of the views of an ultra party merely. Our opponents will no doubt

endeavour to disparage them, as such, but they will only delude themselves by doing so, and will awaken to the truth when the hour of trial comes. The following resolutions were deliberately prepared, and we never witnessed a more entire and cordial support than they obtained from all sections of the Conference :—

‘That this Conference, believing the government measure to be a deadly blow, both at the civil liberties of the community and at the valued institutions and interests of Dissenters, will, together with those whom they represent, feel deeply aggrieved by the conduct of every member of the House of Commons who may support it, and will consider that support as disqualifying such members to represent in Parliament the friends of civil and religious liberty.

‘That it is the solemn conviction of this Conference that the circumstances of the times render it the bounden duty of all who value their civil and religious liberties as their best political birthright, and who justly regard with alarm the system of voting public money in aid of ecclesiastical purposes, as tending to establish an illicit and corrupt connexion between the government and the teachers of religion, detrimental alike to the freedom of opinion and to the interests of truth—to make it a condition of giving their support to any Parliamentary candidate that he will oppose all further grants of public money for such purposes.’

We shall take a future opportunity of directing attention to the vote given on this occasion by our liberal representatives, in order to show where the disqualification has been established, and shall, at the same time, essay to prove, what no competent judge will deny, that if this resolution be honestly applied, a large proportion of them will never return to St. Stephens as the representatives of their present constituents.

The latter resolution, it will be seen, stops short of the point to which we should go. It is, however, a hopeful symptom of the progress which has been made in the right direction, and we are willing to wait the course of events. For ourselves, we shall continue to labour as we have hitherto done, against state-churchism, as such, the past as well as the future, the existing as well as the projected. We protest against the union of the church with the state, and would have all voluntaries unite for its separation. It is not enough that no further grants be made, that no new encroachments be permitted. The existing connexion is essentially vicious, and against this we labour as the first duty which we owe to God and to our countrymen. We care not for the antiquity, the wealth, or the power of the establishment. These things are beside the question, and must not deter us from our mission. What would Luther have accomplished had he permitted the power of Rome or the threats

of the emperor to divert him from his course. 'I will repair thither,' said the intrepid reformer, to the friends who dissuaded him from appearing at Worms, 'though I should find there as many devils as there are tiles on the house tops.' We must possess the spirit of Luther if we would share his success. In the ecclesiastical establishments of these realms, we see an enormous evil, a crying wrong, a foul injustice done to our holy religion, and against this, therefore, *apart from all efforts at its extension*, we must protest and labour.

Another step taken by the conference has our most entire and hearty approval. The necessity for it has long been felt, and we regard it as one of the best features of these times, that it is beginning to engage attention. We refer to a parliamentary representation of our principles. Nothing of the sort has hitherto existed, and the fault has been with ourselves. We have been content to act as a subordinate section of a political party whose chiefs were inveterately hostile to our religious principles. The fear of division in the liberal camp has led to the suppression of our distinctive views, and we have consequently been left at every crisis of our history, without parliamentary advocates to expound and defend them. This was signally the case in the present instance. With the solitary exception of Mr. Bright, no one of our senators appeared to understand us, and but few to be disposed to do us justice. Our views were grossly mis-stated, and ungenerous advantage was taken of our absence to fasten on us charges which are false, or to attribute to us evils for whose correction we were the earliest and most zealous to labour. To the member for Durham the dissenting body is deeply indebted. Before a reluctant audience, he spoke the truth fearlessly and with discretion; did simple justice to our views, and has placed on record a vindication which, in its main points, was scarcely touched, much less refuted, by other speakers. The measure of dissenting forbearance is, however, at length full. The exigency of the case has compelled us to look it fairly in the face. Men were reluctant to do so. Party attachments and personal predilections stood in the way; and if our rulers had been wise, they would have avoided a policy which shut up all honest dissenters, to the adoption of a new and most significant course of action. The following resolution, adopted unanimously by the Conference, sufficiently indicates the change that has been wrought:—

'That seeing how imperfectly the principles of Protestant Dissenters are understood in Parliament, even by those to whose efforts they have been indebted for the redress of some of their practical grievances, and how liable they are to the introduction of measures in which those principles are utterly disregarded and set at nought,

the Conference cannot separate without earnestly recommending to liberal electors, the immediate adoption of well-considered means of securing the return to the House of Commons, of such candidates as not merely profess to hold sacred the claims of religious liberty, but also clearly understand what those claims imply.'

Before closing our remarks, we shall have occasion to notice the steps which have been taken to give effect to this vote, and therefore content ourselves at present with simply recording its adoption.

Another material fact in the history of this discussion, is the negociation which has been carried on with the Wesleyan methodists. We are somewhat reluctant to recur to this, as we cannot do so, without speaking in terms which may be deemed discourteous and condemnatory to the leaders of the methodist body. In our last number we intimated that the followers of John Wesley would be amongst the opponents of the government scheme. Our statement was not made lightly, and it becomes us to show how it has happened that their silence and inactivity have been secured. By the Minutes of Council, which were laid before the upper House by Lord Lansdowne, it was proposed, under certain regulations, to extend government aid to all schools in which the Holy Scriptures were daily read. The language used was general, and was understood by the government journals, and by all its advocates, to be designedly comprehensive, so as to include the schools of all religious denominations. It was so interpreted on every hand, and much empty praise was uttered on the alleged impartiality of the scheme. At length, however, it was discovered that a feeling existed extensively throughout the Wesleyan body against any grant of public money to Catholic schools, and that this feeling would mainly determine their opposition to the scheme. Now it was of importance to the success of the government, to prevent a conjunction of the Wesleyans with the other branches of the dissenting body; and a negociation was opened, through the medium of Lord Ashley, with a view of preventing such a consummation. The result of this negociation is now before the public, and we unhesitatingly affirm that it is dishonourable, in the last degree, to both the parties concerned. According to the explanation of the Premier, there exists a minute of 1839, which limits the grant of money to schools in which the *authorised* version is used, and therefore excludes, by necessary implication, the schools of catholics. We care not whether the word 'authorised' be used or not in the minutes of 1839. If the former be the case, then the omission of the term in the minutes of August and December, 1846, shows an intentional deviation in the projected course of

government; and if the latter, then the limited interpretation now put by the Premier on the minutes of 1846, betokens a policy which seeks to compass its sinister end, by pandering to one of the lowest and most disreputable passions which has survived to the nineteenth century. In either case, the interpretation is obviously an after thought, disgraceful to the ministers who adopted it, and infinitely contemptuous to the parties whom it was employed to cajole.

‘This whole transaction,’ says the ‘Morning Chronicle,’ ‘appears to us perfectly irreconcilable either with constitutional principle, or with the straightforwardness which we expect in public as in private affairs. We have not joined in the clamour against the jurisdiction entrusted to the Committee of Council. We believe that that body has hitherto usefully and honourably discharged its functions. But a practice such as we have described is a thing not to be endured in any public board. It adopts, if Lord John Russell has not fallen into some strange and unaccountable mistake, a regulation in 1839 of great importance. It does not lay that minute before Parliament. It puts forth another minute of a different tenor. The unpublished minute becomes utterly forgotten by those who passed it, as well as by the permanent Secretary of the Board. At the end of seven or eight years it is discovered, or remembered, and then, just at the critical time when it serves a political purpose, it is brought to light. Now we have seen in the case of the poor-law how one of the most important reforms of our time has been impaired, and even its existence jeopardised, by the misconduct of a central board. If a belief once gains ground that the Committee of Council can play fast and loose with its minutes in the way we have seen, nothing can save it from the fate of the poor-law commission.’—April 19th.

Had such a course been pursued by tory statesmen, there would have been some semblance of honour in it. We should have understood it as a revival of the narrow-mindedness and intolerance of their school, a reminiscence of their youth, a momentary homage rendered to the idol whose worship they had been compelled to abandon. But what shall we say of whig ministers who can thus tamper with religious liberty, and basely betray, for a temporary end, the cause to which they were solemnly pledged. Catholic emancipation was for many years the watch-word of their party, but here is a new disability Act propounded by Lord John Russell, and sanctioned by an overwhelming majority of the lower House. We have heard much of the consistency and honour of his lordship, but we hope, for very shame’s sake, that his panegyrists will henceforth omit these qualities from the catalogue of his virtues.

But it may be said, that none were deceived, and this is to some extent true. Government reserves to itself the right

of introducing a new minute on behalf of catholic schools, and will probably do so at no distant period. But, what then? To have pandered even for an hour to an effete 'No popery' cry, is inconsistent with the profession of his life, and identifies him with an ignoble and low-minded race of statesmen. In the meantime, what must be thought of the Wesleyan leaders? It was disgrace enough to have cherished a passion which enlightened and virtuous men of all other classes have long repudiated; but to have been cajoled in its indulgence, to have been shorn of their strength at the moment when they supposed themselves to be accomplishing a triumph, to have insured the very thing against which they protested, and that, too, by the means which they employed for its prevention; this was an instance of folly, of which the examples are happily rare, and which will bring with it no alleviation or comfort when the hour of exposure arrives. Of the Wesleyan body at large we would speak only in terms of respect. Its works and labour of love are manifold, and we have ever been foremost to acknowledge them. But we shall be greatly surprized if such an event as we have been reviewing, does not lead many of its members to doubt the wisdom of the constitution of their society, or, at least, to devise some methods by which they may be guarded from the disgrace and weakness consequent on the infatuated policy of a few leaders.

We come now to the debate on Lord John Russell's motion, and shall dismiss it with brief remark. It lasted for four nights, and presents few points on which an enlightened Englishman can rest with pleasure. His lordship's speech was characterised throughout by a cautious avoidance of the real question in dispute, a contemptuous depreciation of voluntary efforts, an ungenerous use of the past forbearance of political allies, a mean appeal to the lowest passions of his auditors, a gross mis-statement of the views of opponents, and a more than ordinary portion of aristocratic bitterness and hauteur. What will our readers think of the following passage, in which his lordship undertakes to give the substance of Mr. Baines's views on the educational wants of the lowest and most vicious portion of the community. To those who know Mr. Baines the grossness of the libel will be instantly apparent. To others we may say, that his whole life disproves the slander, and that the book from which the extract is given should have convinced the speaker of the falsehood of his commentary:—

'The amount of that passage,' said Lord Russell, after quoting from Mr. Baines, 'is that there is a large class of the people of this country who are to be found ordinarily in constant communication

with vice and familiarity with crime—who are bred up in ignorance, and live in the indulgence of brutal sensuality, and that to such a state they are to be left—that for them there are to be no means of education provided—that all exertions in that direction are to be omitted—that there is to be for them imprisonment, transportation, and the gallows, but that all the milder and softer means are to be withheld—that religion shall not be allowed to show her sacred self to them, and to guide the steps of their youth; and that the state shall not impart to them that knowledge and those habits of industry which would tend to improve their future lives and render them of advantage to the country. It is, in fact, to say that to such religious and secular knowledge must not be broached, or rather that it must be withheld, and that they are to be left in hopeless and helpless misery. To such a proposition I never can assent; and when that proposition comes as it does from a gentleman of intelligence, and connected with a denomination which has been most liberal in money and in toil on behalf of education, I must say it rather astonishes me, whilst it shows to what arguments those are obliged to have recourse who oppose a scheme like this, which holds out a prospect of a better education for those unfortunate persons.'

And this statement was cheered by honourable members, on whom it devolved to legislate for the nation. Alas! on what days are we fallen, that our representatives should mistake for facts what the merest tyro out of doors would denounce as a gross caricature. But so it is. Education should commence in St. Stephens before the nation is wronged by such schemes as the present. The ministerial motion was met by an amendment on the part of Mr. Thomas S. Duncombe, the terms of which were to the following effect:—

'That previous to any grant of public money being assented to by the House for the purpose of carrying out the scheme of National Education, as developed in the minutes of the Committee of Council on Education in August and December last, which minutes had been presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of her Majesty, a select committee be appointed to inquire into the justice and expediency of such scheme, and its probable annual cost; also to inquire whether the regulations attached thereto, do not unduly increase the influence of the crown, invade the constitutional functions of parliament, and interfere with the religious convictions and the civil rights of her Majesty's subjects. The committee to report their opinion, with the evidence to the House.'

It is due to the member for Finsbury to state that he gave notice of this amendment on his own responsibility, and without communication with the Central Committee or the Dissenting Delegates. It is the more honourable to Mr. Duncombe that it should have been so, and the country is indebted to him for the

service he has rendered. He acted as an independent member of the Commons House, and exposed, with considerable acuteness and ability, the hollowness and chicanery of the scheme.

The member for Edinburgh followed, and added another splendid proof to the many already furnished, of his power to evade the real merits of a case on which he pronounces oracular judgment. We readily admit the oratorical power of Mr. Macaulay, and are not insensible of the felicity and splendour with which his thoughts are frequently arrayed, yet we know no man of note and high pretension, whose ratiocination more frequently fails to embrace the real points of a question, or to sound the depths of its philosophy. We are perpetually reminded of the mere advocate; the professional debater is before us; we see and hear a man whose oratory has commended him to the patronage of the Whigs, and given him importance in the senate. In the present case there was much of this. What had been done for education, the progress really made in training the public mind, was only glanced at to leave a most inadequate impression of it on his auditors; the violations of public peace from the riots of 1780 to those of Newport, were adduced as triumphant proofs of the necessity of state interference, and this, too, in immediate connexion with allusions to America, as the place where religious voluntarism is seen in connexion with state education; and the plea of conscience was slurred over with fallacies too shallow to mislead even superficial minds. Mr. Macaulay ought to have known better; the moral of the man should have restrained the advocate from purchasing a petty triumph by so ungenerous a perversion of the views of others, as is contained in the following passage. By the 'theory' denounced, allusion is obviously made to the views now prevalent amongst dissenters, and no one knew better than Mr. Macaulay that there is not a man amongst them who would not protest against the interpretation put on their principles. But such is the return ordinarily dealt out by the men whom they have mainly contributed to place in their present seats of power:—

'This new theory of government,' said the member for Edinburgh, 'may at least claim the merit of originality. It signifies this, as I read it, if it signifies any thing—all men have hitherto misconceived the proper functions of government, which are simply those of a great hangman. The principle on which they are bound uniformly to model their conduct is to do nothing except by harsh and degrading means. From all humane means, which operate by exalting the intellectual character—by disciplining the passions—by purifying man's moral nature—government is to be peremptorily excluded. The only means which are to be at their disposal are those of phy-

sical force—of the lash, the gibbet, and the musket, and of the terror which those dreadful instruments evoke. The statesman who wields the destiny of an empire is to look calmly on while the population of cities and towns is hourly increasing. He knows that on the moral and intellectual culture of the great bulk of that population the prosperity of the country, nay more, perhaps the very foundations of the state, may depend; but no matter, he is not to dream of such a thing as operating on their moral and intellectual nature. He dares not attempt it. He may build barracks as many as he pleases; he may parade bayonets and ordnance to overawe them if he dread their appeal to violence, but of educating them he must not dream. The same things occurs in the rural districts. He may see, and shudder as he sees, the rural population growing up with as little Christianity, as little civilization, as little enlightenment as the inhabitants of New Guinea; but no matter, he is not to interfere. He must wait till the incendiary fires are blazing—till repeated attempts are made on the machinery of the district—till riots occur such as disgraced this country in 1830 and 1831; and then begins his business, which is simply to hang, imprison, or transport the offenders. He sees seminaries for crime arising on all hands around him—seminaries which are eagerly attended by the youth of the population, but he must not endeavour to allure them from those haunts. He may have a thorough conviction on his own mind, that if he were to offer the means of wholesome instruction to those youths, a very great number of them would be drawn away from vice and induced to dedicate their lives to an honourable purpose, but he dare not make the experiment. He must look calmly on with folded arms, and suffer those to become the cancers of the state who might have been made its power and its strength. He must remain inactive till the harvest of crime is ripe, and then he must set about discharging the duties of his mission, which is to imprison one man, to hang another, and to send a third to the antipodes. If he venture to raise his voice against this system—if he venture to say that it is the duty of a government to try and make a people wiser and better, he is an enemy of human liberty, an oppressor of conscience, and ought not to be tolerated.’

There is a barefaced misrepresentation in this passage which would instantly have been exposed in any other English assembly. The whole spirit of it partakes of the nature of malignant caricature, for the men who denounce governmental interference with education—and if they are not referred to, the whole passage is a piece of miserable balderdash—do it avowedly on the ground, that so far is it from ‘exalting the intellectual character—by disciplining the passions, and by purifying man’s moral nature,’ that such interference is adapted to debase that character, to emasculate the national mind, and to diffuse over the region of knowledge and of morals some of the most noxious influences of which human nature is susceptible. It is because they so highly prize the advantages of education, that they are

concerned to bar out the government from its controul. They may be wrong in this, and if so, let their error be exposed; but in common fairness, let no mean advantage be taken of the ignorance or the prejudices even of honourable members. There is much which government may do. Let it relieve popular literature from the taxes which press upon it; let it abolish the newspaper stamp; let it equalize the burdens of the state so that the working man may be able to provide for his children the instruction required. When these things are done, the government advocate will be in a better condition to magnify the good intentions of our rulers. But such things bring with them no patronage, they yield no support to prerogative; and the ministers of the crown, 'wise in their generation,' prefer, therefore, a different scheme.

There is another point on which Mr. Macaulay is clearly at issue with his former self; but as we may be suspected of ultraism on this subject, we prefer adducing the strictures of a Whig journalist, who is far from sympathising with our objection to governmental interference with education:—

'With respect to the sanction and support of exclusive church schools,' says the 'Morning Chronicle,' 'not in a few 'poorer districts,' but in some thousands of parishes, where they will be the only schools, without any attempt to obtain protection for the rights of minorities, the right honourable gentleman spoke thus:—

'With respect to another objection which has been made with regard to the establishment of schools in the poorer districts, I admit there may be some difficulty for some time in supplying education to such districts; and the subject has engaged the most anxious thoughts of the committee of education. But if, in a district, the interests of 900 and those of 100 come in competition, we must consider the former in preference to the latter. That may be objectionable, but you cannot tell me there is any violation of religious principles even in this case, which I feel to be the most objectionable part of the plan. If the district can only support one school, and if that school be given to the church (there being a majority of churchmen), you do not take away from the dissenter any thing he has, but you add to the efficiency of the national school; and I hope that the dissenters and nonconformists of this country will prove themselves, when a little momentary irritation is over, not only Nonconformists but Englishmen and Christians.'

'How Mr. Macaulay would crush these flimsy fallacies at a blow if they were flung in his way by an opponent! He knows well that the interests of the nine hundred and those of the one hundred do not come into competition. He knows that the greater number might be educated strictly in their own creed, and yet the smaller number not shut out from the benefits of secular knowledge. He knows, and no doubt, like Lord John Russell, he approves of the

simple arrangement by which that might be effected. Why has he not insisted upon that arrangement as a condition of state aid? In sanctioning national schools without that condition in districts where they will be the only schools, or where through state help they will become the only schools, we are amazed to be told from such a quarter that there is no violation of religious principle—no injury to the rights of conscience. It does not 'take away from the dissenter anything he has.' This from the mouth, not of Sir Robert Inglis, but of Mr. Macaulay! It is worthy of being preserved as a specimen of the absurdities into which a vigorous mind will plunge in its desperate struggles to find a straight path through a labyrinth of error. What would Mr. Macaulay think if Lord Morpeth, either from love to the bishops, or for the exceeding pleasure of being in harmony with the Wesleyan committees, were to put a clause in the Sanitary Bill to confine the use of drains and sewers to persons of orthodox belief? That would not take away from the dissenter anything that he has. It would take a tax out of his pocket indeed, but then he has an interest in the drainage as well as in the education of his neighbours. It is clearly good for dissenters that refuse should not accumulate on the premises of churchmen who live near them; and at all events, as Englishmen and Christians, it would be wrong to resist a bill for making churchmen comfortable merely because it did not make dissenters comfortable also.'—April 21.

To Mr. Bright's speech we have already referred. It was all which could be desired; and we trust the time is not distant when he will find within the walls of St. Stephen cordial and able supporters. 'I am sensible,' said the honourable member, in rising, 'that I have to defend men and principles which are not popular in this assembly. Nevertheless, being one of the nonconformist body of this country, and being by birth, education, observation, and conviction, fully established in the opinions I hold, I am bound, though it may be in opposition to a government sitting on the same side of the house as myself, to protest against the policy and principles now offered for the adoption of the House.' This avowal was frank and manly, and honourably contrasts with the miserable evasions to which others have stooped. It is easy to boast of our dissenterism in the midst of associates, but it is another thing, and distinguishes a man of higher mark, to do so, amidst the scions and supporters of the hierarchy.

The Premier, as we have already noticed, made ungenerous use of the forbearance of his dissenting allies. They were taunted with the support they had formerly yielded to views which they now denounced. This was to be expected. We are not surprised at it, nor are we disposed to deny that we have been wrong in the matter. Our objection should have been taken in 1839, or rather in 1833; and had our views prevailed,

it would have been so. The inconsistency, however, is not such as Lord John Russell and his supporters allege. Mr. Bright has fairly traced this portion of our history, and we commend the following passage of his speech to the consideration of our detractors :—

‘ The noble lord at the head of the government objected to the dissenters that they had supported the committee of Privy Council in 1839, whilst they opposed it in 1847 ; that they were then in favour of this interference, and are now opposed to it. I admit that many, or at any rate some, of the dissenters were in favour of it eight years ago. But we have had some experience from 1839 to 1847. At that time the dissenters regarded the institution of the committee of Privy Council as a step leading away from that power which the church of England wished to usurp, of being able to educate the whole people ; and the dissenters hoped we were on the road, at last, to overcome those pretensions which the church of England had so long asserted, that she was called upon and bound to undertake the business of education, and that she ought to be entrusted with the education of the people. But from 1839 to this year we have found no step taken by the government which has not had for its tendency the aggrandisement of the established church. In 1839, the noble lord proposed a scheme which, from the opposition of the established church and the Wesleyans, was withdrawn. In 1843, the right honourable baronet, the late Secretary for the Home Department (Sir James Graham), proposed a scheme of education in connexion with the Factories Bill—a scheme which was thought by everybody to give undue power to the established church, and which, in consequence of the opposition of the dissenters, was withdrawn. In 1847, the noble lord comes forward with another scheme. It has the same defect ; its object, tendency, and inevitable result will be to give enormous and increased power to the clergy of the established church. It is a scheme of which the dissenters cannot avail themselves, in accordance with the principles by which they are dissenters, and, therefore, they were bound now to step forward and protest against this as against the former schemes. And I wonder not they have come to the conclusion that it is dangerous to them as members of dissenting bodies, and dangerous also to the civil liberty of the people, that the state should interfere with education, since you appear not to be able to interfere without giving increased power to the clergy of an already dominant church.’

Mr. Bright did justice—and this we regard as the crowning merit of his speech—to the religious scruples with which the government scheme is regarded. It is easy for honourable senators to scoff at these ; to brand them with opprobrious epithets, or to represent them as the offspring of feeble-mindedness and sectarian bigotry. Of one thing they afford ample evidence, when they undertake to speak of conscience and

religion. These matters are foreign from their minds. They do not, they cannot comprehend them. Conscientiousness is bigotry, and a deep conviction of the sacredness of religion an assumption of infallibility, or the pride of pharisaism. Such language as the following must have sounded strange to our modern senators, while to us it recalls some of the brightest passages of our parliamentary history :—

‘ Just recollect, when the whole of the nonconformists are charged with clamour, what they mean by being nonconformists. They object, as I understand, at least I object, to the principle by which the government seizes hold of public funds to salary and support the teachers of all sects of religion, or of one sect of religion, for I think the one plan nearly as unjust as the other. Either the nonconformists hold this opinion, or they are making a sham. They object to any portion of the public money going to teachers of religion belonging either to the established church or to dissenting bodies; they object to receive it for themselves. They find certain minutes infringing on this principle. You wish to establish a system by which the young persons of the country shall be trained to certain religious tenets. In your church schools we are to have the catechism taught, and the liturgy taught, as well as the scriptures read. All this is to be done under the cognizance and supervision of the clergyman of the parish. The children are to be examined by the clergymen, and by inspectors appointed by the government, who are also to be clergymen of the church of England. The minutes do not say so, but under the compact entered into by the government with the church, they can appoint no inspector who is not palatable to the Archbishop of Canterbury. The inspector must be discharged if the archbishop express an opinion unfavourable to him. Of course this is in church of England schools only. I admit that the noble lord will not carry it the length of proposing this for dissenting schools, he will not venture to do so. We are not so humiliated as that. No government in this country durst attempt to carry that into effect; but if you had the power to carry out the spirit expressed in the minutes, I say the dissenting schools would not be free from interference by the clergymen of the state church. I am prepared to contend that the powers given by these minutes to the clergymen examiners are calculated to give a great increase of power to all the clergymen of the established church. They are made public officers with respect to schools. Now, the vicar of the parish enters the schools, and inquires about the children, but he has no more power than any other gentleman who may choose to visit and do the same. But by your minutes you empower him to enter under the authority of an inspector, who, by your compact with the church, can only be a clergyman of the established church. I say these clergymen and inspectors are prone to meddle with everything. They will go there and examine the children in their books; they will interrogate the teachers as to their methods and their learning. Do you think,

if they find a child whose brother or sister goes to a dissenting chapel, the clergyman will not be zealous enough to use his influence to induce him to attend the church? This would be only of a piece with the conduct observed in other respects. It is notorious, that in all parts of England, charities never intended to be used for the promotion of particular religious opinions, but which are in the hands of the established church, are distributed with a view to the effect they may have in bringing an increase of attendance to the national schools or the established churches. I know numbers of these cases myself; and I know that a child who did not bow down to the church, or who refused to go to a national school, would find himself placed under the ban of the clergyman. All the inducements to him, you vaunt of, to rise in the world, and gain an honourable station in society, would be merely as the idle wind that blows, and would be of no avail whatever to obtain for him an honourable place in life. If anything were wanted to show the effect of these minutes, look at the triumphs your propositions have excited among the members of the established church, and the clergy especially. Was there ever a good and beneficial measure for nonconformists proposed that was received with an exulting shout of gratulation by the honourable baronet below me (Sir R. H. Inglis), by the bishops, and by all the clergy of the kingdom? I am wrong, perhaps, as regards the honourable baronet; he did not loudly exult, but he took the measure meekly, he took it thankfully. I acknowledge that the church is thankful for everything it can get, and it never loses anything for want of asking for it. I confess I am astonished that churchmen throughout the country—I do not speak of the clergy, but the laity—have supported this measure, because I think they are as much interested as the dissenters in opposing any extension of power on the part of the clergy. Nothing tends more to impede the progress of liberty, nothing is more fatal to independence of spirit in the public, than to add to the powers of the priesthood in matters of education. If you give them such increased powers by legislative enactment, you do more than you could effect by any other means to enslave and degrade a people subject to their influence.'

Mr. Duncombe's amendment was, of course, negatived by a large majority, and the one subsequently moved by Sir William Clay, that 'It is expedient that in any plan for promoting the education of the people by pecuniary assistance from the state, provision should be made that in schools receiving such assistance the opportunity of participating in all instruction, other than religious, should be afforded to children whose parents may object to the religious doctrines taught in such schools,' was rejected by a majority of 210 to 74.

So far respecting the past. Let us now turn to the future. The ministerial scheme has been sanctioned by the lower House,

and one hundred thousand pounds have been voted towards carrying it into effect. What now will dissenters do? Their professions are before the nation. Authoritative expositions of their principles have been given on various occasions, and with the utmost publicity; and even those of their number who admit, under certain limitations, the right and expediency of government interference, have yet joined with their brethren in denouncing the present scheme as a gross violation of religious liberty, and a wrong to 'tender consciences.' So far, therefore, all are agreed. The exceptions are too inconsiderable to be named. In the large delegation which met at Crosby Hall not an individual was found who did not condemn the government measure on grounds which preclude reception of its aid. So obvious is the position to which we are committed, that our opponents exult in the prospect of our relinquishing our schools or forfeiting our character; the one by refusing the government grant—the other, by accepting it. So far as the latter alternative is concerned, we are not disposed to deny the truth of their averment. On the contrary, we agree with it. It is clearly deducible from what has passed, and we shall be covered with disgrace, shall become a by-word and reproach amongst all honourable men, if our practice do not illustrate and enforce the professions we have made. Mr. Bright was right when he affirmed, that 'It must be clear to those who know the history and understand anything of the principles of non-conformity, that any nonconformist who takes one sixpence of this grant for the purpose of teaching the tenets of his particular sect can never afterwards, with any show of consistency and good faith, say one syllable against the domination and usurpation of the established church.'

Are dissenters then prepared for this? Now that the season of talking has passed, will they address themselves to action in simplicity and earnestness? Has their past conduct justified confidence in their doing so? These are grave questions, and we would not treat them lightly. We have not been amongst the flatterers of dissenters in former times, but have rebuked their half-heartedness and short-comings, whenever occasion required it. We have done this from no bitterness, but in sorrow and from what we deemed, a sense of duty; and may therefore take credit for sincerity, when we avow the conviction that they are now better prepared than ever to act out their convictions with enlightened fidelity. The case, it must be admitted, is a trying one. In many instances it will press most heavily, and test principle to the utmost. This will be felt in the agricultural districts especially, and our brethren inhabiting such parts of the kingdom must have our sympathy and aid. The wondrous

elasticity and manifold powers of the voluntary principle must instantly be evolved. The rich must help the poor, and the whole strength of dissent be concentrated on the point of attack. For one thing, however, we must be prepared. The present measure will act as a test, and will serve to withdraw from our ranks those who are not thoroughly with us in our principles. We do not deem this an evil. It may diminish our numbers, but it will increase our strength. What is lost in bulk will be gained in weight. Those who are dissenters in name only, will readily find excuse for relieving themselves at the cost of the exchequer. Under various pleas they will apply for, and speedily obtain, the pay of government; and when once the forbidden fruit has been tasted, the criminal appetite will become insatiable. For so much we are prepared, and its occurrence therefore will awaken no surprise. But the main body of dissent will continue, we verily believe, sound-hearted and faithful. It is pledged to do so. Self-respect requires it, and the high consideration of religious duty, clearly recognized and repeatedly avowed, leaves honest men no alternative. Let no dissenters, then, accept the proffered bribe. Better anything than this. We have faith in God whilst faithful to his truth, but dare not look up to him for good if we tamper with its sacred interests. At all hazard and at every cost, they must decline to be parties to this fresh aggression on their religious liberties. 'Upon their doing so depend consequences too important to be contemplated without the gravest possible concern. Should they fail, their conscience will be defiled, their principles compromised, their good name tarnished, the very essence of their protest against 'spiritual wickednesses in high places' eaten out, and their heart and power to seek its removal effectually destroyed. It is the hour of their temptation. They are placed upon their moral probation. No common subtilty and force of evil assails them. And if, deeming it 'good for food, pleasant to the eye, and to be desired to make one wise,' they should partake of the fruit of the professed tree of knowledge, they will prove it, and mayhap their posterity with them, to be the tree of DEATH.*

So far our cause is clear; nor is the next step less obvious. Had dissenters been sufficiently alive in past times to the importance of a parliamentary representation of their principles, the ministers of the day would not have ventured on the course they have pursued. They measure our strength by our parliamentary force, and deem us no further entitled to respect than as we are able to influence the votes of the Commons House.

* 'Nonconformist,' April 21st.

Judging according to this rule, we are not surprised at the contemptuous indifference with which we have been treated. Let us now learn from our opponents. A general election is at hand. It will probably take place during the summer, and we must be prepared to carry our question to the hustings. The old distinctions of Whig and Tory must be lost sight of, and religious liberty, *in its large and enlightened sense*, must be our rallying cry. In the first place, it becomes dissenters to withhold their support from all those candidates whose names are found in the ministerial majority. They are clearly disqualified in the language of the Crosby Hall delegates, 'to represent in parliament the friends of civil and religious liberty,' and no local interest or party consideration must induce our brethren to vote on their behalf. Whatever be the result, we must abide by this purpose. So far as our principles are concerned, there is no difference between the followers of Lord John Russell and those of Sir Robert Peel, and we must not, therefore, be scared from our rightful course by any apprehension of the electoral success of the latter. From our political friends we have received greater wrong than our opponents have inflicted for the last fifty years, and the best lesson we can teach them is to withhold the power of doing us further injustice. They can understand this argument, and they care not about any other. We wait to see whether the dissenting electors of London, Edinburgh, Devonport, and other places, are equal to the crisis which has arrived.

But beyond this we must seek a parliamentary representation of our principles. Mr. Bright must not stand alone. We must send into the House—and our numbers, intelligence, and wealth enable us to do so—men who understand and value our principles, and who are equal to their advocacy. We do not underrate the value of wealth and social status. Wherever these are found in unison with the higher qualities required, let them by all means be retained. Such men are needful in such an assembly as the Commons House to give weight and importance to the representatives of any principle. But let not our attention be limited to such. There is another class which should be associated with them; men of transparent rectitude and of clear intellects, conversant with public life, of free speech, and of intense devotion to religious voluntaryism. Such men may become the teachers of the nation through the medium of the debates of parliament, and, if equal to the post, would ultimately command the attention of the House from the power they exercised without it. The two classes are alike needful, and would work in perfect harmony. We rejoice that a parliamentary committee has been formed for the purpose of promot-

ing this most desirable issue, and shall take an early opportunity of calling attention to its labours. At present we must content ourselves with stating, that it was formed on the last day of the Crosby Hall conference by the following resolution :—

‘That, in order to promote the practical efficiency of the resolutions of this conference on the subject of the formation of a central committee, with respect to the ensuing general election, the members of the conference now present, as many as consent thereto, do forthwith resolve themselves into such committee, with power to add to their number.’

This committee has had a preliminary meeting, and its members, with other gentlemen interested in the subject, are to be called together in London on the 7th of May. This is a practical movement which has our entire concurrence, and towards which we direct the confidence of all our dissenting readers. We should be glad to urge at some length the co-operation of all hearty friends to our cause, but our space and time are exhausted, and we must therefore adjourn to a future number many things which we are desirous of saying.

Brief Notices.

Tales of the Reformation. By Anne Maria Sargeant. London: Dean & Co.

ALTHOUGH these are *tales* they are nevertheless *true* stories. Imagination does her part, but she only leads the way with very modest mien, to the discovery of truth ; which is of great importance,—for story without truth is fable.

Our youth, now, *must* study the Reformation : and here is a most lovely book to assist them. We heartily commend it to their thoughtful perusal. It is written with remarkable discrimination, impartiality, and clearness. Perfectly free from that curse of controversy—venom—it is as guileless as a dove ; and presents a beautiful specimen of healthy protestantism, neither morbid nor rabid. Moreover, it is written with that inimitable *finiment* peculiar to woman, which we of the rougher sort cannot even approach.

We are not surprised to find the first edition of *Tales of the Early British Christians* is gone ; doubtless, *Tales of the Reformation* will very soon follow it. We hope the author will then favour us with *Tales of the Commonwealth*.

Patria. France, Ancient and Modern; Moral and Material; or a complete Statistical Collection of Facts respecting the Physical and Intellectual History of France and its Colonies. By J. Aigard, F. Bourquelot. 2 vols, 8vo. Paris: 1847.

It is understood that Ministers mean to propose to parliament the foundation of a Statistical department in London. The design is a most important one. Legislation, administration, and public opinion depend upon the abundance and good arrangement of the facts which form the business of life, and the active movement of society. The complete collection and marshalling of these facts constitute the science termed statistics.

The French are our teachers in this science; and this little work, *Patria*, is an excellent illustration of the usefulness of what the French government has been doing during many years, in order to bring the statistics of France and its colonies into shape. These two convenient volumes contain an able summary of the fruits of that labour. The geography, geology, and climate of France are given in good maps; its plants, and zoology in drawings; its public works, its navigation, its trade, in well arranged tables. Full details are supplied of government, legislation, and administration in all branches. Education, medical science, population, general history, the army, the navy, the prisons, and the colonies are examined with great care.

The work is an invaluable manual upon French affairs; and well worth studying in reference to the plan about to be adopted for a statistical department in Whitehall.

The National Cyclopædia of Useful Knowledge. 8vo. Par's I to III. London: Charles Knight.

OF *The Penny Cyclopædia* we need not say one word. The extensive circulation it has obtained is founded on its acknowledged merits, and affords gratifying evidence of the sound judgment of our countrymen. In the progress of the work its limits were greatly enlarged, and its extent and cost, now that it is finished, place it beyond the reach of many for whose benefit it was projected. Mr. Knight has, therefore, wisely resolved to re-issue the substance of the work in a new and cheaper form, and the nature and mode of the publication will be best learnt from the following extract from his prospectus:—

‘What ‘*The Penny Cyclopædia*’ failed in doing with reference to the great body of the people, can now be accomplished, with an absolute certainty, by the proprietor of that work. He can produce, by a careful condensation of its vast materials, with the addition of all progressive information that the lapse of time demands, a Cyclopædia for the nation, of the most extensive interest and utility. He can do this at a price which precludes all competition, for no similar copyright materials exist for the production of a new Cyclopædia, whose popularity shall be founded upon the acknowledged excellence of the sources from which it will be derived;

he can do this within the most definite limits, as regards quantity of matter and time occupied in publication.

'The Penny Cyclopædia,' including its 'Supplement,' consists of twenty-nine volumes, extending to 15,500 small folio pages; it has occupied fourteen years in completion. 'The National Cyclopædia' will consist of twelve volumes, demy octavo, of more than 500 pages each; the whole quantity somewhat exceeding what was proposed in 1832 as the limits of 'The Penny Cyclopædia,' and at a still lower comparative price. Each volume will consist of four parts, published monthly at 1s. each, the entire number of parts being forty-eight, and the total cost about one-fourth of the 'Penny Cyclopædia.' It will also be published in weekly numbers at 3d., forming 192 numbers. A volume will be published every four months, strongly bound, for 5s. The time occupied in the publication will be four years.

'These conditions of publication are founded upon exact calculation—so exact that the publisher here pledges himself, if the National Cyclopædia should exceed forty-eight shilling parts, or 192 threepenny numbers, to present the quantity in excess, without charge, to every subscriber who has taken the preceding series of parts or numbers.

'The 'National Cyclopædia' will be illustrated with many hundred woodcuts, upon a small scale, engraved for the work.'

The first three numbers of the work are now before us, and we have great pleasure in recommending it most strongly to the favour of our readers. Young men, especially, will do well to possess themselves of it, and will find, in its rich stores, ample recompense for the money and the time expended in its purchase and perusal. The extensive circulation of such works is one of the best means of promoting the true progress of the public mind.

Home Influence ; a Tale for Mothers and Daughters. By Grace Aguilar. 2 vols. London: Groombridge & Co.

THE volumes before us are interesting in many ways, not only for their sound teaching and great talent, but from the fact that they are from the pen of a young Jewish lady.

Miss Aguilar's works have hitherto been addressed solely to her own people, although their broad and enlightened spirit made them equally applicable, and had they been so addressed, they would have been equally acceptable, to the Christian. In the preface to the present work she says that, 'as a simple domestic story, the characters in it are all Christians, believing in and practising that religion; all doctrinal points have been carefully avoided, the author seeking only to illustrate the spirit of true piety and the virtues always designated as the Christian virtues thence proceeding.' And most fully has the author realised her intentions. Truth, love, and obedience are the three great principles upon which she founds her ideas of education, and the superstructure which she presents is excellent.

As a work of fiction the faults all lie in the first volume, which we found somewhat heavy from the lengthened retrospect that is required to make the reader acquainted with the circumstances and

connexions of the family about which his sympathies are to be enlisted. This once overpassed, the story moves on easily and naturally, gathering about it a simple and yet intricate web of incident of such intense, not to say painful interest, as keeps the reader's attention at the utmost stretch. In parts the story is most powerfully written.

The true excellence of the work, however, is less its artistically arranged story, than its sound, healthy, moral tone. It is especially written for mothers and daughters, and to all such we most cordially and entirely recommend it. The character of the mother is one of the most beautiful we ever met with, and yet not too beautiful for human nature. It is a model which every mother may study with advantage.

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1. *The French Prompter, a complete Hand-book of Conversation for the Use of Travellers on the Continent.*
 2. *Petit Musée de la Litterature Francaise, elegant Extracts from the most Eminent Writers of France.* By M. Lepage. London: Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange.

THE first of these two works deserves an unqualified approbation, and we readily recommend it to the public, and especially to travellers in France, as the best companion and assistant they can obtain, before starting for their peregrinations. No publications of the same kind can be compared to this one, which, we have no doubt, will readily obtain a very extensive sale. But while we are bound, in justice, to compliment M. Lepage on his laborious and eminently useful performance, we conscientiously cannot speak, in the same terms of his *Petit Musée*. Like all compilations of the same character published in this country, by French masters, this one contains extracts taken at random, or certainly selected without taste and without judgment. For students, they are dry, uninteresting, and unintelligible sometimes; even worse than that, as in the fifty pages taken from *Gil Blas*. For persons at all acquainted with French literature, they are stale, common place, worthless. This book-making is too prevalent among French teachers, and ought not to be encouraged, at the expense of the public.

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